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ABSTRACT
Systems and attacks are becoming more complex, and classical cyber security methods
are failing to protect and secure those systems. We believe that systems must be built
to be resilient to attacks. Cyber resilience is a dynamic protection strategy that aims
to stop cyber attacks while maintaining an acceptable level of service. The strategy
monitors a system to detect cyber incidents, and dynamically changes the state of the
system to learn about the incidents, contain an attack, and recover. Thus, instead
of being perfectly protected, a cyber-resilient system survives a cyber incident by
containing the attack and recovering while maintaining service.
Cyber resiliency has the potential to secure the modern systems that control our
critical infrastructure. However, several practical and theoretical challenges hinder
the development of cyber-resilient architectures. In particular, an architecture needs
to support and make use of a large amount of monitoring; the problem is especially
serious for a large network in which hosts send low-level information for fusion. The
problem is not only computational; the semantics of the data also creates a challenge.
In combining information from multiple sources and across multiple abstractions, we
need to realize that the sources are describing different events in the system which
are occurring at varying time scales.
Moreover, the system is dependent on the integrity of the monitoring data when
estimating the state of the system. The estimated state is used to detect malicious
activities and to drive responses. The integrity of the monitoring data is critical
to making “correct” decisions that are not influenced by the attacker. In addition,
choosing an appropriate response to specific attacks requires knowledge of the at-
tackers’ behavior, i.e., an attacker model. If the attacker model is wrong, then the
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responses selected by the mechanism will be ineffective. Finally, the response mecha-
nisms need to be proven effective in maintaining the resilience of the system. Proving
such properties is particularly challenging when the systems are highly complex.
In this dissertation, we propose a resiliency architecture that uses a model of the
system to deploy monitors, estimates the state of the system using monitor data, and
selects responses to contain and recover from attacks while maintaining service. Then
we describe our design for the essential components of the said resiliency architecture
for a multitude of systems including operating systems, hosts, and enterprise net-
works, to address lateral movement attacks. Specifically, we have built components
that address monitor design, fusion of monitoring data, and response. Our pieces
address the challenges that face cyber-resilient architectures.
We set out to provide resilience against lateral movement. Lateral movement is a
step taken by an attacker to shift his or her position from an initial compromised host
into a target host with high value. First, we designed a host-level monitorKobra that
generates different estimations of the state of a host. Kobra combines the various
aspects of application behavior into multiple views: (1) a discrete time signal used
for anomaly detection, and (2) a host-level process communication graph to correlate
events that happen in a network. We use the host correlations to generate chains of
network events that correspond to suspicious lateral movement behavior. We use a
novel fusion framework that enables us to fuse monitoring events for different sources
over a hierarchy. Finally, we respond to lateral movement by changing the topology
and healing rates in the network. The changes are enacted by a feedback controller
to slow down and stop the spread of the attack.
Since our cyber resiliency architecture depends on the integrity of the monitoring
data, we propose PowerAlert, an out-of-box integrity checker, to establish the
“trustworthiness” of a machine. PowerAlert is resilient to attacker evasion and
adaptation. It uses the current drawn by the CPU, measured using an external
probe, to confirm that the machine executed the check as expected. To prevent an
attacker from evading PowerAlert, we use an optimal initiation strategy, and to
resist adaptation, we use randomly generated integrity-checking programs. We pick
the optimal initiation strategy by modeling the problem of low-cost integrity checking
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when an attacker is attempting to evade detection as a continuous-time game called
Tireless. The optimal strategy is the Nash equilibrium that optimizes the defender’s
cost of checking and utility of detection against an adaptive attacker.
iv
To the wretched of the Earth.
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“Everybody has a plan until they get hit.”
- Mike Tyson, 1987
Computer systems are managing many aspects of our lives, including critical in-
frastructure, communication, finance, and health care. Those computers enable better
control of systems, enabling more efficiency while promising reliability and safety [22];
researchers project that self-driving cars, for example, will reduce traffic fatalities by
90 percent [74], a reduction of 300, 000 fatalities in the United States over a decade.
However, in reality, security is elusive and often disrupted by new exploits and attacks.
Over time, the attacks are becoming more sophisticated, targeted, and stealthy [128].
The damage due to malicious attacks will no longer be limited to cyberspace; it will
extend to the physical space, causing harm to human life [37, 124, 50, 82]. It is ironic
that the technology that is supposed to save human lives creates new, and perhaps
easier, ways to harm them.
Currently, administrators’ typical defense strategy is to protect systems by deploy-
ing static prevention measures against predefined attacks that are updated when new
attacks are discovered [108]. This strategy employs a cycle of after-the-fact attack
discovery and future prevention. Alas, the security game is a losing one; attackers
are faster at targeting systems than we are at finding vulnerabilities and patching
discovered exploits [24]. It is cheaper for an attacker to target a system than for a
defender to protect it [134]. Moreover, the complexity of the system makes the job of
prevention particularly hard, and the static nature of the defenses allows the attacker
to adapt and come up with new techniques to subvert the system.
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In practice, our security defense strategy is failing; despite all the effort put into
protection, systems are still getting compromised [24, 128]. To adequately address
our vulnerability, we propose a paradigm shift in protection through cyber resilience.
The resiliency strategy considers compromises inevitable; it moves to detect attacks
and devises methods to control a compromise while maintaining an acceptable level
of service [145, 101, 18].
Cyber resilience, as a strategy, does not attempt to protect a system by perfectly
preventing attacks; instead, it assumes that a system is bound to be compromised
and seeks to ensure that the system survives and eventually recovers. Specifically, in
this dissertation, we consider a cyber-resilient system that continuously monitors the
state using sensors, fuses the information and attempts to locate malicious activity,
adapts/reconfigures the system to contain the malicious activity while maintaining
service, and finally restores the system to a secure state. In doing so, we address
the issues of designing cyber resilience into systems. Specifically, we propose a set
of schemes that target the problem of monitor design, monitoring fusion, response,
and trust. They target protection at the host level and the network level for different
types of threats.
1.1 Cyber Resilience
Cyber resilience is a protection strategy that attempts to maintain an acceptable level
of service possible despite cyber attacks. Cyber resilience predicts, realistically, that
attacks cannot be perfectly prevented. For example, users will continue to misuse the
system, or unknown vulnerabilities will be exploited. The alternative to leaving the
system unprotected is to adapt the system during attacks to contain an attacker and
maintain service until the system recovers.
While cyber resilience is inspired by fault tolerance, fault tolerance strategies alone
are not effective when one is targeting cyber attacks. In fault tolerance, failures are
assumed to be caused by “random” independent faults due to physical properties
in the system. The faults do not adapt to the tolerance methods. On the other
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hand, a cyber attack performed by a human attacker can be expected to adapt to the
protection method. An adaptive attacker, as opposed to random faults, will attempt
to evade detection, change the attack method, or target the defense mechanism itself.
In the following, we describe the cyber resiliency architecture and explain the
systems we target and some of the challenges in our approach.
1.1.1 Architecture
The architecture for cyber resiliency implements the strategy for protection through
monitoring of the system and dynamic response to achieve resiliency goals. The
resiliency goals are determined by the designers based on the system to be protected.
The resiliency goals incorporate the need to minimize the amount of time a system
is compromised and maximize the services provided by the system. In a resilient
system, instead of taking the system offline once an attack is detected, the architecture
attempts to heal the system while keeping services online.
Based on the resiliency goals, sensors are deployed to monitor the state of the
system on all levels of abstraction. The data from multiple levels are fused to create
higher-level constructs (views) of the system. Those views aid in detecting attacks
and in identifying degradation in service performance. The response engine, using
the response strategy, determines the best course of action. The response actions
include changing the system to increase service, collecting more information to refine
the knowledge about the attacker model, and containing the attack to prevent further
damage. Finally, after detecting the attack, the resilience engine restores the system
to a secure state and patches the system where needed. Figure 1.1 shows the high-
level resiliency architecture. It shows the system with agents acting as monitors and





















Figure 1.1: Cyber resiliency architecture.
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1.1.2 System Model
We target multiple types of systems in this dissertation. Mainly we are interested
in enterprise networks, cloud systems, and smart meter deployments. Those systems
have unique architectures, service goals/requirements, and security requirements. We
intend for the work to be general; however, we selected those systems to make discus-
sions and some design decisions concrete. Nevertheless, the characteristics of those
three systems encompass the properties of other systems that we did not consider.
Enterprise System
An enterprise system consists of hosts and servers that belong to departments and
groups. The hosts and servers connect through a communication backbone for com-
munication and data access. Enterprise networks consist of a large number of com-
puters and devices with different operating systems and types. The system should
enable device interoperability while reducing the number/diversity of protocols and
applications.
An enterprise system has several services and security goals. End-to-end connec-
tivity and availability are the primary service goals of the system. The purpose of an
enterprise network is to provide connectivity between isolated users and workgroups
in the system. Moreover, an enterprise system has to keep servers and data storage
available at all times. Regarding security goals, an enterprise system has to keep
intellectual property, such as source code, confidential.
Cloud System
A cloud system is essentially a shared IT infrastructure; customers to a cloud service
would use a subset of the computation nodes to perform tasks or host services. Cloud
computing connects a massive number of consumer-grade servers, as opposed to highly
reliable servers, to create a pool of computation nodes. Virtualization is used to
isolate the different services and to maximize the usage of the bare-metal servers.
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By using virtualization, customers can easily scale up their computation. Moreover,
virtualization allows for easy reconfiguration; when servers fail, virtual machines are
migrated without interruption to service. The service goal in a cloud is to provide
the agreed-upon availability to the customers, while the security goal is to enforce
isolation between the virtual machines.
Smart Meter Deployment
Advanced metering systems use digital meters to measure usage of a service, such
as electricity, and send the measurements to a remote service for collection. Smart
electric meters are an example of the measurement devices. Smart meters are low-
energy devices that accurately measure power usage by a customer and report it back
to the utility. The smart meter provides the utility with a means to remotely connect
and disconnect service. It can also be used with a home area network, to reduce the
utility bill by utilizing instant pricing of power. Finally, a smart meter is equipped
with a battery to report service outages automatically. The service goal of the smart
metering deployment is the availability of the connectivity. The security goals have
to do with the integrity of commands and measurements.
1.1.3 Monitors
Designing a cyber-resilient system requires methods for monitoring the system at
all levels of abstraction. Monitors are software or hardware sensors placed on de-
vices to provide information about the events that occur in the system. Monitors
deployed within hosts collect information about the users, the operating system, and
the applications, while monitors deployed within switches and the router collect in-
formation about network events. Moreover, monitors could be deployed as dedicated
network-level intrusion detection systems.
Data captured from different monitors might describe the same event. Diversity
of monitoring increases confidence in the observed state of the system and makes it
harder for an attacker to hide her tracks. For example, a network communication
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event appears as a packet in a switch, a system call from the initiating host, and a log
entry at the application level. In this dissertation, we tackle the problem of designing
monitors that use diverse data sources and address the issue of monitor data trust.
1.1.4 Monitor Fusion
Monitor fusion is the process whereby monitoring data from a diverse set of sources
are combined. The data sources, deployed as monitors in the system, provide a
rich dataset that describes the events occurring in the system. The events reflect
the actions of the users in the system, applications, and potential malicious actors.
However, the monitoring data collected provide a low-level view of the events in the
system. Thus the data have to be fused to obtain a higher-level abstraction of the
events. However, the fusion process faces several challenges due to the massive size
of the data, the diversity of the semantics, and the limit on computational resources.
In this dissertation, we provide a fusion framework and use it to fuse host-level and
network-level information.
1.1.5 Response Selection
The response selection mechanism attempts to balance the need to learn more about a
possible attack, the need to contain an attack, and the need to maintain service. The
response selection algorithm selects a response from a set of available actions. The
algorithms use an attacker model and the current estimated state of the system to pick
an appropriate response. The strategy that the selection algorithm uses assumes that
the attacker is a player attempting to subvert the security measures in the system.
However, when information about the attacker is not available, the response selection
algorithm might opt to select an action to learn more about the attacker to make a
better decision in the future.
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1.1.6 Challenges
We face several challenges when designing a cyber resiliency architecture. We now
describe those challenges and how this dissertation’s contributions address them.
Data Scale
Monitor fusion has to process information from multiple hosts and devices to estimate
the state of the system. With systems spanning thousands of hosts and processing
billions of packets, the amount of data generated is massive and requires significant
computation resources to be exploited effectively. The challenge is even grater because
that information may come from sources at different levels of abstraction, such as host
data (system calls), network information (netflows), and intrusion detection systems
(IDS alerts). Consolidating the various types of information requires understanding
of how different data sources relate to each other. Finally, the fusion methods must
handle data with varying time resolutions; clocks from different sources are typically
unsynchronized, and even a clock on the same source drifts. In this dissertation, we
design methods for efficient and scalable data analysis that tolerates clock skews.
Data Trust
As the resiliency architecture uses agents to collect information and actuate responses,
it has to grapple with the possibility that the attacker will target the monitoring and
response infrastructure. We cannot blindly trust that the agents are well behaved.
While trust is a well-studied problem, it is especially important in this work because
we depend on the monitors to deliver accurate information that reflects the events
in the system, and we rely on the actuator to implement the responses with high
fidelity as prescribed by the response selection algorithm. Philosophically, trust is a
human relationship, in which a human, warranted or not, decides to rely on another
human [85]. We cannot place trust in inanimate objects such as data, hardware, or
software [117], since trust involves humans. Instead, we need to identify the human
8
actor in the trust relationship. The human actors are the user, attacker, program-
mer, and designer. In the monitoring problem, when we trust data coming out of
a compromised machine, that boils down to a decision to “trust” the attacker. We
either trust that the attacker does the right thing and does not alter logs and state
information, or trust that the attacker is not powerful enough to undermine our as-
sumption. In this work, we propose a system that verifies that agents have not been
tampered with, instead of placing trust in the attacker.
Attack Models
The response selection algorithms in the resiliency architecture use attacker models
when making decisions. In essence, the algorithms predict the attacker’s future moves
using the model in order to decide on responses. If the model is inaccurate or wrong,
then the response algorithm will be responding to the wrong threat. Attacker models
are typically learned using historical data collected from data sets and using expert
knowledge. However, there is a shortage of datasets that contain real attacker behav-
ior; even when data are available, we cannot guarantee that the attacker will hold to
old behavior patterns. In this dissertation, we design methods to learn attack models
in an online fashion.
1.2 Dissertation Contributions
It is our thesis that cyber resilience against lateral movement can be achieved using
validated, practical, and theoretically sound detection and response.
Starting with the host, we designed a low-overhead kernel-level monitor, Kobra,
without modifying operating system internals (a restriction in modern OSes). Kobra
collects low-level process events and fuses them to learn a behavior model using sparse
representation dictionary learning. We use the behavior model to perform anomaly
detection that has a low false positive rate and a high true negative rate.
Then, to detect lateral movement, we propose a scalable method to fuse host-level
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and network-level events. Each host-level monitor maintains a process communication
graph containing network connections, which is a fusion between network and host
information. The host-level state is abstracted as a network correlation. We combine
correlations over a hierarchy of agents to generate lateral movement chains. After
detecting lateral movement behavior, we design a response and recovery engine that
stops the spread of an attacker while maintaining service in the system.
While our components provide resilience against lateral movement, our scheme de-
pends on monitoring data to be accurate and consistent. We designed PowerAlert,
an out-of-box checker that provides runtime integrity using power measurements as
a trustworthy side-channel. PowerAlert uses diversity and unpredictability as a
resiliency measure against attacker deception. We compute an optimal resiliency
strategy for the defender against an adaptive attacker. The contributions in the
dissertation are summarized as follows.
1.2.1 Host-level Monitoring
To address host-level resiliency, we fuse host-level monitoring information to learn
behavioral models of applications. We use the models for anomaly detection. We im-
plemented Kobra, a host-level monitor, that implements the proposed anomaly de-
tection algorithms and generates views that fuse kernel level information for network-
level protection. Kobra is implemented as a set of cooperative kernel modules that
collects time-stamped process events, which are converted to a discrete-time signal
in the polar space. We learn local patterns that occur in the data and then learn
the normal co-occurrence relationships between the patterns. The patterns and the
co-occurrence relations model the normal behavioral baseline of an application. We
compute an anomaly score for tested traces and compare it against a threshold for
anomaly detection. We evaluate the baseline by experimenting with its ability to
discriminate between different processes and detect malicious behavior.
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1.2.2 Lateral Movement Detection
Attackers often attempt to move laterally from host to host, infecting them until an
overall goal is achieved. Our goal is to achieve resilience against lateral movement
by online detection and response. In this dissertation, we propose a scheme to fuse
host-level information with network-level information. The fusion scheme uses views
generated by host-level monitors to detect lateral movement chains. Then, we propose
a framework for distributed data fusion that specifies the communication architecture
and data transformation functions. We use this framework to define an approach for
lateral movement detection that uses host-level process communication graphs to
infer network connection correlations. The network correlations are then aggregated
into system-wide host-communication graphs that expose possible lateral movement
in the system. We evaluate the scalability of the hierarchical fusion scheme in terms
of storage overhead, the number of message updates sent, the fairness of resource
sharing among clusters, and the quality of local graphs. Finally, we implement a low-
overhead host-level monitor prototype to collect connection correlations. The results
show that our approach provides an efficient method for detecting lateral movement
between hosts.
1.2.3 Lateral Movement Response
We designed a response and recovery engine (RRE) to protect against lateral move-
ment. RRE takes as an input lateral movement chains and responds by reconfiguring
the network and healing nodes. The network achieves resiliency as RRE stops lateral
movement due to virus spread while maintaining acceptable service (connectivity).
RRE employs control theory to find the conditions for stable and cost-effective protec-
tion. RRE’s strategy starts by learning the parameters of the attacker; it then uses the
learning results to find an optimal defense configuration that stops the attack while
maximizing service, and finally recovers system service. First, RRE learns the spread
rates of the attacker by reconfiguring the system. The engine finds the maximum
likelihood estimate of the attacker parameters by measuring the time of compromise.
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After learning the parameters, the RRE temporarily changes the connectivity and
healing rates in the network to reach a stable disease-free equilibrium (DFE). The
temporary connectivity graph maintains some level of availability in the network, in-
stead of completely disconnecting the network to heal all the nodes. We implemented
RRE as an SDN application for Floodlight. We emulate a virus spreading over an
emulated network in Mininet. RRE uses an ACL to alter the graph, and the healing
responses are scheduled through sampling of the healing rates.
1.2.4 Host-level Trust
Resiliency using monitoring and response depends on trusted monitoring and re-
sponse agents. Instead of trusting agents in our scheme, we propose PowerAlert,
an efficient external runtime integrity checker for untrusted agents. Current attesta-
tion systems suffer from shortcomings in requiring complete checksums of the code
segment, in being static, in using timing information sourced from the untrusted
machine, or in using highly erroneous timing information (e.g., network round-trip
times). We address those shortcomings by (1) using power measurements from the
host to ensure that the checking code is executed and (2) checking a subset of the
code space over an extended period. We compare the power measurement against
a learned power model of the execution of the machine and verify that an attacker
did not tamper with the execution. Finally, PowerAlert diversifies the integrity-
checking program to prevent the attacker from adapting. In essence, PowerAlert
provides resiliency against adaptive state-tampering attackers. We have used Rasp-
berry pi to implement a prototype of PowerAlert, and in this dissertation we
evaluate the performance of the integrity-checking program generation. We model
the interaction between PowerAlert and an attacker as a game. We study the
effectiveness of the random initiation strategy in deterring the attacker. The study
shows that PowerAlert forces the attacker into a trade-off between maintaining
stealthiness and working to achieve other goals, while still maintaining an acceptably
low probability of detection (from the attacker’s perspective), given the long lifespan
of stealthy attacks.
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1.2.5 Optimal Resilient Monitoring
PowerAlert uses a strategy of continuous, incremental, and unpredictable state
checks to achieve resilience against state-tampering attacks. However, two challenges
thus arise for the defender: 1) it must check system state integrity in a way that does
not unacceptably degrade system performance, and 2) it must determine how often
and when to check system state integrity. To address those challenges, we propose a
game-theoretic approach whereby the defender incrementally checks the state of the
system at certain time instances. More specifically, we propose Tireless, a novel
continuous-time game for integrity checking to detect malicious state manipulation
when the attacker is attempting to evade detection. We analyze the game for different
strategies, compute the best response strategies, and find the Nash equilibrium for
each strategy. Finally, we apply Tireless to two real-world problems: 1) use of
PowerAlert to detect rootkits in an untrusted host, and 2) checking of flow tables’
manipulation in SDN switches. For each problem, we find the optimal strategy that
the defender should use to maximize system resiliency.
1.3 Dissertation Organization
We organize the rest of the dissertation as follows. Chapter 1 addresses the challenges
of host-level monitoring using Kobra. Chapter 2 proposes the method for lateral
movement detection. Chapter 3 showcases the control-theoretic response and recovery
engine. Chapter 4 presents our approach to addressing monitor trust issues by using
the laws of physics. Chapter 5 introduces Tireless, the optimal resiliency strategy





Image 2.1: Live Transmission: movement of hardcore MacDowell colony fellows during a Navy SEALs workout (Credit: Morgan O’hara).
As today’s computers are involved in every aspect of our lives, they are attractive tar-
gets for attacks. Attackers target major stores to steal credit card information; control
systems are attacked with advanced malware to physically damage devices [37]. In
today’s world, the damage caused by these attacks is no longer limited to the cyber
assets, but also extends to the systems they control. Those threats raise the need for
secure protection mechanisms.
Compromises are caused by inadequate security measures, vulnerable software,
and misuse by users. Despite these specific problems, the underlying root cause of
security problems is that modern computers are intrinsically insecure. Computers are
general-purpose machines that implement a universal Turing machine, an improve-
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ment over special-purpose hardware. Instead of designing new machines from scratch,
designers create new functionality with simple software updates. There is, however,
a caveat: malware is also software. That means it can run on general-purpose ma-
chines without being detected. The problem of detecting malware reduces to the
halting problem, which is undecidable [36, 91]. Researchers have turned to using
heuristics, such as signatures, to determine whether a piece of code is a malware.
The antimalware effort through heuristics aims to limit the operation of the Turing
machine. Modern computers are still Turing-complete, however, and these approaches
merely make it a bit harder to run malware. Return-oriented programming is a good
example of this phenomenon. In effect, attackers and defenders are locked in an
arms race; for example, modern firewalls, intrusion detection systems (IDSes), and
anti-virus software must always be kept up to date to face ever-evolving malware.
In that arms race, it is prudent to build several layers of protection to make systems
more resilient to intrusions. Intrusion resilience [10], inspired by fault tolerance,
aims to build systems that can maintain their mission despite compromises. An
intrusion-resilient protection mechanism is one that employs a strategy of continuous
monitoring and response. The protection mechanism reacts to changes in the security
state by reconfiguring the system while maintaining an acceptable service level.
Intrusion detection, through either anomaly detection (for unknown attacks) or
signature detection (for known attacks), is often deployed as the monitoring compo-
nent of resilience strategies. Unfortunately, intrusion detection systems are notori-
ously noisy (with a high rate of false positives), which overwhelms both operators
and decision algorithms [83], making them the Achilles heel of resilience strategies.
Still, anomaly detection is the most effective strategy against unknown attacks.
State-of-the-art black-box anomaly-detection systems in modern OSes rely on execu-
tion traces of running processes [58] as an alphabet to detect anomalous subsequences.
Anomalies are detected when events co-occur in a manner different from normal. This
approach is particularly effective in detecting arbitrary code execution attacks, unau-
thorized behavior, and other policy violations that change a running process without
modifying binaries; such attacks defeat signature-based mechanisms.
However, most behavior traces proposed in the literature use an alphabet such as
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system calls, and function calls that are hard to collect in most modern operating sys-
tems. Since intrusion detection systems run as independent processes in OSes, their
developers resort to modifying the kernel by overwriting the addresses of functions in
order to intercept the events from other running processes. Ironically, attackers uti-
lize the same techniques in developing rootkits [129]. As a result, modern operating
systems include several mechanisms to prevent tampering with kernel data structures
(such as Kernel Patch Protection in Windows) [6]. Those protections make it impos-
sible for intrusion detection systems to collect system calls without tampering with
the security of the system being protected; this creates a gap in host-based security
protection. Therefore, there is a need for host-based intrusion detection systems that
are practical and safe to deploy. In this chapter, we address the following related ques-
tion: Can we utilize available information in the operating system, without modifying
its internals to achieve accurate anomaly detection?
During an attack, an application’s behavior deviates from its normal behavior,
which can be modeled as a baseline. There are two challenges in modeling behavioral
baselines: (1) deciding on the data sources to monitor, and (2) extracting features
from said data. First, models extracted from low-level data (e.g., network usage
patterns) might not be discriminating, while models with high-level data (e.g., system
calls and function calls) are costly to build and maintain and might not be accurate
because of their high dimensionality. Second, feature extraction involves projection
of the collected data onto a vector space basis. The selected features should reveal
the subtleties in behavior that enable anomaly detection.
Figure 2.1 shows Kobra, the practical kernel semi-supervised anomaly-detection
system that we developed for Microsoft’s Windows operating systems (Windows 7+).
To address the first challenge, we focus solely on the low-level information exposed by
the kernel via public filters and APIs, without requiring instrumenting or “hacking”
of the kernel. We observe that much of this information, such as network and file
system usage patterns, evolves over time, and thereby provides a high-fidelity feature
set that may be used to uniquely identify running applications and variations thereof.
In particular, we found that we can build accurate behavioral baselines to detect
anomalous process behavior due to arbitrary code execution attacks.
16
Figure 2.1: High-level description of our approach.
We collect information from the kernel using Kobra. Kobra filters the data by
application to create per-application event traces. We transform each trace into a
complex-valued discrete-time signal by mapping discrete events onto the z-plane, as
explained in Section 2.2.1.
Instead of explicitly specifying the vector set of basis vectors (features), we address
the second challenge by learning the set of basis vectors using a training set of normal
behavioral traces. The training set is constructed using overlapping subsequences
that are obtained by sliding a window over the transformed time signal. We use
a sparse dictionary-learning algorithm to learn local patterns in the data. Then we
learn a second set of basis vectors using latent semantic analysis; these vectors encode
co-occurrence relations between local patterns in the training data. We compute an
anomaly score as the reconstruction error when approximating the data by using the
learned set of basis vectors. Normal behavior will be accurately represented when
projected onto the learned set of basis vectors; anomalies, which occur in different
patterns from normal behavior, cannot be accurately represented and thus will lead
to high anomaly scores.
In this chapter, we evaluate the effectiveness of the learned behavioral baselines
for anomaly detection. We consider process-execution-hijacking attacks over a wide
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range of applications, such as the VLC player. Process hijacking is a technique
used by malware to perform malicious tasks without having persistent processes that
can easily be detected. Our study shows that the learned baselines for different
applications did not share similar local patterns, confirming that they are suitable
for modeling application behavior. Moreover, we evaluated the effectiveness against
attacks by weaving attack data into normal behavioral traces. We considered two
types of shellcode attacks, and the detection accuracy was around 95% with a low
false positive rate. Finally, we evaluated the performance ofKobra for data collection
and online anomaly detection; in general we observed low overhead during the data
collection phase, and the system was stable for online anomaly detection.
Finally, we implemented a whitelisting-based security policy in SCADA as a use
case for Kobra. We specify the policies as a function of the system views generaed
by Kobra.
In summary, the contributions of this chapter are as follows.
• Kobra, a Windows kernel-monitoring engine and an online anomaly engine
that collects events correlated with running processes;
• A novel way to transform discrete event traces into a complex-valued discrete-
time signal; and
• A method utilizing sparse representation and latent semantic analysis to base-
line application behavior and detect anomalous behavior.
2.1 The System View
The intent of the system view is to provide high-level information about the state of
the host, including the kernel state information and history of operation. The system
view reflects the methods by which users, via processes, access different resources
(e.g., storage devices or the network). Each user is associated with a session; each
session contains a set of processes that consume resources and perform I/O operations.
In other words, the system view (as shown in Figure 2.2) is a composition of these
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entities (e.g., user accounts, processes, and file resources) and their interactions (e.g.,
file read operation). In the view in Figure 2.2, the process view contains three local
processes that connect to remote processes. The local processes read and write files
and use I/O devices. Each process is owned by a user.
The concepts and relations encoded by the system view (as defined in ontologies)
are generic and platform-independent. In the remainder of this section, we will briefly
define a view, describe each of the component views in more detail, and specify their
interactions to compose a system view. We later describe how Kobra instantiates
the system view by parsing kernel data structures, monitoring events, employing
callbacks, and filtering network traffic.
2.1.1 What is a View?
Briefly, a view is a labeled graph that encodes one perspective on the entities and
relationships within a system. The etymology of the word “system” tells us it means
“organized whole; body.” We are using graphs to organize the variety of information
associated with a system along with labels to provide a human-readable, machine-
actionable language to communicate and analyze concepts and relations within our
discipline. We now define and explain the motivation for the views employed by
Kobra.
2.1.2 User View
The user view captures information about logical users of a machine. The current
approach employed by Kobra is to use user accounts to infer user behavior. One
aspect of particular interest to Kobra-enforced policies is whether a user is local or
remote.
The user view consists of a multidirected graph whose vertices correspond to users
and edges to interactions among those users. The current version of Kobra does not
consider inter-user interactions, as those occur through processes, and as such the
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Figure 2.2: Kobra-generated system view.
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view is a graph with verticies corresponding to each user without an edges. Each
node in this view is labeled with several attributes:
• User identifier: the canonical name of the user.
• Group identifier: the canocnical name of the user’s group.
• Privilege: the privilege level assigned to the user.
• Location: the location defines whether the user is local or remote.
In Figure 2.2, the user view is a subset of the full system view (labeled as such). The
view in the example contains two users “User 1” and “User 2”.
2.1.3 Process View
The process view encodes interactions among locally running processes in the oper-
ating system. Kobra identifies each process with a unique ID, a KID; a KID is
different from the OS-assigned process ID (PID). Kobra does not reuse KIDs, since
terminated processes are not removed from the process view. For example, Kobra-
enforced security policies may use the process view to ensure that a process can run
if and only if its hashed executable is on a whitelist.
Currently, the process view consists of a multidirected graph whose vertices corre-
spond to locally running processes and edges to relations among those processes, such
as the parent/child process and process owner. Attributes on those vertices include a
process category (e.g., browser), state (e.g., suspended or terminated), privilege level
(e.g., user or superuser), and signature (e.g., hash of process executable). We now
describe these attributes and relations in more detail.
Process Attributes
Although processes can have a wide variety of possible attributes, Kobra-enforced
policies based on the process view focus on process category, state, privilege level,
and signature.
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Software are divided into different categories, and the list of categories can be
extensive. For example, Kobra’s current classification scheme for processes includes
categories for browsers (e.g., Chromium), computational applications (e.g., MAT-
LAB), and service daemons (e.g., Apache server). In effect, the classification scheme
is used as a basis for categorizing different processes based upon their behavior; which
we use in section 2.2.4 for anomaly detection.
Our notion of process state reflects the traditional notion of process state in an
operating system. Specifically, a process may be running, suspended, started, or
terminated. Terminated processes maybe maintained within the view in order to
establish a complete view of the history of a host. Nevertheless, when we use Kobra
to detect lateral movement (Chapter 3), the terminated processes in the process view
are pruned iteratively to reduce the memory overhead when storing the graph.
A process’s privilege level reflects whether that process has run as a regular user
or superuser during its Kobra-observed lifetime. A process’s signature measures the
integrity of the binary executed to instantiate that process as a hash.
Process View Relations
The higher-level system view depends heavily upon the relations defined within the
process view. We now consider each of these relations in more depth.
The parent/child relation captures the hierarchical relation of process instantiation
within an operating system. For example, in Linux the init process, created at boot
time, is the parent of all processes. We relate processes with two labeled edges:
devos:ParentProcess and devos:ChildProcess. In our example, process p2 is the
parent of process pi, and thus there is an edge between those processes’ corresponding
vertices that is labeled with devos:ParentProcess.
An edge between a process and a user allows Kobra to track which processes
a user starts. Figure 2.2 illustrates this relation: when user User 1 starts process
pi, Kobra modifies this process view instance and inserts an edge labeled with
devos:isProcessOwner between the vertices for User 1 and process pi.
Finally, during its lifetime a process uses a variety of different resources that
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include files, devices, and sockets. Kobra enables practitioners to track the use of
these resources over time with respect to the process view.
2.1.4 Communication View
The communication view augments the process view to reflect communication among
locally running processes as well as remotely running processes with which those local
processes communicate. Local processes, captured by the process view, may be iden-
tified by a tuple consisting of their KID as well as their corresponding executable’s
signature. In contrast, the existence of processes running on remote hosts must be
inferred when a network communication flow is created. Therefore, a different con-
vention for identifying remote processes must be employed. For example, in one
approach, Kobra infers and identifies remote processes by IP address, port num-
ber, and protocol when a locally running process connects to a remote host’s socket
via TCP. Kobra-enforced security policies may use this view to whitelist local and
remote communications among processes.
The communication view is a multidirected graph whose vertices correspond to
locally and remotely running processes and whose edges correspond to communication
flows among those processes. Furthermore, edges are labeled with attributes which
we describe in the examples below.
The communication flow acknowledges the variety of different types of communi-
cation flows. Local communication may occur via a variety of interprocess commu-
nication (IPC) mechanisms, pipes, loopback sockets, and shared memory, and this
is represented by an edge labeled with devos:hasIPC. It is worth noting that covert
communication channels might exist among processes or between a user and the out-
side world (but such channels are outside the scope of this work, as they are hard to
identify).
Figure 2.2 illustrates the communication view with examples of local and remote
communication. For local communication, process p1 has IPC with process pi, so
Kobra inserts a devos:hasIPC labeled edge. Attributes on this edge include the path
of the pipe that connects the two processes. For remote communication, consider the
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following: When process p2 connects to remote process IP2, Kobra instantiates an
edge between their two corresponding vertices. We note that the identifier for inferred
process IP2 consists of the destination address and destination port (as described
earlier). Moreover, the edge itself is labeled with the source address and port.
2.1.5 Storage View
The storage view encodes information about the files present on the system and their
relations with users, and processes. Each file is a segment of permanently stored data
that is uniquely identified (locally) via its file path and name. Permanent storage
media include flash and magnetic hard drives as well as solid-state devices (SSDs).
Kobra-enforced security policies may use the storage view to whitelist file accesses
and operations with respect to a file, a user, or process attributes.
The storage view is a multidirected graph whose vertices correspond to files and
edges to relations that encode the file system hierarchy as well as permissions for
access control. Attributes on those vertices include a file’s name and path. In ad-
dition, each file has an attribute to denote whether it is a directory or regular file,
and this may determine additional attributes. For example, a regular file may have
a data attribute for its contents (text or audio). Finally, files have a set of time at-
tributes: one for when the file was created (devos:TimeCreated), one for when the
file was last read (devos:TimeLastRead), and one for when the file was last modified
(devos:TimeLastWritten).
The storage view encodes relations among files (e.g., the file system hierarchy),
between files and processes (e.g., file accesses), and between users and files (e.g.,
access control permissions). More specifically, first, the storage view reflects relations
among files captured within a file system hierarchy, such as whether a file is in a
directory (devfs:inDirectory) or a symbolic link (devfs:linksTo). Second, the
storage view reflects relations between files and processes. For example, when a
process reads a file, Kobra updates the storage view with an edge directed from
the process to the file corresponding to the devos:readsFile relation. Finally, the
storage view encodes relations among users and files that correspond to access control
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permissions, such as read, write, and execute (devfs:canRead, devfs:canWrite, and
devfs:canExecute).
In our example in Figure 2.2, the storage view contains two files “File1” and
“File2”. ”File1” is read by process p1 and ”File2” is read by process p2.
2.1.6 Device View
The device view documents the set of devices and drivers installed on the local ma-
chine as well as the relations within the device tree. Kobra identifies a device by
its name and physical path within the device tree. Kobra-enforced policies may use
this view to whitelist which devices may be active on a host or which processes or
users may use a device.
The device view consists of a multidirected graph whose vertices correspond to
devices and drivers. Edges represent relations among devices (e.g., the device tree),
between devices and their drivers (e.g., a driver stack for a device), and between pro-
cesses and devices. Vertex attributes for devices include a name and path. Attributes
for vertices corresponding to drivers include the file path to the drivers’ binary. Fig-
ure 2.2 illustrates the device view; when process pi interacts with device dev2,Kobra
populates the device view instance with an edge between the appropriate vertices to
reflect device I/O.
2.1.7 Resource View
The resource view describes the resources consumed by different entities on the host
indicated in each of the aforementioned views. The metrics used to describe re-
source consumption depend upon the view of the system and are likely to evolve
as new technologies emerge. With that said, these metrics, documented within the
supporting ontologies, are free to evolve and can be applied consistently. There-
fore, Kobra-enforced policies can whitelist resource consumption and usage patterns
across different views of a system by using different metrics for resource consumption.
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The resource view augments processes within the process view with attributes that
include CPU time (both in userland and the kernel) and memory usage (including
both virtual memory and peak virtual memory sizes). Edges for IPC and network
flows within the communication view may be augmented with attributes that include
bytes transferred, bandwidth, and/or number of packets. For the storage view re-
sources, such as the file, attributes that measure resource consumption include disk
bandwidth and file size.
2.1.8 View Encoding
Kobra maintains the system views by monitoring kernel events and then changing
the views accordingly. For example, when a file is created, a new node is added to the
file view and an edge between the file and the process that created the file is inserted.
Kobra represents views as a dynamic graph stream [5, 98]. A graph stream allows
Kobra to store the graph as it evolves during the runtime of the host, as opposed
to just storing one snapshot of the view.
In essence, a kernel event is represented by Kobra as a graph modification
(node/edge insertion or deletion).
The graph is G[k] = (V [k], E[k]), where k is discrete time.
• V [k] is the set of vertices in the graph; the number of nodes varies at each
timestep. At each timestep, Cv[k] is the set of characteristics (or attributes) for
which v ∈ V [k].
• E[k] is the set of undirected edges in the graph, where
E[k] = {(vi, vj)|vi, vj ∈ V [k]}. At each timestep, Ceij [k] is the set of character-
istics (or attributes) for each edge eij at time k.
The input is a sequence Se = ⟨a1, a2, . . .⟩ and Sv = ⟨b1, b2, . . .⟩, where
• ai = (ei,∆i) with ei ∈ E[i] and ∆i ∈ {−1, 1}, and
• bi = (vi,Θi) with vi ∈ V [i] and Θi ∈ {1, 0}.
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t=0, (add-node {lp1:p1, devos:Process})
t=0, (add-node {lp1:p2, devos:Process})
t=1, (add-node {lp1:file1, devos:File})
t=3, (add-edge {lp1:p1, lp1:file1,
devos:readsFile})
Figure 2.3: Excerpt of a dataset generated from a Windows 7 machine.
In the edge update sequence, ∆i is added at each timestep. We update the vertices
with an XOR operation. The sequence of adds and removes is ordered by a timestamp
when stored. The ⟨node-name⟩, ⟨node-type⟩, and ⟨edge-type⟩ are the same labels used
in the system views. Figure 2.3 shows a sample of a streamed graph.
In the following section, we encode the graph stream as a discrete-time complex
valued signal which we use for anomaly detection.
2.2 Application Behavior Model
Kobra generates a stream of data resulting from process behavior. We use the
normal behavior data to learn a baseline for anomaly detection. We start by trans-
forming the data stream into a complex-valued discrete-time signal. Specifically, each
event is transformed into a complex number, and the sequence of time-stamped com-
plex numbers generates the discrete-time signal. Then we construct a training set
from collected normal behavior traces. We use the training set to learn a behavioral
baseline by constructing a sparse representation dictionary. Then we use sparse rep-
resentations of the training set to construct latent semantic analysis (LSA) matrices.
Both the dictionary and LSA matrices represent a process’s normal behavior. Fi-
nally, the anomaly-detection algorithm computes an anomaly score using the sparse
reconstruction error and LSA reconstruction error. Detection thresholds are assigned
as the 90th percentile of the anomaly scores of the normal data.
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2.2.1 Data Stream to Complex-Signal Transformation
We transform Kobra’s data stream into a time signal for analysis. First, we divide
the stream into per-process/per-application traces using a process tag in each event.
Next, we convert each event in a trace to a complex-valued number. Finally, we
combine the complex values to form a discrete-time signal.
We start by dividing the data stream by application to generate per-application
traces. For example, Figure 2.4 shows part of a VLC trace. Events are tagged by the
unique KID and application ID to identify the running process and the application,
respectively. (Each application might have more than one running process.)
The event-to-complex-value transformation was inspired by constellation diagrams
in digital modulation schemes. The basic idea is to map discrete events to the complex
space, f : e → x, e ∈ E , x ∈ C. Equations (2.1) and (2.2) compute the phase and
magnitude of the transformed event, respectively. The complex plane is divided into
N equal-angular zones, where N is the number of types of events (in our example,
N = 4); each type of event is mapped to a zone. In Equation (2.1), z is a function
that maps an event type to the appropriate zone z : e → k, e ∈ E , k ∈ [0, N − 1] as
defined in Table 2.1. e.Obj.ID is a counter assigned to each unique instance of an
object (file or IP). The phase of each event within each zone is assigned according
to the total number of unique instances. In Equation (2.2), the magnitude of each
number (e.Obj.size) is the normalized size of the magnitude of the event (number of













We transform the trace into a complex-valued signal by transforming each event, e,
into a complex value such that θ = ∠f(e) and r = |f(e)|, and then assigning the value
to the appropriate position in the complex-valued signal (tr) tr[e.t] = r.exp(j.θ).
The Gs-Transform method in Algorithm 1 filters the events by KID, and then
transforms each event to a complex number; finally, it generates a discrete-time signal
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Table 2.1: The angular zones used for this representation.
z Event Range
0 Read File [0 , π
2
]
1 Write File [π , 3π
2
]
2 Network Receive [π
2
, π]
3 Network Send [3π
2
, 2π]
for each process by using the timestamp to order the events. In order to achieve linear
running time O(n), we precompute the maximization for the event transformation
function f . As each signal is tagged by the application ID, we form a training set
for each application by combining signals from different processes that have the same
application ID.
Algorithm 1 Transformation algorithm
Require: S = (e1, e2, e3, . . .)
Require: A process id
1: procedure GS–Transform
2: SP := (e ∈ S | e.KID = id)
3: for each event e in SP do
4: θ := ∠f(e)
5: r := |f(e)|
6: tr[e.time] := r.ej.θ
7: end for
8: return <tr, Application ID >
9: end procedure
The zone mapping allows us to fuse heterogeneous sources of data into one signal.
Figure 2.5 shows an example of the transformation; the plot shows the complex-time
signal with the time domain collapsed. Each data point is plotted on the z-plane.
We compare the events extracted from explorer.exe (◦) and the Apache server (•).
The Apache server’s behavior has high activity in the network zones (more biased to
the send zone); in this instance, the reason is that WordPress is using MySQL for
data storage. On the other hand, explorer.exe has more activity in the file read
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...
870 {"VID.mp4" :?: 2044}{devos:read} {512}
895 {"VID.mp4" :?: 2044}{devos:read} {512}
923 {"VID.mp4" :?: 2044}{devos:read} {4096}
...
Figure 2.4: Data stream output while VLC is playing a video.
zone (as it is the file browser).
Traditionally, anomaly-detection systems encode events as sequences of integers.
Those encodings remove essential timing information and other semantics that are
important for behavioral analysis, while our complex time signal preserves them. The
semantics and timing reflect the behavior of the application (functionality) and im-
plementation details (buffer sizes, sleep intervals, etc.). By keeping the semantics,
we protect our anomaly-detection method against mimicry attacks that only change
function call parameters [92]. Moreover, even though the transformation is lossy, it
preserves important frequency information that helps in baselining processes’ behav-
ior. Our anomaly-detection algorithms will exploit the information in the signals to
learn the behavioral baselines.
Given a set of normal behavior traces of an application Y = {tr[k]}i, we construct
the training set by applying a sliding window over the time signals. By using overlap-
ping subsequences, we alleviate the issue of time shifts in the signal. Specifically, the













k is a subset of the trace tri[.] that spans n points (the window size)
ts
(i)
k = (tri[k], . . . , tri[k + n]). The training set is a concatenated set of overlapping
subsequences arranged in a matrix with n columns. Figure 2.6 shows a HeatMap of
the training set from Chromium and VLC; it is easy to see the difference between
the patterns emerging from the two datasets. Those patterns will be learned by the
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Figure 2.5: Time-collapsed representation of execution of two applications.
behavioral baselines.
2.2.2 Learning Sparse Representation
The output of the transformation is a time signal that we want to sparsely represent
to detect local patterns. Sparse approximation assumes that an input signal y ∈ Rn
can be described in terms of an overcomplete linear system.
y ≈ Dx, (2.3)
where D ∈ Rn×p (n ≪ p) is called the dictionary and x ∈ Rp is the sparse ap-




∥y −Dx∥22 s.t. ∥x∥0 ≤ T. (2.4)
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VLC Training Data

















Figure 2.6: The HeatMaps of the training sets for VLC and Chromium.
In this optimization, we want to find the representation that minimizes the approxima-
tion error ∥y −Dx∥2; the minimization is subject to the number of nonzero elements
in the approximation T , referred to as sparsity. The pseudonorm ℓ0 ∥·∥0 counts the
number of zero elements in the vector. We typically want T ≪ p. Equation (2.4) is
a combinatorial optimization problem; researchers have proposed suboptimal greedy
algorithms to solve it. In this chapter, we use the Orthogonal Matching Pursuit
(OMP) algorithm [95].We interpret the atoms of a dictionary as the local patterns
that emerge in the behavior trace. The sparse representation of a signal is its decom-
position onto those atoms. Thus, the dictionary choice affects the resulting sparse
representations. In this work, we are interested in choosing a dictionary with atoms
specifically designed for normal behavior traces. That is, we seek atoms that represent
unique local patterns that exist in the data. For that purpose, we learn the dictio-
nary using K-SVD [4]. K-SVD is an algorithm that iteratively learns a dictionary by











The set of training data has to be large enough for K-SVD to learn normal local
patterns. The learned dictionary D∗ is used for testing new data for anomalies. The
sparse representation of the training data, XT R, is used for semantic analysis to learn
the normal co-occurrence relationships.
2.2.3 Learning Co-occurrence Relationships
The next step is to learn co-occurrence relations between local patterns in the sig-
nal. We use latent semantic analysis (LSA), a dimensionality reduction method used
in NLP. In LSA for NPL, a term matrix is decomposed and approximated [120].
The term matrix is a matrix that counts the frequency of words (from a corpus)
in documents to be studied. The sparse representation of a vector similarly assigns
frequencies of local patterns in the subset to be studied. In that sense, words in the
corpus and local patterns are equivalent. The sparse representation vectors of the
training data are arranged in a matrix X∗. LSA is performed using the following
steps:
1. Factorize the sparse representation matrix of the training data using singular
value decomposition (SVD), X∗ = UΣV T .
2. Approximate the matrix decomposition by keeping the eigenvectors of the k-
largest eigenvalues in Σ such that X∗ = UkΣkV
T
k .
3. Transform to a lower dimension, x̂ = Σ−1k U
T
k x.
4. Reconstruct the sparse representation, x̃ = UkΣkx̂.
The decomposition matrices, Uk and Σk, are the co-occurrence baseline for the appli-
cation. The anomaly score is computed as (x− x̃)2, which is the reconstruction error
due to the latent semantic analysis. If the behavioral traces are anomalous (not part
of the normal trace), the relationships within the traces cannot be represented, and
thus will have a high reconstruction error.
33
2.2.4 Behavioral Baseline for Anomaly Detection
We learned the per-application normal behavior model using sparse representation
and latent semantic analysis < D∗,Σk, Uk >. Our behavioral model learns two modes:
(1) local patterns and (2) co-occurrence of the local patterns in the normal behavior
trace. The local patterns are extracted by learning a sparse representation dictionary
using K-SVD. The sparse representations of the reference signal are used to learn a co-
occurrence model of the normal behavior relative to the local patterns by using LSA.
The detector will use both modes in the behavior model for detection of anomalies.
The detector uses the modes in two stages to detect anomalies. In the first stage,
the sparse representation of input signal y is constructed using the learned dictionary
x̂ = argminx |D∗x− y|; if the sparse reconstruction error (SRE) |y−D∗x∗|2 is higher
than a threshold λSRE then an alert is issued. In that case, the normal local patterns
could not effectively represent the behavior being tested, and thus the behavior is
marked as an anomaly. However, if the SRE is below the threshold then the latent
semantic representation of the sparse representation vector x∗ is computed, x̃∗ =
UkΣkx
∗. The latent reconstruction error (LSE) is computed as |x∗− x̃∗|2. An alert is
issued if the LSE is greater than a threshold λLSE. The two-stage process is used to
avoid expensive computations; if the SRE is high, then we do not need to compute
the LSE. The thresholds are selected as a function of the SRE and the LSE of the
training data. Algorithm 2 lists the procedure for anomaly detection using behavioral
baseline < D∗,Σk, Uk > for any application trace x.
This section described the method used to transform a graph stream into a
complex-valued discrete-time signal. It introduced the behavioral baseline as a learned
dictionary for sparse representation and the anomaly-detection method. In the next
section, we evaluate the effectiveness of the behavioral baselines in detecting anoma-
lies.
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Algorithm 2 Anomaly detection procedure using LSE
1. Given x a subsequence of a behavior trace for application A1 with baseline
(DA1 ,Σk, Uk).
2. Compute the sparse representation using OMP: y∗ = argminy ∥DA1y −
x∥2st∥y∥0 ≤ T .
3. Compute the sparse reconstruction error (SRE): δSRE = ∥DA1y∗ − x∥2.
4. Compute the latent semantic representation: x̂ = Σ−1k U
T
k .
5. Compute the latent semantic error (LSE): δLSE = ∥UkΣkx̂− x∥2.
6. Check that δSRE ≥ λSRE and δLSE ≥ λLSE.
2.3 Implementation
We implemented Kobra with multiple components to collect and fuse data, respond
to enforced policies, and interact with the user. Figure 2.7 shows the architecture of
Kobra. The collection components hook kernel data structures and driver stacks,
and also implement callbacks, network, and file system filters. We transfer the data
from collection components to the fusion component. The fusion component main-
tains the system view we described in Section 2.1. We also implemented a basic
response module; it supports the responses listed in the previous section and draws
from a whitelist for response selection. The logging server is currently used for data
exports.
We implementedKobra as a set of drivers in Windows 7 (64-bit). We now discuss
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Figure 2.7: Architecture of Kobra.
2.3.1 Collection & Fusion Modules
To instantiate views on a host, Kobra collects events and data from the kernel. Two
strategies for data collection employed by Kobra are (1) events-driven collection and
(2) periodic polling. In the event-driven collection, Kobra registers to notification
and callback object functions in the kernel. Drivers on older versions were able to
modify the behavior of Windows by hooking into the Windows API, service calls,
interrupt handlers, and so forth. Kernal Patch Protection (KPP) (which has been
available since Windows 7) protects Windows kernel components against tampering;
in the event that KPP detects tampering, it crashes the system and throws the error
code CRITICAL_STRUCTURE_CORRUPTION [103]. Even though KPP has been thwarted
repeatedly [6], we do not disable KPP to implement Kobra functions, because that
would lower the security posture of the host.
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Process View
In order to collect the processes in the system, we start by parsing the EPROCESS
structure in the kernel. Windows maintains a list of the processes that contains all
the state information pertaining to each process. We register a notify function that is
called when a new process is created or terminated. The notify function updates the
process view by adding a new process or updating the state of the process. The parent
of each process is also stored in the kernel. We used Windows debugger, which is part
of the Windows SDK, to get information about some internal kernel data structures.
Windows uses handles as pointers to objects. Whenever a process acquires a
handle, a pointer to that object is added to the handle table, where the handle is
an index used to find the object. The handle table is implemented as a three-level
scheme [103]. We parse the handle table in EPROCESS to find all the objects that a
process is using. The objects include sockets, pipes, files, devices, and mutexes.
We use access tokens in Windows to determine the privileges used by each process.
The tokens are stored in EPROCESS and contain the following relevant information: (1)
“the security identifier (SID) for the user’s account” and (2) “a list of the privileges
held by either the user or the user’s groups” [86]. For each process, we use the image
path to read the image file, and we compute a secure hash of the file. The secure
hash is stored with each process in the process views. We will use the secure hash
in our whitelists. As for the process category, we have a set of labeled software. The
whitelist contains each piece of software along with its category.
Communication View
In order to instantiate the communication view, we implement several kernel com-
ponents. The first is a Network Driver Interface Specification (NDIS) filter. It is
attached to the kernel network stack just above the minicom. We use this filter to
detect remote processes. When we observe a packet, we note its destination port and
IP address, and its protocol. We use the tuple to add a remote process to the process
view. In order to detect which process starts a flow, we implement a callout driver for
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Windows Filtering Platform (WFP). The callouts are attached to the flow-established
layer in WFP. Each flow is associated with the process that starts the connection.
We associate a context with each flow; WFP tags each packet in the flow with the
context. We can thus correlate each packet with the process that sent it. The process
and flow information is used to form the networking part of the communication view.
In order to form the local communication view, we find the pipes opened by each
process and then match common pipes between processes to find the communicating
pairs.
Storage View
The storage view is implemented via file system filters and parsing of handle tables.
When a new file type handle is acquired, the file is checked against the list of already
opened files. If the file is new, we add it to the list of files and update its properties,
such as size and timestamps. We note the process that acquired the handle and add
it to the storage view. On the other side, our file system filter intercepts read and
write requests. The filter gets the ID of the requester process. We use both methods
to update the storage view.
Device View
In order to generate the device view, we start by collecting all indicators of devices in
the kernel. First, we iterate over the module list in the kernel. The module list cannot
be directly accessed, but by using an undocumented field in the device object [129],
we can access it indirectly using WinDbg with Windows kernel debugging symbols
loaded to dump the variable information of all the structures we need to parse. When
a process acquires a handle to a device object, we update the device view. We also
enable custom drivers in the stack of each device. The driver intercepts all I/O
request packates (IRP) from the processes. The intercepts are sent down the stack
and recorded for processing. For example, we hook the keyboard stack to log all
keystrokes. We use the keyboard activity to infer whether the current machine user
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is remote or local. The IRP structure contains a pointer to the caller thread, which
we map back to the caller process.
Resource View
The resource view is collected from several sources. Disk bandwidth is calculated by
the file system filter over time. Network usage, in terms of bandwidth and absolute
bytes, is calculated over time by the NDIS and WFP callouts. Finally, process usage
information is contained in the EPROCESS structure. A thread periodically polls the
data in memory to collect statistics about said data.
Event Sequence
The event sequence contains events and actions taken in the system. A process
creation event is added when the view update function detects a new process. User
input is inferred from the keyboard driver. Connects and disconnects are detected
from the WFP callouts. Every time we intercept an event, we detect the process that
started it. We do so either by using internal information in the event, for example
the information that a fork has a parent, or by accessing the processor control block
(PRCB). The PRCB contains a pointer to the current scheduled thread. Finally, each
event is tagged with a timestamp of when it happened. Most hosts have synchronized
timestamps across the cores; thus, we can use the timestamps to order the events in
the view.
2.3.2 Security Policy Module
The security policy is an essential component of Kobra. Security policies are defined
as a proposition over the system view; that is, the security policy is defined in terms of
processes, files, communication, device access, user actions, and the event sequence.
Formally, a security policy P is a predicate on the event sequence (execution) and
views (state) of the host. A security policy is satisfied iff P(∪Ep, V iew) is true [109].
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Possible candidates for security policies are blacklists of IP addresses, whitelists
of allowed IP addresses, security automaton, and access control lists. In Section 2.5,
we study the use of whitelists in industrial control systems.
2.3.3 Response Module
Kobra is supplemented with multiple responses. The basic response mechanisms are
based on OS-level event sequences. That is, for a file, Kobra can block reads and/or
writes per process and per user. Moreover, it can block a process from accessing any
of its resources, and it can block processes from forking new processes. Finally, we can
block hardware access, and prevent new hardware from installing drivers, essentially
preventing it from running on the kernel. Table 2.2 shows some response actions that
are implemented in Kobra.
Table 2.2: The set of basic responses implemented in Kobra.
















We implemented the responses using capabilities within the kernel. To implement
privilege de-escalation, we modify the access token acquired by a process. In order
to suspend/terminate a process, we use multiple techniques:
• Using functions calls ZwTerminateThread over all threads, or ZwTerminateProcess,
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• Remove the threads related to the process from the ETHREAD list, which stops
the scheduler from giving it CPU time, or
• Crash the process.
The set of termination techniques is by no means complete and will be extended if
needed. In order to prevent forks, we use callbacks to get notifications about process
creation and termination; Kobra can stop a process from being created.
In order to control file and network reads and writes, we implement file system
and network filters. The filters sit in the driver stacks of the file system and network.
When a file is read/written, the filter has the ability to drop the request or modify
the resulting data. The network filter can drop a packet or allow it to continue while
logging it.
To disable a driver, we have several options. We can either inject a driver into the
stack of the device and prevent all IRP communication, or change the access control
on the device object to prevent processes from using it. We can also stop a driver
from getting installed if we detect the hardware insertion. Finally, in order to reboot
or turn off the host, we can intentionally crash the machine, or use a WinAPI call.
2.3.4 Communication Module
We built Kobra with two communication modes: it can communicate both with
a userland application and with a remote server. In our current implementation,
the userland application has the ability to query the view information by using IRP.
Kobra supports printing of a list of processes, remote connections, the process tree,
and file operations. The userland client can request detailed information about any
process from the process view; Kobra would respond with all views pertaining to
the particular process. In our example (Figure 2.2), if the client requests process p1,
Kobra would return the neighborhood view. The neighborhood of a vertex is defined
as the set of its first-degree neighbors. In the process context, this view provides a
process’s owner, parent, communication endpoints, and files. This view contains its
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Figure 2.8: Neighborhood view of process p1.
pipe with process pi, its remote connections to IPi and all disconnected flows, its
average resource usage, and its owner. The custom view is shown in Figure 2.8.
We use remote communication for dataset generation. Kobra streams the view
as a graph stream, and communicates to the outside through UDP broadcasts to be
received by a listening logging server.
2.3.5 User Role
The user has multiple roles in Kobra. The administrator has the responsibility of
setting up Kobra. Kobra has to be installed on the host, and the security policies
need to be determined and set. The administrator should also observeKobra’s graph
output. On the other hand, regular users do not have any administrator role, but
Kobra might ask them to resolve uncertainties.
2.3.6 Anomaly Detector
The anomaly detector implements Algorithm 2. Learned application behavioral base-
lines are stored in memory (loaded from a file) and indexed by the secure hash of the
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application’s image file. The secure hash is used to match the process’s application
with the learned baseline. In step 1, Kobra separates the behavior into different
traces per process. If Kobra is in learning mode, the traces are exported to an
external server. The server learns the behavioral baseline. If Kobra is in online
detection mode, each event in the trace is converted to a complex value. In step 2,
batched OMP computes the sparse representation y of a set of the converted traces
x. In step 3, the sparse representation error, δSRE, is computed. An alert is issued
if δSRE ≥ λSRE, where λSRE is the 95th percentile of the SRE from the training
data. Otherwise, in step 4, the latent semantic representation approximation of y is
calculated. In step 5, the latent semantic error, δLSE, is calculated. In step 6, an
alert is issued if δLSE ≥ λLSE, where λLSE is the 95th percentile of the LSE from the
training data.
2.3.7 Limitations
Kobra is intended to handle misuse by deploying security policies. Nevertheless, its
current implementation and deployment have several limitations. For the time being,
we assume that the host starts with a clean slate. Kobra, like most protection
mechanisms, is vulnerable to physical tampering and we are yet to study the effect
of rootkits on its operation. Moreover, we do not have a method to detect covert
channels, and those could be a mechanism for circumventing our security policies.
Moreover, Kobra is implemented for Windows 7, although the architecture and
views of Kobra are platform-independent.
2.4 Evaluation
In this section, we describe our strategy for evaluating anomaly detection by using the
behavioral baselines. We started by collecting data from different applications; then
we wove attack traces into normal behavior and computed the detection rates of the
anomaly-detection method. Our objectives were to verify the following: (O1) that
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the learned local patterns and co-occurrence relations are unique to each application,
and (O2) that use of the baselines enables detecting anomalous behavior including
malicious behavior. We devised multiple experiments to evaluate the baselines.
In experiment set 1, we collected normal behavioral traces from different appli-
cations, and then learned the baselines for all the applications. We compared the
similarities between baselines and their levels of effectiveness in discriminating be-
tween the applications. In experiment set 2, we evaluated the ability of the baselines
to detect malicious behavior. We wove attack behavior into the behavior trace of one
application.
In the following, we explain our experiments and the results, and then we study
the performance overhead of Kobra.
2.4.1 Experiment 1: Comparing Applications and Baselines
In the first set of experiments, we wanted to verify that the learned behavioral base-
lines are unique for each application. For this purpose, we used Kobra to collect
behavioral information for multiple applications. Then we learned the behavioral
baselines of the applications, and finally we tested the effectiveness of the anomaly
score in discriminating between applications. We selected the following applications
for training:
VLC: We obtained 20 VLC (version 2.2.1) execution traces by playing local videos
of various lengths and formats.
Web server: We set up Apache (version 2.4.9) with PHP and MySQL (version
5.6.17). The Web server has a set of files for download and a Web blog applica-
tion (WordPress). We performed a stress test on the Web server by sending it
random requests with a varying rate. The timing distribution followed a Pois-
son process with rate λ = 20. The requested content was drawn from a uniform
distribution over the index of all accessible data. We ran the tests for 4 hours.
OS processes: We scraped the traces generated by Kobra in the VLC and Web
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server setups for behavior traces generated by running Windows processes, in-
cluding svchost.exe and explorer.exe. Most applications run in different
modes; for example, VLC can be used to stream video or play local files. In
this work, we learned a behavioral baseline per mode of operation. The mode
of operation was detected by finding the baseline that had the lowest anomaly
score.
For each application, we assembled the training set in a matrix with a sliding
window of size n = 32. We learned the behavioral baseline of each application using
the method we highlighted. We set the number of local patterns to m = 180, the
sparsity to T = 5, and the LSA approximation to k = 30.
Comparing Baselines
A good discriminating baseline bears the least similarity to other baselines (that de-
scribe other behaviors), as it should have learned unique local patterns pertaining to
the application. We define the similarity between two sparse representation dictio-




∥da − db∥2 ∀a, b ≤ m, (2.6)
where da and db are local patterns in Di and Dj, respectively. Our similarity metric is
a conservative metric: just one similar set of local patterns would lead us to consider
the dictionaries similar. We trained dictionaries for all the profiled applications, while
varying the sparsity (sp), number of local patterns to be learned (m), and number
of iterations (k). Then, we computed δij for all pairs of dictionaries. We consider
dictionaries with δij ≤ 0.01 similar. Figure 2.9 shows the similarity measure between
the dictionaries; each element < i, j > in the result matrix represents the distance
measure δij. If the distance is more than 0.01, the cell is filled with white; otherwise, it
is filled in black. The diagonal is white as it represents δii as it compares a dictionary
to itself. Most of the elements in the result matrix are black, and thus the learned
baselines are different. We used the learned baselines for the rest of the experiments.
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k=180, m=128, sp=6


















Figure 2.9: Similarities of behavioral baselines for different parameters.
Comparing Execution Traces
For each application, we picked a behavioral trace and computed the anomaly score
(LSE) against all the behavioral baselines. For detection, we compared the anomaly
score to the 95th percentile threshold (λLSE) from the training data. Figure 2.10
shows a sample of the LSE anomaly scores of mysql.exe compared to the behavior
of vlc.exe as captured by the behavioral baseline of vlc.exe. The error of the
mysql.exe behavior trace is consistently greater than that of vlc.exe. The red
reference line in the plot is the detection cutoff. For each behavior baseline, we average
the true positives and the false positives of detection against all the application traces.
Table 2.3 shows the true positives and the false positives for each application. The
results show a consistently low false positive rate. That is, the baseline does not
mark normal behavior as anomalous. At the same time, the detector is capable of
accurately discriminating between applications, to varying degrees. In the case of
mysql, the accuracy is lower than for the others; the reason is that the behavior of a
database application has similarities to the behaviors of the other applications.
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Figure 2.10: The SRE anomaly score of the behavior two applications.
Table 2.3: Comparing execution traces.







2.4.2 Experiment 2: Injecting Attack Behavior
In the second set of experiments, we wanted to evaluate the effectiveness of the base-
lines in detecting anomalous malicious behavior. We considered two classes of attacks:
one-time arbitrary code execution through shellcodes, and permanent code injection.
Permanent code injection is used to hide malicious activity within “trusted” appli-
cations. Malware families such as Duqu and Dyre use calls such as ZwOpenThread,
ZwQueueApcThread, and ZwCreateSection to inject malicious code into Windows
subsystem processes. The goal is for Kobra to be able to detect both permanent
and one-time anomalies. In order to evaluate the anomaly detection, we wove mali-
cious behavior into normal execution traces of a process. In the following, we explain
our weaving process and show the accuracy of the anomaly-detection method.
Malicious Behavior Weaving
Given a trace of malicious (malware) behavior, we wove the behavior trace into a
normal process behavior trace. Weaving of the traces is a reasonable way to emulate
malware behavior within a process, because the execution of the exploit happens
within the compromised process, and thus the collected trace will reflect the behavior
of the exploit. We do not need to prove that the applications are vulnerable, as we do
not use specific vulnerabilities; instead, we look at the behavior after the exploit has
been “executed.” Moreover, weaving malicious behavior instead of finding vulnerable
versions of applications means that other researchers can reproduce the results.
We consider two cases of malicious behavior: takeover and interleaving. In the
first, malware takes over process execution by means of shellcode execution, DLL
hijacking, and portable executable (PE) injection into the process image. In the
second, the malicious behavior is interleaved with normal behavior; the malware
achieves this when it adds a thread to the process execution.
We performed malware weaving by emulating malware behavior and by using
Kobra to extract behavior traces. We added the behavior traces of the malware to
the normal behavior of an application. While it might seem that the insertion point
48
Figure 2.11: Malware behavior weaving modes.
should be restricted to network read events, the start of malicious behavior might not
align with the network read events, perhaps because of multithreading, for example.
Because of the uncertainty, we selected a random insertion point and repeated the
experiment multiple times to increase confidence in the result. Finally, we adjusted
the timestamps to be consistent. Weaving was performed before the transformation
to a complex signal.
The malware behavior was either inserted to cause a shift of normal behavior or
interleaved with random periods within the normal behavior. Figure 2.11 shows the
two weaving modes. The gray box is the normal behavior, and the red boxes are the
emulated malware behavior.
We studied shellcode behavior in order to assess malicious behavior. First, we
studied common behaviors of shellcodes by surveying the Exploit Database complied
by Offensive Security [90]. For all of the database’s 500 Windows exploit samples, we
used a shellcode debugger, scdbg [144], to extract and simulate the binary shellcode.
The output of the debugger was the list of service calls executed. We identified two
behaviors to study:
Reverse Shell (RS): An attacker starts a new socket, connects to a remote server,
creates a new process for a shell, and redirects input/output of the new process
to the new socket.
Drive-by-Download (DD): An attacker downloads malware from a remote server
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and creates a new process that loads the downloaded file.
The selected behaviors are by no means an exhaustive list of possible behaviors, as
we cannot predict the behavior of an attacker. However, they provide a good starting
point for verifying that attack behavior that is unknown to our system (which, i.e.,
has not been trained for it) is getting flagged as an anomaly relative to the learned
baseline. Finally, we created custom implementations of the malicious payloads and
ran them on aKobra-instrumented machine, after which we wove the behavior traces
with the applications we wanted to study. When a shellcode is executed, it might
cause a new process to be forked or the current process to crash. We do not consider
those scenarios, because we are interested in the behavior change due to the malware
in the application itself.
Detection Results
In this experiment, we tested whether anomaly detection that uses our learned behav-
ioral baseline is effective against malicious reverse shell (RS) and drive-by-download
(DD) behavior. After weaving the malicious behavior, we computed the anomaly
score for each trace and compared the scores against the thresholds. The threshold
was selected as the 95th percentile of the anomaly scores from the training data.
We compared our results to a kNN classifier that clusters the original trace infor-
mation without using the behavioral baseline transformation. Table 2.4 shows the
true-positive rates of detection of both reverse shell and drive-by-download behaviors.
For reverse shell behavior, the true-positive rate was higher than 0.90 for all appli-
cations, while the false-positive rate was extremely low (≤ 0.07). The false-positive
rate is consistent with the threshold we picked, the 95th percentile. The detection
method using the untransformed traces had lower true-positive rates in detecting the
malicious behavior. The improvement in detection while having a low false-positive
rate is important for a resiliency strategy that uses alerts for response. For drive-by-
download behavior, the true-positive rate was high for all applications (≥ 0.90) and
the false-positive rate was low. Finally, the detection method using the untransformed
traces had a lower true-positive rate.
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Table 2.4: True-positive rate and false-positive (FP) rates.
Reverse Shell (RS) Drive-by-Download (DD)
Application LSE FP Original LSE FP Original
vlc.exe 0.9800 0.0466 0.8635 0.8941 0.0585 0.6342
svchost.exe 0.9687 0.0753 0.9001 0.8620 0.0627 0.8362
explorer.exe 0.9826 0.0480 0.8888 0.9214 0.0791 0.8822
httpd 0.9933 0.0244 0.9068 0.9641 0.0352 0.94
mysqld 0.9800 0.0499 0.9010 0.9272 0.0848 0.8665
System 0.9094 0.1092 0.8511 0.9041 0.0371 0.7890
x̄ 0.969 0.0589 0.8852 0.9121 0.0595 0.8247
2.4.3 Kobra’s Performance
We tested our current implementation of Kobra on a machine running Windows
7 1. We used a suite of performance benchmarks [115] to evaluate its logging over-
head and online operation. During logging mode, the benchmarks ran various CPU,
memory, disk, and network tests. The results (Figure 2.12) show that Kobra has
negligible overhead; it did not exceed 6% for any of the tests. The results in Fig-
ure 2.12 are divided by the targeted subsystem: CPU, graphics, memory, and disk.
The low resulting overhead is not surprising; most of the logging functionalities are
implemented as callbacks and in-line filters, and the state is updated asynchronously.
The 2% network overhead was due to events’ streaming to the logging server at 277
kbps.
During online detection mode, the detection algorithm runs with full data collec-
tion with logging disabled. That is, Kobra does not use network communication,
but it does increase CPU usage. On average, the batch OMP used for sparse represen-
tation runs in 0.12 ms for a batch of 100 signals. We modeled the per-process online
anomaly detection as an M/M/1 system. The input to the queue was the behavior
trace with 32 elements; the service ran the anomaly detection Algorithm 2. The
online system is stable when the service rate is higher than the arrival rate, λ
µ
< 1.
Currently, events are coded in 0.12 ms, and the median arrival time per event is 24





































































































Figure 2.12: The overhead due to Kobra’s operations.
ms. Thus the system is stable and is viable for online operation.
2.5 Example Security Policy
In addition to using Kobra for anomaly detection, we use it to enforce security
policies that are specified as a function of the system view. In this section, we specify
a security policy to protect devices in the power grid’s supervisory control and data
acquisition system (SCADA).
A SCADA provides digital monitoring and control for industrial processes. The
largest SCADA system is the electric power grid. The grid contains millions of devices
that provide protection and situational awareness services. Using digital controllers
in the grid provides faster reaction times when incidents occur. However, computers
added to a SCADA system increase the risk of cyber attacks. Nevertheless, SCADA
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systems have unique characteristics that distinguish them from computing systems.
SCADA systems have deterministic behavior such that we can precisely describe 1)
the communication taking place in the system, 2) the events occurring in each host,
and 3) the users and their privileges. We want to whitelist these characteristics in
SCADA systems. Such a whitelist removes the risk of attack. By using one, we
can provide a higher level of protection against misuse and insider attacks. In the
following, we define a scenario in a power grid network and propose a security policy
that whitelists its expected behavior.
2.5.1 Setup
For the purpose of this example, suppose we have a set of instruments. N sensors
are measuring a physical property: voltage. The readings from the sensors have to
be sent to a human-machine interface (HMI), for operator inspection. Each sensor
uses a serial link to communicate. To get data from the sensors to the HMI we use
a serial aggregator. The aggregator has serial connections to all the instruments and
has an Ethernet connection to the HMI. Figure 2.13 shows the setup. Specifically,
the aggregator fetches readings from the sensors over the serial links. It packages the
readings into one packet, which it sends over a TCP/IP connection to the HMI. The
aggregator is a Windows box with serial communication and network access.
2.5.2 Operation
In the setup described above, the only purpose of the aggregator is to forward serial
data to the HMI. However, if one uses a fully capable machine to perform that simple
task, that machine has more privileges. Those uneeded privileges can be exploited
by an insider to gain access into the control network. The principle of least privilege
suggests that “Every program and every user of the system should operate using the
least set of privileges necessary to complete the job” [105]. This reduces the damage
that can occur during compromise or misuse. We want to implement least privilege







Figure 2.13: SCADA setup with sensors and aggregation.
The whitelist works for this device because it has a single purpose; the aggregator is
not intended to browse the web or interact with any service beyond the sensors and
the single HMI. Conceptually, the operation of the aggregator can be represented in
Unix-style command line notation as follows:
read-serial <COM#> | combine | write-network <HMI-IP>
The security policy used to whitelist operations in the serial aggregator is represented
as a state machine in Figure 2.14. The state diagram represents the exact operations
allowed; the process read-serial reads the device N times, and the readings are sent
to the combine process via a pipe, which only combines the data and sends them to
the write-network process. This process connects to the HMI at a known IP address
and sends the data. At that point there is only one allowed operation: the serial read
can start again and repeat the process. This whitelist has some limitations, as it does












Figure 2.14: The deterministic finite state machine of operation of serial aggregator.
• The process view is limited to the serial aggregator process and the network
process;
• The serial aggregator process can connect only to the serial ports and pipes
where it has no network access;
• The network process can communicate only with a single IP address (that of
the HMI);
• The processes are not allowed to write to file system files; and
• The processes are not allowed to fork new processes.
To implement these features, the security policy in Kobra has the following
constants for each of our views. Only our three processes, read-serial, combine,
and write-network, are allowed to start. We identify those by a list of secure hashes
of their binary files. The communication view only allows limited pipe and network
communication to the HMI-IP. Only packets destined for the HMI are allowed. Only
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serial devices are allowed to work, and only read-serial processes can access them.
Finally, at the event view, the event sequence has to follow the state machine in
Figure 2.14.
2.6 Related Work
The techniques for host-based anomaly detection can be classified according to the
collected data, the extracted features, and the detection methods.
2.6.1 Data Collected
Collection of system calls and function calls in modern operating systems is not
possible without lowering the security stature of the OS [103]. In our work, instead
of extracting a subset of the features in the network and file activity traces (e.g.,
bandwidth), we collect continuous file and network activity and use the whole trace
for analysis. Creech and Hu [30] and Hofmeyr et al. [58] collected system calls;
Peiser and Bishop [96] collected function calls; Tang et al. [121] collected architectural
information, e.g., cache misses; Malone et al. [80] collected hardware performance
counters, e.g., INS; and, finally, Gao et al. [44] collected “gray-box” measurements.
2.6.2 Features
After collection, monitoring data features are extracted for anomaly detection. Sev-
eral approaches have been proposed in which data are arranged into: (1) short se-
quences in which events are represented with sequential natural numbers [58] (n-
grams), (2) frequency and wavelet transformation coefficients [79], (3) entropy values,
or (4) Fisher scores [121]. Selected features should discriminate between normal and
anomalous behavior. In our work, the features consist of the decomposition of the
traces over the learned set of basis vectors, as opposed to designed features. Thus,
our features are always well-suited for the supplied data.
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2.6.3 Analysis Method
Finally, the selected features are used to learn normal behaviors; we refer interested
readers to the extensive surveys by Agrawal and Agrawal [3] and Kandhari et al. [64]
on anomaly detection. On top of the surveys, some researchers use Markov models [21,
43] or finite state machines [110] to learn relationships between operations. Such
methods do not take into account delays and call semantics. PCA methods have
gained popularity [132]. They transform the data into independent components for
clustering; PCA only considers second-order statistics, unlike learned dictionaries,
which exploit the data beyond those statistics.
2.6.4 Monitoring Software
Dunlap et al. [32] argue that the logging capabilities of the kernel are not trustworthy,
and, they moved logging to a hypervisor. They record all events that occur in a guest,
including CPU counters, network messages, file I/O, and interaction with the periph-
erals. OSck [56] implements rootkit protection by monitoring kernel integrity. The
trust argument for hypervisor monitoring has been weakened by multiple compromises
from hardware below [49] and from guest machines above [135]. The semantics gained
from monitoring in the kernel instead of the hypervisor outweighs the (already weak-
ened) trust argument. OSSEC [54] and AIDE [99] provide kernel-level monitoring of
the registry and file integrity. These tools do not provide process-tagged activity for
behavior analysis.
Work in securing and monitoring kernels has been done on different levels. Meth-
ods include host-based intrusion detection system (HIDSes), direct kernel inspection,
and virtual machine introspection (VMI).
Host intrusion detection system (HIDS) software sets up local agents on a host.
The agents, much like Kobra, collect logs from installed applications and the kernel
to detect malicious events. OSSEC [54] provides an administrator with the ability to
do rootkit detection, log analysis, Windows registry monitoring, and active response.
OSSEC’s log analysis engine supports a wide range of applications that are used in
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servers. Since OSSEC sits at the kernel level, however, it is extremely vulnerable
to kernel compromises and malicious state changes. Tripwire [66] and AIDE [99]
provide tools to create a snapshot of the system to be used as an integrity checker. The
Prelude Hybrid IDS is a universal security information and event management system
(SIEM) [140]. Prelude collects information from all possible log sources, normalizes
it, and stores it for analysis. The idea behind Prelude is that it is harder for the
attacker to fake the large number of input sensors. In general, none of the HIDS
packages provide a formal way to represent data collected from the system, and all
of them use ad hoc methods to correlate different data sources.
Other work [56, 68, 118] implements kernel-level tools to detect malicious activity.
Barebox performs malware analysis without virtualization; however, it only targets
user-mode malware. OSck detects rootkits by instrumenting kernel data. Finally,
work by Sun et al. [118] hooks API calls to stop injected code by monitoring system
service calls. The authors inspect API calls to behaviorally detect legitimate calls.
API hooking does not give a complete view of the state of a kernel. Moreover, KPP
in Windows 7 prevents hooking API calls. SPECTRE leverages SMM to inspect the
system state.
Finally, some researchers exploit virtualization to monitor a host. Virtualization
provides the monitor with higher privileges than a guest virtual machine would have,
thus deterring a wide range of attacks. BareCloud [69] detects malware by comparing
resource use of malware run on a bare-metal system to that of the same malware
running with virtualization to detect evasive techniques. Lycosid [62] counts the
number of address spaces in a VM to detect hidden processes. Virtualization promises
isolation of monitoring, but exploits have always plagued hypervisors. Moreover, low
level monitoring loses the context and the richness of the data.
2.7 Conclusion
We proposed a method to model application behavioral baselines by using monitoring
data obtained from the kernel in a practical way. While typical anomaly-detection
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methods assume access to low-level system calls, in this work, we use file and network
activity captured by Kobra, a kernel-monitoring and anomaly-detection engine. We
propose a novel transformation from Kobra’s data to a complex-valued discrete-
time signal. The signals are used to learn a sparse representation dictionary and a
latent semantic analysis transformation that serve as a behavioral baseline for each
application. The generated baseline captures the uniqueness of an application. Our
approach is effective in detecting simulated attacks with a low false-positive rate.
Moreover, Kobra has low overhead and is stable for online operation.
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CHAPTER 3
HIERARCHICAL FUSION OF MONITORING
DATA
Image 3.1: Network (Credit: XKCD)
Resiliency is the ability of a system to maintain proper service when facing abnor-
mal changes. In this chapter, we focus on resiliency to intrusions in networks and
distributed systems. With the growth in size and complexity of these systems, it
has become practically impossible to prevent all intrusions. Resiliency provides an
additional layer of security by detecting the intrusions and controlling the effects of
these intrusions while maintaining system service.
Monitoring the operation of a system is essential to achieving resiliency. Monitor-
ing information is used to estimate the current state of the system, detect intrusions,
and drive response actions.
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In any real-life system, the volume of information that is required in order to
construct a system-wide state can grow rapidly, imposing significant challenges on
any analysis for resiliency, such as intrusion detection [13, 119]. Previous approaches
that tried to process the large volume of information for intrusion detection have not
been adopted in practice. Most of these approaches require significant manual effort
and domain expertise to build models for intrusion detection. Moreover, since the
models are built based on what has already been observed in the system, detection
of previously unseen intrusions may fail. These approaches are also unable to detect
attacks that happen over a long period of time, such as long-lasting targeted attacks
and coordinated attacks. This is evidenced by the fact that many attacks are detected
long after a significant loss has already been incurred [128].
To address the problem of information overhead in constructing a system-wide
state, we propose a distributed data fusion framework. This framework formally
specifies how information should be collected, exchanged, and transformed to detect
certain intrusions and possibly respond to them. This framework also allows us
to reduce resource overhead on a central location and provide a robust processing
architecture.
We demonstrate the use of the proposed fusion framework in detecting lateral
movement behavior. Observed in many long-lasting targeted attacks such as advanced
persistent threats (APTs), lateral movement is the phase of an attack in which the
attacker tries to expand control over other machines in a network starting from one
compromised machine. Detection of lateral movement imposes significant challenges
in terms of information overhead, and requires coordination among multiple entities
in a system.
In the previous chapter we presented Kobra, a kernel-level monitor that fused
low-level events to build a behavioral model of an application. Kobra generates
custom views of the system that represent its state as a graph. In this chapter, we
use the views generated by a kernel-level monitor to represent a view of network
communication and process communication. The fused view of communication is
used to detect lateral movement in the whole network.
In our approach, monitoring and fusion agents at different levels across the system
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coordinate to detect lateral movement. The agents are arranged in a hierarchy from
the host level, to the cluster (group of hosts) level, to the global level.
The host-level agents collect process information from the kernel and infer causal-
ity relationships between incoming and outgoing network connections. A causation
relation implies that there is a dependency between the incoming and outgoing con-
nections. Use of kernel-level information allows us to infer the connection causations
more accurately than we could by just using timing information or port numbers. The
higher-level cluster agents use abstracted data from host-level agents and construct
a graph of lateral movement. Finally, the global agent uses the information from the
cluster agents to generate a global view of lateral movement in the system.
We demonstrate that the distributed fusion enables lateral movement detection
in large systems by distributing the storage and processing overhead among multiple
clusters. We also show that fairness and locality of information among clusters can
be achieved using different types of host clustering approaches.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
• We propose a distributed data fusion framework for system resiliency, and for-
malize different fusion requirements within our framework (Section 3.1).
• We show the utility of our framework by developing agent-based monitoring
and fusion mechanisms to detect lateral movement behavior in an enterprise
system (Sections 3.2, and 3.3).
• We propose a method to infer communication causation events by collecting
and analyzing kernel-level process activities on a host (Section 3.3).
• We perform a trace-based simulation experiment to evaluate the lateral move-
ment detection approach in terms of scalability, fairness of distributed process-
ing, and quality of local states at higher-level agents (Section 3.4).
• We use DTrace on an OS X machine to implement a prototype host-level data
collection and processing agent, and we evaluate its overhead (Section 3.4).
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3.1 Data Fusion Framework
Data fusion, in a general sense, is defined as a set of tools and techniques to combine
data originating from different sources. Data fusion aims to obtain information of
greater quality [11]. Data fusion is required for intrusion resiliency to obtain a holistic
view of the system state that can be acted upon without overwhelming the analyses.
This leads us to define the components and formalism of our data fusion framework
as follows.
3.1.1 Components of Data Fusion
The main building blocks of our fusion framework are the agents that are responsible
for monitoring and fusion in a computing system. More precisely, agents perform
data collection, transformation, and transmission. The communication structure of
these agents is defined by a fusion architecture.
Data collection Agents collect data by monitoring a local computer system or
communicating with other agents. The data available to an agent at time t represent
the local state of the agent at time t. For example, we can implement an agent to
collect kernel-level activities on a host machine.
Data transformation The agents can apply transformation functions on their lo-
cal state to convert it into different representations. In most cases, the purpose of
transformation is to decrease the level of complexity of the system state representa-
tion. We say that this process increases the level of abstraction. The highest level of
abstraction is the entire system view, while the lowest level could be a very detailed
view of what an individual agent observes. A higher-level abstraction provides a more
concise view of a larger part of the system at the cost of some information loss.
Data transmission The agents send a transformed representation of local state to
other agents. Triggering events or triggers determine when the data are transmitted.
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The triggers can be periodic, i.e., based on a function of time, or state-specific, i.e.,
based on a function of the agent’s current state.
Fusion architecture The fusion architecture defines how the agents communicate
in order to disseminate the data among themselves to achieve a specific goal. Agents
can communicate to one central server or among themselves in a distributed manner.
One can divide the agents into multiple levels of hierarchies to build a hierarchical
fusion architecture. The agents that are higher in the hierarchy receive data from
lower-level agents and apply transformations to fuse and convert the low-level data
to the right level of abstraction.
Different hierarchical structures provide a tradeoff between communication over-
head and robustness. A centralized structure is simple and incurs less communication
overhead. However, the central collection agent at the root of the tree is a single point
of failure. A fully distributed architecture, on the other extreme, is more robust to
failures but comes with additional communication overhead. The number of levels in
the hierarchy and the communication protocol at each level can be chosen based on
the goal of fusion. We describe and evaluate these variations in later sections.
3.1.2 Data Fusion Framework
Definition 1. The fusion framework F is defined as a quadruple (G, f, g,T).
G : A directed graph G(V,E) that defines the fusion architecture. The set of vertices,
V = {1, 2, . . . , n}, represents the agents in the system. The set of edges, E ⊆
V × V , represents the communication structure of the agents.
f : A set of transformation functions, {fi|x̂i = fi(xi),∀i ∈ V }, applied by an agent
to fuse and abstract local data. The output of the function fi is x̂i, the current
state of the agent i.
g : A set of transformation functions, {gj|x̂j ′ = gj(x̂j),∀j ∈ E}, that an agent can
apply before sending the local state to another agent located on the tail endpoint
of edge j.
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T : A set of temporal propositions, {Tj,∀j ∈ E}, that represents the triggering events
that cause the agent to send data along edge j to the agent at the tail endpoint.
Figure 3.1 shows examples of different ways in which the fusion framework can be
instantiated. In all of the architectures, at agent i, the local state x̂i is transformed
into x̂i
′ = g(x̂i) and sent to another agent. Figure 3.1a shows a centralized archi-
tecture in which the root of the tree is a collection agent that receives data from its
child agents. It can combine and increase the level of abstraction of the data received
from the children. Figure 3.1b shows an extension of the centralized architecture with
multiple levels of hierarchy. In this three-level structure, the lowest-level agents are
divided into multiple clusters, with each cluster having one leader to collect informa-
tion from the lowest-level agents. The cluster leaders then send their information to
a global leader that is at the root of the tree. Finally, Figure 3.1c shows a variation
of the hierarchical architecture in which the agents in the topmost level communi-
cate in a distributed manner. Grouping of hosts into clusters is shown by the dotted
boundaries. Depending upon the underlying network topology, different clustering al-
gorithms can be used for different trade-offs among scalability, fairness of distributed
processing, and quality of local state.
3.2 Lateral Movement
Using the fusion framework proposed in Section 3.1, we describe our approach to
detect lateral movement. We first define lateral movement and argue for the necessity
of detecting such behavior. Then, we give an overview of our approach.
3.2.1 Lateral Movement
Even though cyber intrusions take many forms, most forms have a common anatomy,
described by Lockheed Martin Corp.’s intrusion kill chain [59]. The phases of attack
in this kill chain are reconnaissance, weaponization, delivery, exploitation, lateral
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(c) Two levels with distributed communication at the top level.
Figure 3.1: Examples of the fusion framework instantiation.
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with social engineering, spear-phishing, or malware. Exploitation is done by gaining
privileged access on a host and establishing command and control (C2). Then, the
attacker performs lateral movement, which involves use of legitimate services to move
to other hosts in the network. This allows the attacker to expand his or her control
over the system and eventually reach a set of target machines. After lateral movement,
the attacker maintains access to the system to eventually achieve some malicious goal,
such as data exfiltration or service disruption.
We focus on the lateral movement phase because if we are able to detect and thwart
an attack in this phase, we can prevent the system from sustaining more serious
damage. Recently, lateral movement played an important part in the Ukrainian
power grid control network compromise. After using spear-phishing to gain access to
the internal network, the attackers used VPN and remote desktop to move laterally
through the system and control hosts in order to trip breakers in substations [107].
In this work, we detect all lateral movement chains, whether they are malicious
(e.g., part of an intrusion kill chain) or benign (e.g., a system-wide administrative
task [35]). Since an attacker may hide lateral movement by using the benign chains
of events in the system [104], it is difficult to distinguish between benign activity and
malicious behavior that hides within such activity. Therefore, we believe that finding
all possible chains of events that are related to each other is the first step towards
discovering evidence of malicious lateral movement.
3.2.2 General Overview of Approach
In our work, we use a hierarchical fusion architecture to fuse host process communi-
cation information and network connection information to track lateral movement as
it happens in the system.
Intuitively, lateral movement can be thought of as a targeted walk on a network
graph such that sequential pairs of steps are causally related. To track this walk, we
need to detect series of ordered network connections between hosts. However, not all
network connections between hosts will be part of lateral movement. It is typical to
use known port numbers or timing to correlate incoming and outgoing connections in
67
a host. This leads to a high number of false positives and false negatives. To improve
the accuracy of correlation, we monitor inter-process communications to establish a
causality relation between incoming and outgoing connections on each host across the
system.
Figure 3.2 shows an overview of our approach for using distributed data fusion to
detect lateral movement. Each host in the system maintains a process communication
graph (PC-graph) by monitoring inter-process communication. The host uses the
PC-graph to infer causation between incoming and outgoing connections. When a
connection causation event is detected, the host contracts the PC-graph and sends an
update to a higher-level collection agent. In a network, hosts are clustered into sets;
each cluster has a leader that collects connection causation events. The leader then
uses the events to build a host communication graph (HC-graph). The HC-graph
tracks related connections between hosts and, thus, tracks lateral movement. Finally,
as the network grows in size, maintenance of a full HC-graph becomes infeasible. We
then create a third-level abstraction in which a global leader collects abstracted views
of the HC-graphs from the clusters in the network.
To summarize, the global agent stores the most abstracted view (cluster commu-
nication); the cluster leaders store a more detailed view (host communication); and
host-level agents store the least abstracted view (process communication). As we go
up the hierarchy, the purview increases, but the level of detail about the commu-
nication becomes more abstracted. Thus, in essence, our data fusion architecture
generates a global communication graph.
3.3 Lateral Movement Detection
Based on the high-level overview of our approach given in Section 3.2.2, we now detail
our detection technique. First, we introduce the data models used to represent system
state. Then, we propose two different fusion architectures for generating the state.

















Figure 3.2: A host-level monitor collects inter-process communication events and
generates a process communication (PC) graph. It extracts connection causation
events from the PC-graph and sends them to a cluster leader. The cluster leader
fuses the events to construct a host communication (HC) graph. The cluster leader
abstracts the HC-graph and updates a global leader with inter-cluster connection
events. The volume of information decreases as abstraction level increases.
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3.3.1 Data Model
Lateral movement behavior is a chain of communication events; we track these com-
munication events and represent them as system state. In this section, we formally
define communication events and the communication causation relation. We use the
communication causation events to define a communication causation graph (CC-
graph). We also formally define the host communication graph (HC-graph) and the
transformation from a CC-graph to an HC-graph.
We consider communication to be any event by which two entities exchange in-
formation. Communication flows are directional by nature; nevertheless, information
flow might be symmetric. Communication occurs on multiple levels in a system: at
the network level between hosts, and at the host level between processes.
Definition 2. The universe of communication events is defined as C. A communica-
tion initiated from A to B is defined as a communication event c =
−→
AB, where c ∈ C.
The communication event is initiated at time t(
−→
AB) and has a unique ID h(
−→
AB)1.
We define the system state according to the causation relation between connec-
tion events. In lateral movement, an attacker starts from a host X, moves to a host
Y, and then uses host Y to target other hosts. This malicious connection from Y
to the other hosts is caused by the malicious connection from X to Y. Connection
causality in lateral movement is the existence of a flow of events that signify a depen-
dency between an outgoing connection and an incoming connection. Instead of using
only temporal ordering among network events to establish causality, we use host-level
process communication to find a dependency path between the process that sent an
outgoing connection, and the process that receives a connection. By using host-level
process communication information, we increase the accuracy of the inferred connec-
tion causalities. We formally define connection causation below. In Section 3.3.4, we
describe the procedure to infer communication causation relations by using process
communication graphs.
1A connection is easy to identify; e.g., in TCP, the hash of port numbers and sequence numbers
in a SYN message is unique. Moreover, t(c) is relative to a universal system clock.
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Definition 3. Let x, y ∈ C be communication events. Connection causation is a
relation of the form xy such that y was caused by x. This form xy is also termed
a causation event2.
Now we construct the communication causation graph that directly represents the
lateral movement behavior.
Definition 4. The communication causation graph (CC-graph) is a directed graph
CCG = (V,E, ℓV ) where the set of vertices is the observed communication events in
the system, and an edge connecting two vertices signifies a causation relation between
the two communication events. The function ℓV : V → h(C) labels the vertices with
an ID taken from the set of connection IDs.
The CC-graph represents connection events as vertices and is thus unbounded in
the number of vertices, since the connections in a system are unbounded. State-of-
the-art theoretic analysis of dynamic graphs only considers insertion and deletion of
edges, whereas graphs with changing vertices (e.g., CC-graphs) are not fully studied.
Thus, we propose to transform the CC-graph to a host communication graph that has
a static number of vertices.
Definition 5. The host communication graph (HC-graph) is a directed graph HCG =
(V,E, ℓV , ℓE) where the set of vertices represents hosts in the system, and the set of
edges represents connections. The function ℓV : V → ΣV labels a vertex with an ID
taken from the set of host IDs ΣV , and ℓE : E → ΣE labels an edge with an ID and a
bit array b.
For every host, the edge ID on an incoming connection represents a bit mask on
the bit array of every outgoing edge. When causation event x y is added, the mask
is used to set on edge y the bit positions represented by the ID of edge x.
In most cases, any two incident edges in the HC-graph define a causation relation
between two unique connections. However, when a host is reused during lateral
movement, some incident edges in the graph will not correspond to valid causation
2If x y then t(x) < t(y), and if x y  z then t(x) < t(y) < t(z).
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relations. Those ambiguities are clarified using the unbounded bit arrays on the edges
of the HC-graph.
To transform a CC-graph into an HC-graph, we take each causation event ck =−−−→
HiHj 
−−−→
HjHk and add it to the HC-graph as two directed edges e1, e2, such that:
• e1 = (vi, vj) s.t. (ℓV (vi) = Hi) ∧ (ℓV (vj) = Hj).
• e2 = (vj, vk) s.t. (ℓV (vj) = Hj) ∧ (ℓV (vk) = Hk).
• ℓE(e1) = (id1, b1), where id1 is unique to e1.
• ℓE(e2) = (id2, b2), where b2[id1] = 1 and id2 is unique to e2.
The bit array used to represent the causation events in the HC-graph is un-
bounded. In practice, we want a bounded scheme to represent those events. De-
pending on the usage of the HC-graph for detection, a few different methods may be
used to encode the causation events:
1. unbounded
2. limited history, in which the size of the bit array is fixed and old data are
overwritten during an overflow;
3. probabilistic, in which a Bloom filter is used for each edge to encode the
causation events; and
4. nondeterministic, in which no explicit causation relations are stored on the
edges. In the nondeterministic case, the structure of the HC-graph still guar-
antees that there exists a valid HC-graph to CC-graph transformation.
Finally, a valid HC-graph should simulate a CC-graph. We define a simulation
relation as a one-to-one mapping from an HC-graph to a CC-graph, in which the
connection IDs are unique but not exactly reproduced. For a valid HC-graph, we
define a function that maps an HC-graph to a CC-graph. For each pair of incident
edges e1(v0, v1), e2(v1, v2) ⊆ E × E in the HC-graph, if the pair represents a valid
causation event e1  e2, then two vertices E1, E2 connected by an edge e
′(E1, E2) are
added to the CC-graph.
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3.3.2 Centralized Architecture
We can detect lateral movement by joining pieces of the local graph together to
construct a global graph of attacker movement. Using our fusion framework, we
can define a 2-level fusion architecture (Figure 3.1b). In that setting, monitoring
agents on all hosts maintain a local process communication graph, which is contracted
whenever a causation event occurs. Each agent then sends the causation event. We
now describe the fusion algorithm that uses the received causation events to maintain
a set of HC-graphs.
We model the system state as a set of HC-graphs G = G1, G2, · · · , Gk. This state
represents possible lateral movement chains as they are being tracked by the central
collection agent. Each time a new causation event is received, the state is updated.
In particular, Algorithm 3 updates the state by first searching for the connection IDs
in each of the graphs (line 2). If neither of the connection IDs is found, a new graph
is created and added to the state (line 15). If only one of the connection IDs is found,
a new edge is added to the corresponding graph (line 8). If both connection IDs are
found, then the graphs are merged (line 11).
The collection agent also maintains a hash table for storing the connection IDs
and the graph in which the connection is represented. The search function checks
this hash table for the connection.





HjHk. It then inserts two edges e1(Hi, Hj) and e2(Hj, Hk) into Gk. We
use a shorthand G′k = Gk + c for the addevent function.
The causation events allow the collection agent to receive out-of-order messages,
because timing information is encoded in the semantics of the relation. The merge
function is used to merge two lateral movement graphs when a causation event is
received out of order. It takes as input two HC-graphs and adds all the edges from
one graph to the other.
Proposition 3.1. HC-Graph-Maintain has a constant amortized runtime com-
plexity, O(1).
Proof. The HC-Graph-Maintain algorithm is an online algorithm. The search
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Algorithm 3 System State Maintenance
Require: G = {G1, G2, · · · , Gk}
Require: c = x y
1: procedure HC-Graph-Maintain
2: Gi ← search(G, x)
3: Gk ← search(G, y)
4: if Gi = ∅ & Gk ̸= ∅ then
5: addevent(Gk, c)
6: end if
7: if Gi ̸= ∅ & Gk = ∅ then
8: addevent(Gi, c)
9: end if
10: if Gi ̸= ∅ & Gk ̸= ∅ then
11: Gm ← merge(Gi,Gk,c)
12: G ← G \ {Gi, Gk} ∪Gm
13: end if
14: if Gi = ∅ & Gk = ∅ then
15: G ← G ∪ newgraph(c)
16: end if
17: end procedure
function uses a hash table that has O(1) amortized runtime complexity. The ad-
devent function runs in constant time O(1). The merge function has a runtime
O(min(|E1|, |E2|). The worst-case running time occurs when we merge graphs every
time the size of the input doubles. That is, we merge graphs of sizes 1, 2, 4, . . . , n/2, n,
where n is the number of causation events. The total worst-case running time is
1 + 2+ 4+ . . .+ n/2+ n < 2n. Thus, the worst-case amortized runtime complexity of
the algorithm is O(1).
Finally, we validate the state maintenance algorithm by proving inductively that
each operation should keep the state (i.e., all the HC-graphs) valid.
Proposition 3.2. HC-Graph-Maintain generates a set of valid HC-graphs.
Proof. For |G| = 0 (i.e., no graphs in the state), a new graph containing the vertices
and edges involved in the causation is added. An HC-graph with one causation event
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can simulate a CC-graph. Assume we have |G| = n valid graphs. When we receive a
new event e, there are three cases:
• The search leads to one match, and the event is added to the respective graph.
The addition of the event maintains the validity of the graph because the event
is added to the simulated CC-graph.
• The graphs G1 and G2 are to be merged. Since a graph can be seen as a series
of event additions, G2 =
∑
i ei, merge inserts the sequence of events of G2 into
G1. Since adding an event preserves validity, adding a sequence of events also
preserves validity.
• No matches exist, so a new graph is created with a single event. This is similar
to the base case.
3.3.3 Multilevel Hierarchical Architecture
The centralized fusion architecture works well for smaller systems. However, as the
system size increases, the local computing and network bandwidth requirements at
the central location may lead to poor performance of the overall system. The central
agent also becomes a single point of failure.
To address the weaknesses of the centralized architecture, we propose a hierarchi-
cal architecture. In this setup, we group the host-level agents into multiple clusters.
One agent in the cluster is chosen as the cluster leader that receives causation events
from all host-level agents in the same cluster. A cluster leader applies suitable trans-
formations to the received events and shares the transformed events with other cluster
leaders or a global leader. The hierarchical architecture is thus an extension of the
centralized architecture, since it consists of multiple centralized clusters of agents that
coordinate with each other on the next level of abstraction.
To show that our data model and fusion framework can be extended to specify a
hierarchical architecture, we describe a three-level hierarchical architecture, shown in
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Figure 3.1b. It is easy to see that the same method can be applied to other types of
hierarchical architectures. As in the centralized case, the host agents in the three-level
hierarchical architecture maintain a process communication graph and send causation
events to the cluster leader. Each cluster leader acts as the centralized collection agent
for its cluster and uses Algorithm 3 to maintain HC-graphs. At a cluster leader, the
external hosts (i.e., hosts that are not in the cluster) in an HC-graph will have either
no incoming edges (a source vertex) or no outgoing edges (a sink vertex). From the
definition of the HC-graph, since a cluster leader can receive causation events only
from hosts within the cluster, it can never merge two graphs that have an external
host in common.
A cluster leader abstracts its HC-graphs and generates a cluster communication
graph (CL-graph), which we define as follows.
Definition 6. A cluster communication graph, CLG = (V,E, ℓV , ℓE), is a graph
where the set of vertices represents cluster leaders and an edge (c1, c2) ∈ E represents
the connection from a host in cluster c1 to a host in cluster c2. The function ℓV :
V → ΣV labels the vertices with an ID taken from the set of cluster IDs ΣV , and
ℓE : E → ΣE labels the edges with connection IDs between the two hosts.
Transformation function at cluster leader: The transformation function applied
by a cluster leader to abstract the local state (HC-graph) into the higher-level CL-
graph is as follows. On receiving a new causation event from the host-level agent,
the cluster leader c looks for an outgoing connection in the HC-graph. If there is
one, it does a backwards traversal to find all the incoming connections present in
the same HC-graph; also, the cluster leader collapses consecutive vertices that share
the same cluster ID into a single vertex representing that cluster ID, while retaining
connection IDs on the edges. This algorithm generates inter-cluster connection chains
with an incoming connection to cluster c, causing an outgoing connection from cluster
c. These inter-cluster connection chains are sent to the global leader.
Trigger events: We consider only one trigger event: the existence of an outgoing
connection from the cluster c that is caused by an incoming connection to the cluster.
Transformation at the global leader: The global leader fuses the inter-cluster con-
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nection chains received from different cluster leaders. It runs an algorithm similar to
Algorithm 3 at the cluster-level abstraction. The CL-graph maintained at the global
leader exposes the system-wide lateral movement chains.
We believe that the multilevel hierarchical architecture is suitable for most real-
life systems and provides a balance between communication overhead and robustness,
because it adopts the scale-out model rather than the scale-up model of the centralized
architecture. The scalability benefits will be shown in a detailed evaluation presented
in Section 3.4.
3.3.4 Causation Event Generation on Hosts
The fusion architecture uses the causation events emitted by host-level agents to
build the HC-graphs. A host-level agent uses process communication events to infer
causation relations. We use process communication instead of pure timing information
between connections in order to reduce false causation relations. For example, a
causation event is inferred when a process in a host receives a connection, forks a new
process, and then creates an outgoing connection to a new host.
To infer causation events, we build a process communication graph that contains
time-ordered remote and local process interactions.
There are three types of elements in a process communication graph: a local
process, a remote process, and a file. A process is identified by a unique identifier,
and not by the OS-supplied PID, which is reused; a remote process is identified by the
port number and addresses of the remote host; and a file is identified by the unique
ID assigned by a file system, and not by the file name.
We consider three types of process communication events: 1) a network connection
with a remote process, 2) a transient communication (a local interprocess communi-
cation, memory operation, or file read), and 3) a permanent state change (a file or
Registry write). All these events, except file reads and writes, are bidirectional.
Definition 7. The process communication graph (PC-graph) is a graph PCG =
(V,E, t), where the set of vertices corresponds to processes and files, an edge con-
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necting two vertices represents a process communication, and the function t labels the
edges with a time interval [ti, tj] of the communication.
The time interval [ti, tj] denotes the time when the communication channel was
established, ti, and the time of the last observed communication, tj. When a com-
munication channel such as shared memory between processes as opposed to sockets
and pipes cannot be observed, we assume that the channel is active at all times.
A host-level agent monitors processes and collects the relevant communication
events. When a new event is observed, the PC-graph is updated through addition of
a process/file vertex with the relevant attributes, or through addition or updating of
an edge with the observed time. The timestamps of the communication events are
sampled using the system’s provided timestamps.
We use the PC-graph to infer causation events. A causation event is emitted when
a valid path is found. A valid path starts from an incoming connection edge, passes
through a set of communicating processes whose periods of activity are sequential or
overlapping, and ends on an outgoing connection edge.
Definition 8. A valid path is defined as p = rin, . . . , pi, ei, pj, ei+1, pk, . . . rout, where
• The outgoing connection, rout, happens before the incoming connection rin, i.e.,
t(rin) < t(rout),
• t(ei) and t(ei+1) overlap, and
• t(ei) happened before t(ei+1).
We find these causation events using Algorithm 4. The algorithm, a modified
depth-first search (DFS), walks the graph starting from an outgoing connection edge
until an incoming connection edge is found. At every step, the algorithm picks edges
such that the properties in the valid path are satisfied.
The algorithm has a worst-case runtime complexity of O(|E| + |V |). However,
the PC-graph is not fully connected, and has many disconnected sub-graphs. So in
the average case, MOD-DFS will only walk smaller sub-graphs. Section 3.4.3 shows
that the overhead of our prototype host-level agent is less than 10%.
78
Algorithm 4 Modified Depth First Search (DFS)
1: procedure Mod-DFS(G,v,e)
2: if v is an incoming connection then
3: trigger causation event
4: end if
5: if all edges to v are visited then
6: label v as discovered
7: end if
8: for edge k=(w,v) in time-ordered set G.E(v) do






To reduce the memory overhead of the host-level agent, we prune the PC-graph
to remove those processes that no longer affect running processes. When a process
is terminated or a file is deleted, the agent removes the process from the PC-graph if
all reachable processes from the terminated process have terminated. However, if the
process has a path to a file write event, then the process is not removed until the file
itself is removed or overwritten.
3.4 Evaluation
We used a discrete-time simulator to study the performance trade-offs of the proposed
lateral movement detection approach. We focused mainly on evaluating our hypoth-
esis that the resource overhead on the leader can be distributed using the multilevel
hierarchical fusion architecture for lateral movement detection. First, we implemented
the algorithms presented in Section 3.3. Next, we simulated lateral movement over
a network topology, and ran our fusion algorithms using the simulation traces. We
evaluated the scalability of the hierarchical fusion by implementing different cluster-
ing techniques and computing fairness and locality metrics. Finally, we evaluated




We modeled a generalized lateral movement as a set of two-state Markov chains at
every node. The transition probabilities between the states are affected by the state
of neighboring nodes. The complete system dynamics are expressed in Equation (3.1).
Pi = (I + βA)Pi−1, (3.1)
where Pi ∈ Rn×1 is a probability vector describing whether a node has been visited at
time i, A ∈ {1, 0}n×n is the network topology, and β is the rate of node traversal. The
rate of traversal describes the aggressiveness of the attacker during lateral movement;
a high value of β denotes an aggressive attacker, signifying fast lateral movement. We
model the skill level of an attacker, α, as the probability that a host in the system is
exploitable by the attacker.
The simulation starts by using the attacker’s skill level to pre-select hosts that are
vulnerable. Then, the simulation runs the dynamic model from Equation (3.1), and
generates a trace of causation events to evaluate the proposed framework for lateral
movement detection. Table 3.1 shows the values of the simulation parameters that
we used in our experiment. The network topology is a generalized random graph
(GRG) with probability γ. As mentioned in Section 3.3.3, the trigger event is an
outgoing connection from a cluster, and the transformation function is the cluster-
level abstraction. For the centralized fusion architecture, all the events are processed
by a centralized collection agent. For the hierarchical architecture, the nodes are
assigned to distinct clusters.
Table 3.1: Simulation Parameters.
Parameter Value Parameter Value
Number of nodes (n) 5,000 GRG probability (γ) 0.027
Aggressiveness (β) 1/10.0 Skill set (α) 0.7
We evaluated the performance and effectiveness of four different host-clustering
methods, given below.
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• Random: Randomly divide the nodes into a fixed number of clusters.
• Page rank: Divide the neighborhood of high-page-rank nodes into clusters.
• Hierarchical clustering: Divide the graph by greedily optimizing the modu-
larity metric.
• Spectral clustering: Identify connected sets of nodes as clusters by computing
the graph Laplacian and clustering the top k eigenvectors.
3.4.2 Results
In the centralized data fusion architecture, one global collection agent or leader per-
forms all the event processing. This collection agent has a complete view of the system
state, but it requires a lot of resources to handle the events from the whole system
and is a single point of failure. On the other hand, the hierarchical architecture dis-
tributes the load among the clusters. However, every cluster has a limited view of the
system, and the global leader agent has a more abstracted view of the whole system.
In order to study the trade-off between performance and quality of system view at
cluster leaders in the hierarchical architecture, we varied the number of clusters for
different clustering methods and computed the following metrics: 1) resource usage
at the global leader, 2) resource usage at cluster leaders, 3) resource fairness among
clusters, and 4) locality of graphs at cluster leaders.
To study the resource usage on the global leader, we measured the number of
messages sent from the cluster leaders to the global leader. The results in Figure 3.3a
show that when there is only one cluster, which is the centralized case, all of the
messages are processed by the global agent. The number of messages is reduced
by a factor of 100 when there are two clusters. For all the clustering methods, the
number of messages always decreases as the number of clusters increases. However,
the number of messages sent for random clustering is about 10 times higher than
for the other clustering methods. The reason is that the trigger event occurs more
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frequently in random clustering because of the random manner in which nodes are
clustered.
Next, we measured the average size of the graph (number of messages) maintained
by each cluster leader. As shown in Figure 3.3b, for all the clustering methods,
the average graph size decreases as the number of clusters increases. The random
clustering generates smaller graphs at the cluster leaders than the other clustering
methods do. That happens because the random clustering uniformly divides the
network into clusters, so each cluster leader will have a small graph.
Ideally, the hierarchical architecture should distribute the communication and
processing workload fairly among the clusters. To evaluate the fairness, we measured
the standard deviation of the set of graph sizes for all the clusters. The standard
deviation describes the distribution of the measurements around the average. If the
standard deviation is low, then the resource usage per cluster is balanced. If the
standard deviation is high, then the resource usage per cluster is not balanced, and
some clusters use more resources than others to maintain the local HC-graphs. As
shown in Figure 3.4a, we observed that the number of clusters and fairness are not
correlated, and that fairness is affected by the clustering method. For each clustering
method, when the number of clusters is more than 30, the fairness converges to a
singular value. The reason is that each cluster has a very small number of nodes,
and thus the local graph is also very small. Moreover, the page rank clustering
performs poorly in terms of fairness, giving the highest standard deviation of all
the methods because it produces unbalanced clusters because of the nature of the
generated random graph.
Finally, we evaluated the locality of the HC-graphs at a cluster leader. The locality
metric aims to measure the quality of the graph for use in local response actions.
Local response mechanisms use the local HC-graph, whose information is limited to
cluster-level causation events. Local response to lateral movement would benefit from
HC-graphs that contain more information pertaining to lateral movement within the
cluster. Thus, we define the graph locality as the fraction of vertices in the graph
that represent internal hosts within the cluster. A larger number for graph locality
means the cluster has a better view of the lateral movement within itself. As shown in
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Figure 3.3: Evaluation results for (a) number of messages received at the global
leader, and (b) local graph size at cluster leaders. The results are averaged over 50
runs of simulation. The envelope around each line is the 95% confidence interval.















































Figure 3.4: Evaluation results for (a) standard deviation of local graph size at
cluster leaders, and (b) the locality of the graph at cluster leaders. The results are
averaged over 50 runs of simulation. The envelope around each line is the 95%
confidence interval.
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Figure 3.4b, we observed that random clustering has the least locality of the graphs at
cluster leaders. The other methods have almost the same locality values. The reason
is that random clustering does not consider the network topology when creating the
clusters. We also observed that the number of clusters has very little effect on the
locality of the graphs.
In summary, for a network size of 5,000 nodes, use of 20–30 clusters achieves an
optimal balance among resource usage, fairness, and quality of the local state. With
more than 30 clusters, the benefits of the hierarchy start to diminish. All of the
clustering methods that utilize underlying graph topology perform well in terms of
reducing the resources needed for the global leader. Finally, while random clustering
has the best fairness measures, it has the worst quality of local graphs.
3.4.3 Host-level Agent Implementation
We used DTrace on OS X to implement a prototype of the host-level agent. The
prototype uses probes from the syscall, proc, and fsinfo providers in the kernel
to collect process communication information. Information collected from DTrace
is piped to a Python program that maintains the PC-graph and prunes the graph
when a process is terminated. python-igraph is used to implement the PC-graph as a
labeled directed graph. We evaluated the implementation over a MacBook Pro (from
Mid-2012) with 2.6 GHz Intel Core i7 and 16 GB of memory, used as a workstation
inside a university network. Table 3.2 shows the resources used by the host-level
agent. The results show that the CPU overhead is at 9.09%, and data are produced
with an average rate of 14 kbps. This indicates that such a host-level agent, despite
the lack of explicit optimization of the collection of host-level activity, is lightweight
and uses few resources, making it suitable for practical use.
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Table 3.2: Overhead (measured using top) of the host-level agent implemented
using DTrace and Python.
Time CPU DTrace Memory
Data rate Graph size
period overhead events usage
3 hrs 9.09% 328,377 19 MB 14 kbps
|V | = 4, 584
|E| = 14, 607
3.5 Related Work
Effective intrusion detection is a necessary component of secure and resilient sys-
tems. Multi-sensor fusion techniques [11, 7, 77, 138] aim to the improve accuracy and
performance of intrusion detection by combining security information from multiple
sources. Most of these approaches, however, rely on heuristics and predefined rules
about the properties of the underlying system and the behavior of attacks, which
change very frequently. These approaches generally fail to detect many sophisticated
attacks, such as zero-days and long-lasting targeted attacks [111].
Lateral movement detection can help in detecting intrusions in early phases and
preventing significant damage to the system [123, 107]. However, a sophisticated
lateral movement attack is difficult to detect, since the attack is targeted and usually
uses normal network operations to spread slowly and silently across the system.
Thus, lateral movement behavior is very different from worm propagation, which
quickly spreads far and wide. Thus, worm detection techniques [111, 34, 65] that rely
on detecting changes in host behaviors or network communication structures may
not successfully detect lateral movement. As we show in this chapter, more general
behavioral features, which provide a holistic view of system-wide activities, are needed
to detect such an attack. The distributed fusion framework proposed in this chapter
enables us to detect such long-lasting and slow-moving attacks in large-scale systems.
The concept of establishing causality among network connections has previously
been used to profile normal network communications in order to detect worms. The
techniques proposed in the literature detect worms by using anomalous timing and
port distributions [111], signatures of known worm packets [34], and rare connections
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between hosts [65]. However, these methods fail in the context of lateral movement
because the attacker may change behavior or use known services and paths to spread
through the system. Instead, our approach for finding connection causation chains
relies on looking at the kernel-level activities on the hosts and thus allows us to infer
the causations more accurately.
Finally, the work in [61] describes an approach to quantitatively determine the
level of exposure to certain types of lateral movement that are based on pass-the-hash
attacks. It can be used to help configure a network to minimize exposure to these
types of attacks.
Our work, on the other hand, uses high-level behavioral patterns to detect lat-
eral movement in large-scale systems. In particular, our approach collects host-level
activities and correlates them with network communications. The hierarchical collec-
tion and fusion of this information across all the hosts, based on our distributed data
fusion framework, then provides the basis for scalability and performance of lateral
movement detection.
3.6 Conclusion
Intrusion resilience through response and recovery presents a practical solution for
system security. To achieve resiliency, we need to monitor the system to estimate the
security state, and then select responses that maintain a resiliency metric related to
service and intrusions. We present a flexible framework for distributed data fusion
aimed at addressing intrusion resilience. The framework defines different components
of data fusion: data transformation, dissemination, and abstraction. We use the
framework to define a method that uses agents in the system to detect lateral move-
ment. Our method merges host-level communication causation events to create host
communication graphs. The merge algorithm exploits the semantics of the causation
relation to avoid requiring time ordering on the host-level events. Then, in order
to avoid having a centralized collection agent, we cluster the agents into a hierarchy
in which each cluster leader maintains local host communication graphs and sends
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abstracted updates to the global collection agent. We evaluated the performance
gains from clustering the agents and distributing the workload for different clustering
approaches. Our results show that clustering methods that utilize network topology
achieve a good balance between performance and quality of state. We also imple-
mented a prototype of the host-level agent and showed that the agent is lightweight
and suitable for practical use.
This work is the first step towards resiliency against lateral movement. In the




LATERAL MOVEMENT RESPONSE AND
RECOVERY
Image 4.1: Etruscan pottery at the Getty Villa, Los Angeles, California (Credit: Wolfgang Sauber)
“Upon cutting off each of its heads he found that two grew back, an
expression of the hopelessness of such a struggle for any but the hero,
Heracles”
- Ruck and Staples, The World of Classical Myth
Lateral movement describes an attacker’s motion from an initially compromised
host to a set of target servers. Virus/worm spread is an example of lateral movement
whereby an attacker moves from one host to another to reach a target server [28, 60].
It is vital to stop lateral movement as it occurs in the network, without disconnecting
the whole network. To meet this need, we aim at a resilient response strategy that
88
learns and contains the spread while maintaining an acceptable level of service in the
network.
Fortunately, today’s networks are configurable. Software-defined networking [84]
and similar technologies allow a network administrator to have complete control over
the network’s topology. A response strategy can adjust the network’s topology at
runtime to contain the spread of a virus/worm and heal the infected machines, possi-
bly isolating parts of the network. This introduces a trade-off between the speed and
cost of the recovery/healing.
The best topology to stop the spread is a disconnected one, wherein the machines
can be healed one host at a time. Obviously, disconnecting all the hosts is undesirable
as it results in complete loss of the network services. On the other hand, a policy
of aggressive healing might stop the spread of a virus while maintaining the full
connectivity of a network. Aggressive healing is costly as it requires spending of vast
resources to ensure all hosts are healed while the virus is freely spreading.
In this chapter, we address the problem of keeping the network services partially
available while meeting a constraint on the cost of healing. To this end, we propose the
response and recovery engine (RRE): a centralized engine that employs a mechanism
that balances between healing speed and network availability to halt lateral movement
in a network. We draw an analogy between the lateral movement in a network
and epidemic spread by modeling virus spread with a susceptible-infected-susceptible
(SIS) model. RRE utilizes a feedback controller to estimate the parameters of the
attacker’s spread in a network. According to those learned parameters, it determines
the healing rates and adjusts network topology (while maintaining bare minimum
connectivity) to achieve an asymptotically stable disease-free equilibrium (DFE). In
this work, we find the necessary and sufficient conditions for the learning to converge,
and for the healing to be successful in halting the virus spread.
When RRE detects a virus spreading, it starts the parameter learning phase. Using
the feedback estimator, the response engine will vary the healing rates periodically
over a specially designed, partially connected network to estimate the rate of virus
spread at each host. When the estimation error converges, the engine moves to
the containment phase by deciding on the best network topology that achieves an
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asymptotically stable DFE. After halting the virus spread (i.e., the lateral movement)
and healing the machines, the engine moves back to the recovered phase. It stops the
healing process and returns the connectivity back to its original state.
While it sounds counter-productive to keep the network infected during the learn-
ing phase, the time spent during the learning phase leads us to find an optimal
response strategy that will surely obliterate the spread at an exponential rate. The
alternative to this approach is to change the response mechanism until a stable DFE
is reached; the time spent searching for a valid response is better spent (in terms of
service availability) learning the attacker’s parameter as our approach limits connec-
tivity during the response phase only.
In order to find the optimal trade-off between healing cost and service, RRE for-
malizes the problem as an optimization that maximizes service while maintaining the
sufficient conditions for learning and healing. The optimization is a mixed-integer
nonlinear problem, which is an NP-hard problem. Thus, the problem is hard to solve
for large networks. Instead, RRE uses a stochastic gradient descent algorithm to search
for a suboptimal solution for the problem.
We implemented RRE as an SDN application on top of Floodlight, an SDN con-
troller in a network of virtualized hosts. RRE uses input from a lateral movement
detection to detect the events of virus spread in the network. We implemented pa-
rameter learning as an ML estimator. We propose a static and dynamic learning
strategy that modifies the connectivity graph such that the estimation error con-
verges while service is maximized. Then, we grapple with estimation error and its
effect on the result of the learning phase. We find that a sparse topology minimizes
parameter estimation error and is especially robust against clock drifts. In order
to tolerate the estimation error, use interval matrices to extend the sufficient DFE
conditions. We implement connectivity changes by using Floodlight’s firewall mode,
while healing events are done by re-imaging VMs, machine reboots, or scripted heals
(that do not patch vulnerabilities).
We evaluate the effectiveness of RRE’s mechanisms in learning and response. First,
we showcase the ability to reach a stable DFE in a simulated environment. Then,
we study the robustness of the stable DFE for bounded estimation error. We study
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the tolerance of the learning phase against measurement errors and numerical errors.
Finally, we study the overhead of the topology search algorithm and compare its
performance to the optimal solution.
In this chapter, we make the following contributions:
• We propose an online-noise resilient method to estimate the attacker’s param-
eters that does not use the unobservable state of the system;
• We find a robust condition to achieve a stable disease-free equilibrium that uses
the estimated parameters to halt the virus;
• We implement the system, RRE, as an SDN application to attain resiliency
against virus spread by alternating between learning and response to restore
the system to a secure state.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.1 we list our notations;
then, in Section 4.2, we specify our threat model. In Section 4.3 we describe RRE’s
architecture and modes of operations; in Section 4.4 we find the optimal parameter-
learning dynamics; in Section 4.5 we find the necessary conditions for robust virus
spread control; and in Section 4.6 we specify the implementation details of RRE and
the methods for overcoming estimation bias. In Section 4.7 we show our evaluation
results, in Section 4.8 we list the related work, and we conclude in Section 4.9.
4.1 Notation
We use the following notations in the rest of this chapter. The function λ returns all
the eigenvalues of a matrix. We use x̂ to refer to the estimate of variable x. We refer
to the p-norm of a vector or matrix as ∥x∥p; thus the 2-norm of a vector is ∥x∥2. We
index any vector or matrix using a lower-case subscripted variable; for example, for
matrix A, aij refers to the value of the matrix in row i and column j. The transpose
of matrix A is AT , its trace is tr(A), and its determinant is det(A). A diagonal matrix





Figure 4.1: CTMC of the SIS model for node i.
j is dj and all the other elements are zeros. Given a function vector p(t), the time
derivative of the function is denoted by ṗ(t). An interval is denoted by a = [a, a],
where a is the lower bound and a is the upper bound of the interval. Finally, Pr(x)
is the probability of an event x and E[Y ] is the expected value of a random variable
Y .
4.2 Threat Model
Consider a scenario in which a virus is propagating in a network with n hosts. The
virus spread speed depends on the attacker’s decisions, the nodes’ resources, and
the users’ behavior. We model the spread of the virus with the susceptible-infected-
susceptible (SIS) model. Figure 4.1 shows the continuous-time Markov chain (CTMC)
of the model.
In this model, a node starts in the susceptible state (S); it gets infected (I), when
in contact with another infected node, with a rate βi. Note that in a CTMC, the
holding time in a state is an exponential random variable with rate 1
βi
. The node is
healed when it moves back to being susceptible (due to the healing process) with rate
δi. Let p(t) be the probability that a node is compromised, i.e., p(t) is the probability
that the CTMC is in the infected state at time t, p(t) = P (state(t) = I). In a
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network, nodes are affected by adjacent nodes; a node is infected only if one or more
neighboring nodes are infected. The effect of virus spread over a graph is captured
by the N-intertwined model [127] in Equation (4.1). In this model, the probability
that a node i will be infected is computed by chaining the n CTMCs of each node.




where p ∈ [0, 1]n is the state of the system with pi the probability of compromise
a node, ṗi(t) is the rate of change of the probability of the node i, βi is the fixed
infection rate of node i, δi is the healing rate of the node, and aij is the indicator of
the connection between nodes i and j. That is, aij = 1 if node i is connected to node
j, and aij = 0 if the nodes are not connected. Equation (4.2) shows the full form of
the dynamics
ṗ(t) = (AB − P (t)AB −D)p(t), (4.2)
where B = diag(β1, . . . , βn), A is the adjacency matrix of the graph representing the
connectivity in the network, P (t) = diag(p1(t), . . . , pn(t)), and D = diag(δ1, . . . , δn).
In our work we assume that the response and recovery engine has control over
the connectivity of the nodes and the healing rates. However, we assume that the
infection rates βi ∀i are an unknown property of the attacker. The goal of the defender
is to achieve resilience against virus spread. The challenge for the defender is to find
an optimal response strategy to stop the spread of the attack, i.e., p(t)→ 0 as t→∞,
using the controls available (healing rates and connectivity), all while the infection
rate is unknown.
4.3 Response and Recovery Engine
The response and recovery engine’s (RRE’s) goal is to achieve resilience against virus
spread attacks. Upon detecting virus spread in the network, the engine starts by





























Figure 4.2: Architecture of the response and recovery engine.
spread by finding a configuration of the connectivity of the network. Finally, after
the spread stops the engine restores the system to the original state.
In this section we discuss the architecture (Figure 4.2) of the response and recovery
engine, the different operating modes, and the resiliency goals in the system.
4.3.1 Architecture
The master component in RRE is the decision engine. It tracks the state of the
network and the progress in learning and stopping the virus spread. The decision
engine controls the learning module, the response module, and the system state. Its
operation is determined by the state machine shown in Figure 4.3, which uses input
from the modules to make transitions. We describe the state machine in the next
section. The system state is a representation of the system being protecting by RRE.
The state stores the hosts in the network, the connectivity graph, and the observations
due to virus spread. The event detection module monitors the network for lateral
movement and virus spread events. It records all the information pertaining to the
spread and updates the system state. The learning module is an online estimation
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mechanism that uses input from the system state to learn the attacker’s parameters,
i.e., the infection rate vector β. The learning module changes the connectivity and the
healing rates using the actuation module. The learning module updates the decision
engine when the estimation process is completed. The response module is responsible
for finding the optimal response configuration to stop the spread of the malware. The
response module uses the estimated parameters from the learning module to compute
the connectivity matrix and healing rate, and it uses the actuation module to deploy
the responses. Finally, the actuation module deploys the responses after input from
the decision engine, learning module, and response module. It uses the available
technology in the system to enact the changes, for example by using software-defined
networking (SDN).
In general, RRE achieves resilience against virus spread by stopping the virus spread
through use of learned parameters while simultaneously maximizing service availabil-
ity. In the following sections, we design the connectivity graph for each phase to
maximize service while achieving the goal of the phase, be it parameter learning or
recovery.
4.3.2 Modes
RRE’s decision engine transfers operation among four modes in order to maintain
the system’s resiliency against virus spread attacks. Figure 4.3 shows the finite state
machine that describes the operation of RRE. Starting from an initial safe state (INIT),
RRE continuously monitors the network and hosts for signs of virus spread. While in
the initial state, RRE assumes that the system is secure and is not under attack. Once
an attack is detected, the actuator starts healing machines to clear the virus spread.
The healing process, however, should be able to contain and stop the virus spread
without an overwhelming cost or without being overrun by the attacker. RRE starts
that process by learning the attack’s parameters; it then contains the attack, and
finally recovers. Specifically, after detecting virus spread, RRE transfers to the learning
mode (Learn). In the learning mode, RRE’s goal is to learn the parameters of the virus









Figure 4.3: RRE’s finite state machine.
we assume are unknown to RRE. During the learning mode, RRE reconfigures the
connectivity graph and then changes the healing rates to a “rich” signal. It runs
a parameter estimator and learns the unknown parameters. The learning mode is
concluded when the parameter estimator converges, after which RRE moves to the
containment mode. In the containment mode (C), RRE limits the connectivity in
the network in order to aid the healing process to eliminate the virus spread. RRE
decides on the changes by finding a connectivity graph that increases availability
while maintaining the conditions for a stable, disease-free state and limiting the cost
of healing the nodes. After the virus spread has been obliterated, RRE transfers to
the recovery mode. In the recovery mode (R), RRE returns the connectivity to the




Recall the nonlinear SIS attacker model in the previous section. The model uses
unique healing and infection rates per node.
ṗ = (AB − P (t)AB −D)p(t), (4.3)
where p ∈ [0, 1]n is the probability vector describing the state of the system, n is the
number of hosts, and A is the connectivity of the network. The healing rates are
set by RRE during the response phases; however, the infection rates are unknown, as
they are qualities intrinsic to the attacker. In the learning mode, RRE uses parameter
estimation to learn the infection rates by vigorously changing the healing rates to
persistently excite the system and observing the changes in the system state. We
start by constructing a state estimator p̂ by using the parameter estimator. Even
though we assume we can measure the state directly, the state estimator gives us an
indication of the quality of the parameter estimation. Consider the state estimator
in Equation (4.4), where Am is a Hurwitz matrix, and B̂ is the parameter estimate.
˙̂p = Am(p̂− p) + (I − P )AB̂p− PD. (4.4)
Let the error on the state estimation be e = p̂ − p; the error dynamics are shown in
Equation (4.5). The goal is to make e→ 0.
ė = ( ˙̂p− ṗ) = Ame+ (I − P )AB̂p. (4.5)
We proceed using a Lyapunov-based design strategy. We pick an update law for the
parameter estimator that results in the error dynamics’ being stable, that is, ė → 0
and e→ 0. Consider the candidate Lyapunov function in Equation (4.6), where Q is
the solution of the Lyapunov equation AmQ+QAm = −I.
V = eTQe+ tr(B̂T B̂). (4.6)
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For the estimator to be stable, we need V̇ < 0:








= −eT e+ tr(B̂TAT (I − P )TQep+ B̂ ˙̂B)︸ ︷︷ ︸
want to cancel this
+ tr(pT eQ(I − P )AB̂ + ˙̂B
T
B̂)︸ ︷︷ ︸
want to cancel this
.
The parameter estimator dynamics in Equation (4.7) cause the error dynamics to sta-
bilize by canceling the unwanted terms in the Lyapunov function. After the dynamics
into the Lyapunov function V (e), the derivative of the function V̇ = −eT e = −|e|2 < 0
becomes strictly decreasing. Thus, the parameter estimator causes the state estima-
tor to stabilize. Specifically, V is bounded ⇒ e is bounded, because V̇ < 0 then
e ∈ L2, and ė ∈ L∞ ⇒ (Barbalat’s lemma) e→ 0.
˙̂
B = −AT (I − P )TQepT . (4.7)
When the state estimation error converges, e→ 0, the parameter estimator converges,
˙̂
B → 0. However, even though the estimator converges, we cannot guarantee that
the value will reach the true state B̂ → B unless we have further studied the effect of
the input signal (i.e., the healing rates). The healing rates, which are the input for
the learning phase, should be rich of order n for the parameter estimation to reach
correct values.
Lemma 4.1. The parameters β = {β1, . . . , βn} can be estimated only if A be invert-
ible.
Proof. Consider the model of the virus spread dynamics as a continuous-time Markov
chain (CTMC); a node is infected when its neighboring nodes are infected. In a
CTMC, the waiting time between transitions is an exponential distribution of rate µ,
and when multiple neighboring nodes are infected, the distribution becomes that of
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competing exponentials. The infection rate of a node becomes an exponential with
a rate that is the sum of the exponential rates. Given a graph represented by an
adjacency matrix, A ∈ {0, 1}n×n, and a vector β = {β1, β2, . . . , βn} ∈ Rn equal to
the infection rate of each node, the cumulative infection rate of each node due to its
neighbors is L = Aβ.
Consider the following online method to estimate L̂ = {µ̂1, µ̂2, . . . , µ̂n} ∈ Rn,
the cumulative infection rates in the system. Each time a node is compromised we
measure how much time it takes for its state to transition from susceptible to infected,
denoted by sk. Let Si = (s1, s2, . . . , sm) be the vector of m measured samples of the
time to infect node i. We use the measurements to estimate the rate of the exponential
distribution (the interarrival time). The likelihood function of λi for the independent












We compute the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE), argmaxλ∈Λ L(λ, s1, . . . , sm),







After we estimate the cumulative infection rate of each node, we compute the infection
rate by using Equation (4.9) to solve for the infection rate vector, β̃.
β̃ = A−1L̂. (4.9)
Thus the adjacency matrix should be invertible, a necessary condition to find the
infection rates.
Note that the advantage of the method highlighted in the proof is that it does not
require computation of p(t); instead it only finds the time of compromise, which can
be directly measured when lateral movement is found in the system.
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Conjecture 4.2. B̂ → B when A is invertible, and the healing rate has a unique
frequency per each independent set.
The ML estimation method we just proposed uses the duration because informa-
tion on state transitions is needed in order to estimate the rate of the competing
exponential distribution. The condition for including the measurement in the estima-
tor is that all the neighboring nodes must be infected, or else our measurement reflects
a different, competing exponential rate. We speculate that an input signal is rich if
it allows for measurements to be taken such that all the neighbors of a healed node
are infected. Thus, if we separate nodes into independent sets and heal those nodes
independently with an out-of-cycle signal, we can persistently excite the system such
that the parameter estimator will converge to the correct value. In summary, a signal
has the following format: d = [Aj|sin(wjt)|, . . . , Aj|sin(wkt)|], such that wi = wj only
if nodes i and j are in the same independent set.
4.5 Changing the Topology
We change the topology and healing rates to achieve a globally asymptotically stable
(GAS) disease-free equilibrium (DFE). The DFE is the state after the virus spread
has been eradicated, that is, pi(t) = 0, ∀i exponentially as t ⇒ ∞. GAS ensures
that the healing measures taken by RRE result in stopping of the virus without the
possibility of its spreading again. Since we will switch the topology once when in
the response phase, we will treat the network as static with a new system. The new
system has an initial state p(0) = p(ts), where ts is the switch time. Thus, after
learning the parameters of the attacker, β, RRE finds the connectivity matrix to reach
a stable DFE. In the following we find the sufficient conditions for a stable DFE,
and then we delve into methods for finding the optimal response parameters that
maximize service (availability) while maintaining the sufficient stability conditions.
Theorem 4.3. If (AB−D) is Hurwitz, then the DFE is globally asymptotically stable
(GAS).
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Proof. This proof is similar to the work in [93]. Since P (t)AB ≥ 0, we can bound
the nonlinear system with a linear system:
ṗ = (AB − P (t)AB −D)p (4.10)
= (AB −D)p− P (t)ABp (4.11)
≤ (AB −D)p (4.12)
Let the Hurwitz matrix K = AB−D. Consider the Lyapunov function V (p) = pTRp,
where R is the solution of the Lyapunov equation RK+KTR = −Q withQ = QT > 0.
The system is globally asymptomatically stable if V̇ (p) < 0 for all p ̸= 0. Note that
AB −D is similar to the symmetric matrix B1/2AB1/2 −D; hence, AB −D has real
eigenvalues.
V̇ (p) = pTRṗ+ ṗTRp
= pTR(K − P (t)AB)p+ pT (KT − (P (t)AB)T )Rp
= pT (RK +KTR)p− pT (RP (t)AB + (P (t)AB)TR)p
= −pTQp− pT (RP (t)AB + (P (t)AB)TR)p
< −pTQp−
∥∥RP (t)AB + (P (t)AB)TR∥∥ ∥p∥2
< 0
The response and recovery engine changes the connectivity graph of the system
such that AB̂ −D is Hurwitz. We propose a method for finding such a connectivity
matrix, where RRE solves a mixed-integer nonlinear convex (MINLP) optimization
that maximizes the number of connections in the graph. MINLP is an NP-hard
problem, and we propose a suboptimal stochastic gradient descent algorithm to find
a connectivity graph that satisfies the Hurwitz condition.
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4.5.1 Perfect Estimation
In order to find the optimal response strategy, RRE solves the optimization in Equa-
tion 4.13. The optimization maximizes the number of links in the connectivity graph.
The optimization constrains (1) the connectivity graph to the sufficient GAS condi-
tion from the previous section, and (2) the total healing cost to a maximum value.
Thus, the optimization encodes the resiliency goals of the response and recovery en-
gine. The stability constraint leads to containing and stopping of the virus spread,
while the objective function maximizes the available service in the system, and the
constraint on healing cost ensures that the cost is within business-acceptable levels.
We compute the objective function and each constraint as follows:
• Availability: We compute availability as the number of edges in the connec-
tivity graph. Service availability increases as the number of nodes that can
communicate increases. This function is computed as the sum of all values in





• Stability: We compute whether the sufficient condition is met by the connec-
tivity matrix and the healing rate. The condition for a stable DFE is that the
eigenvalues must all be real and negative, maxλ(AB̂ −D) < 0.
• Cost: We compute the cost of healing as the frequency at which nodes are
interrupted to be restored. Each node is healed at randomly determined instants
of time using a Poisson process with rate δi. We compute the total cost in the
system as the sum of all rates
∑
i Di.
The resulting optimization is a mixed-integer nonlinear program (MINLP) prob-
lem, where A ∈ {0, 1}n is the connectivity matrix, N is the number of nodes in the
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s.t. maxλ(AB̂ − diag(d)) < 0∑
i di ≤ c
A ∈ {0, 1}n×n
d ∈ Rn.
(4.13)
We propose a greedy stochastic gradient descent-inspired algorithm to efficiently
generate connectivity graphs. The optimization in the previous section is NP-hard
and thus cannot be solved for systems with a large number of hosts. The greedy
algorithm will generate connectivity graphs that satisfy the conditions for stability.
Specifically, we will iteratively generate a connectivity graph and check whether the
stability condition is satisfied. The algorithm generates a random graph by using the
Erdos-Renyi model, G(n, p), where all possible pairs of n nodes are connected with
probability p. Algorithm 5 shows the generation method.
Algorithm 5 Stochastic Generation Algorithm
max Itr = 100, p=1
while maxλ(AB̂ −D) > 0 do
A := erdosRenyi(n,p)
i++






In practice, the result of the parameter estimation will be not be perfect; errors will
creep into our estimate of β̂. Previously, we found a connectivity matrix that satisfies
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the condition that (AB −D) be Hurwitz. However, when our parameter estimate is
noisy, that is, B − ϵ < B̂ < B + ϵ where ϵ = diag(ϵ1, . . . , ϵn), the connectivity matrix
satisfies the condition that (A∗(B + ϵ)−D is Hurwitz; and that does not necessarily
mean that (A∗B − D) will be Hurwitz. In the following we study the eigenvalues
of the interval matrix K = (AB − D) + Aϵ. In an interval matrix, either terms
are fixed or they vary independently within a range. We use K(Q) to denote the
interval system matrix with noise, where Q is the set of interval variables such that,
qi = {qi ∈ Q|qi = [qi, qi]}. The interval variables are due to the estimation error, that
is qi = [−ϵi,+ϵi]. The error is multiplied with the connectivity matrix; thus, for the
error vector, the interval matrix looks as follows:
K(Q) =

a11[−ϵ1, ϵ1] a12[−ϵ2, ϵ2] . . . a1n[−ϵn, ϵn]





xn1[−ϵ1, ϵ1] xn2[−ϵ2, ϵ2] . . . ann[−ϵn, ϵn]
 .
An exposed edge of an interval matrix is set by letting one of the entries be free and
then fixing all the other intervals to either their lower bound or their upper bound.
An edge can be extended to an exposed face, K(Q2), by fixing all values except for
two variables.
Definition 9. An Exposed Face Q2 is
Q2(qij, qkl) = {q | qij ∈ [qij, qij];
qkl ∈ [qij, qij] for kl ̸= ij;
qmn = qmn or qmn,
for (m,n) ̸= (k, l) and (m,n) ̸= (i, j)}.
The interval matrix is Hurwitz if all the exposed faces of the interval matrix are





This formalization with the interval Hurwitz condition ensures that we are robust
against estimation noise. The number of exposed faces (NF ) depends on the inde-
pendent intervals in the matrix, and is equal to the number of nodes in the system,
NF = 2
n−2n(n − 1)/2. Thus, the search space to find a Hurwitz interval matrix in-
creases with the number of nodes in the system. In order to reduce complexity, we




a11(q) 0 . . . 0





0 0 . . . akk
 ,
where Aii represents the connectivity within a quarantine region; each block matrix
is an interval matrix of size n/k × n/k. The resulting interval system matrix is a
block diagonal matrix as well. The eigenvalues of the whole matrix are equal to the
eigenvalues of the individual block matrices at the diagonal. Thus, to design an n×n
connectivity matrix, we design k, n/k×n/k matrices that result in a Hurwitz system.
4.6 Implementation
RRE is built as an SDN controller application that uses state information and controls
the topology and healing of the network to provide resilience against virus spread. The
engine consumes lateral movement chains to learn an attacker’s parameters and then
to find an optimal response strategy. In this section we provide the implementation
details for the parameter learning phase and the response deployment phase.
4.6.1 Estimating the State
The estimator we proposed in the previous section uses the value of the state to learn
the parameters. However, in reality, the state of the system (the probability of a node
is infected) is not measurable or computable, especially in a networked system. Even
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if we use an intrusion detection system, the historical confidence in an alert does not
reflect the actual probability of compromise that we model in our dynamics. Instead,
in our work we rely on estimation and stabilization mechanisms that do not depend
on the modeled state of the system. Our estimator uses measurable events in the
system. Moreover, our control mechanism uses the estimated parameters to design
the connectivity graph and the healing rates such that the disease-free equilibrium is
globally asymptotically stable (GAS). The GAS property ensures that whatever the
starting state of the system, even if all the nodes are compromised when the response
phase starts, all nodes will be healing at an exponential rate as t→∞.
Measuring State Duration
In our measurements for parameter estimation, we use the lateral movement detec-
tion scheme described in [39]. The authors use a hierarchical agent-based scheme
to generate lateral movement chains by fusing network information and host-level
events. We convert the lateral movement chains to timing samples for estimation.
Assuming that we identified a lateral movement event as unwanted, for each machine
we measure the duration si it takes to move from being susceptible to being infected.
RRE maintains the state of each machine as infected or healed; each time a machine is
healed, the machine’s state is set to susceptible, a timestamp is recorded as th = T (t)
(where T (t) is the global clock), and a count of healing events, i, is incremented.
When re-infection of a machine is detected, because a lateral movement chain has
been observed passing, the state of the machine is set to infected, and a timestamp
is recorded, tc = T (t). The duration between healing and infection is calculated as
si = tc − th.
Learning Strategies
The measured sample is recorded only if all the machine’s neighboring nodes are
infected. The reason we need all the nodes to be infected is that we are estimating
the cumulative infection rate due to all the neighbors’ being infected; thus, for us to
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measure the competing exponentials, we require that all the machines be infected.
It does not matter when the machines when infected, because of the memoryless
property of the exponential distribution, that is, Pr(X > t+ s,X > t) = Pr(X > s).
The healing strategy is the method by which we select nodes for measurement. In
the following, we suggest three strategies: naive and optimal static strategies, and a
dynamic strategy.
Näıve Static Strategy In this strategy, we learn the estimated infection rates of
hosts one at a time. Starting from a completely infected network, for each host we
heal the machine and perform the measurement until m samples have been collected.
This strategy is extremely slow and inefficient, because not all hosts are affected by
the healing process.
Optimal Static Strategy In this strategy, we find the subset of hosts that can
be independently measured without impacting the rest of the system. Those are
nodes that are not connected and thus do not change the cumulative infection rate
when healed. This set is equivalent to a vertex coloring of the graph, where nodes
of identical colors are not connected by an edge. The optimal set of independent
nodes is one that minimizes the number of colors needed for a graph. The number
itself is called the chromatic number of the graph, χ(G). After finding the minimum
coloring of the graph, we measure the infection durations of the nodes belonging
to each color until m samples have been collected. We aim to maximize resiliency
by increasing connectivity and shortening the learning duration. To shorten the
learning duration, we should decrease the chromatic number of the graph, because
our estimation method can then measure more nodes per set. However, the chromatic
number is lower-bounded by χ > 1 − λ1/λn, where λ1 is the largest eigenvalue and
λn is the least eigenvalue of the connectivity matrix [14].
Dynamic Strategy In this strategy we increase connectivity by dividing the nodes
into two sets: a measure set and an attack set. The attack set is fully connected,








Figure 4.4: The topology for fast dynamic measurement.
measuring a node’s infection duration, where the node is considered as part of an
independent set, the rest of the nodes in the graph need not be independent, as they
will not be healed and measured.
However, instead of connecting each node from the measure set to only one node
in the attack set, we create a square matrix Ams of size n/2 that is invertible with
the highest number of possible edges. Let pg be the generation probability of the
matrix; we generate the connection matrix, Ams, by randomly sampling a uniform
distribution and checking it against the generation probability.
In order to map the matrix Ams to network connectivity, we connect each node
in the measure set to the corresponding nodes in the attack set. For example,
(00101)(β1, . . . β5)
T = β3 + β5 means that node 1 in the measure set is connected
to nodes 3 and 5 in the attack set. Figure 4.4 shows an example topology as seen
during dynamic learning. The topology shows a fully connected attack set, an inde-
pendent measure set, and the connectivity between the sets.
Thus, the generation probability determines the connectivity during the learning
phase. A dense matrix with a high generation probability provides high availability,
while a sparse matrix with a low generation probability provides low availability.
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The strategy proceeds as follows. We create a measure set and an attack set
that are connected as described by matrix Am. First, we collect the measurements
from the measure set; then, we switch the connectivity to swap the measure set and
the attack set. By reversing the roles, we allow for measurement of all the nodes in
the system while increasing overall availability and decreasing the time to learn the
infection rates of the system.
Claim 4.4. The expected ML estimation error decreases with a dense connectivity
matrix.
Proof. The ML estimator normalizes asymptotically. Thus, by the central limit the-
orem, the estimation error has mean 0 and is asymptotically normally distributed
with variance 1/β2m, where m is the number of samples. Thus, the expected error
is equation E[σ2(x̂i − xi)|t = T ] = 1/(x2i × E[m|T ]), where E[m|T ] is the expected
number of events that occur in the interval 0 ≤ t ≤ T . The number of samples is
affected by the duration of learning (T ) and the rate of the exponential distribution.
The expected number of events due to the sample exponential distribution, which is
a Poisson process, is E[m|t = T ] = E[xi] × T . Thus, for the same amount of time,
a process with a high expected rate will result in a greater number of events than
would a process with a lower rate. The expected infection rate of a node is affected
by the number of connected nodes; the cumulative infection rate is xi =
∑
j∈A(i) βj,
where A(i) is the set of attack set neighbors of node i. Thus E[xi] = E[A(i)]×E[β],
assuming that E[β] is well-defined. Finally, a dense connectivity matrix has a high
number of edges compared to a sparse matrix. E[A(i)] = n × p. So, each node i in
the measure set is connected to a larger number of nodes in the attack set, making
the A(i) larger than that of a sparse matrix.
E[σ2(x̂− x)|t = T ] = 1
n× p× E[β]× E[x2]× T
. (4.14)
So in theory, a dense matrix improves the performance in the learning phase while
maintaining service in the system, making our resilience and security goals consistent
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with each other.
However, in practice, we have to deal with the estimation error due to the ML
estimator. It turns out that the final solver has to be robust against those errors.
The solver attempts to solve the equation Ab = x, where A is the dense matrix, x is
the estimations, and b is the attacker parameters. When the estimation is affected by
an MLE error, that is, x = x + δx, then the solution of the system will be affected,
b = b+δb. The error in the solution is upper-bounded by the condition number of the
matrix A, ∥δb∥p < Kp(A) ∥δx∥p. The condition number of the matrix is computed
as the product of the norm of the matrix with its inverse, Kp(A) = ∥A∥p ∥A−1∥p.
A well-conditioned matrix with a low condition number tolerates the ML estimation
error, while an ill-conditioned matrix will amplify the estimation error, making the
parameter estimator’s performance worse. Our goal is to generate well-conditioned
matrices with high connectivity. However, when matrix A is dense, it tends to be
ill-conditioned.
Conjecture 4.5. The condition of a dense connectivity matrix is always greater than
that of a sparse connectivity matrix.
We do not provide a proof of the conjecture; however, we provide a geometric and
numerical discussion of our intuition that it is true. Consider the geometric interpre-
tation of the condition of a system of equations. The matrix A is a linear mapping
that transforms an N-dimensional sphere of radius 1 to an ellipsoid (Figure 4.5). The
condition of the matrix can be interpreted as the eccentricity of the ellipsoid; the
thinner the ellipsoid, the worse the matrix [122]. Because we are dealing with a con-
nectivity graph with 0,1 elements, as we increase density we will increasingly deform
the resulting ellipsoid, meaning that the transform was ill-conditioned. Moreover, nu-
merically, the condition number is bounded by Equation (4.15) [88]. The Frobenius
norm of the connectivity matrix increases significantly when it becomes dense. Thus,
the bound leads us to believe that when the matrix is sparse, the upper bound of the



















Figure 4.5: Sketch of sphere-to-ellipse transformation.
Thus, in practice, a low error in the parameter estimation requires a sparse connec-
tivity matrix between the attack set and the measure set. Thus, a tradeoff emerges:
if we increase service by increasing connectivity in the network, the quality of the
estimate deteriorates.
Thus, in our proposed implementation, we take the following measures to alleviate
the problems due to the condition of the matrix and the ML estimation error.
• We do not solve the system as an exact system, that is, as b = A−1x; instead, we
solve it as a nonnegative linear least-squares problem, that is, minx ∥Ax− b∥22
such that x ≥ 0. This formalization minimizes the effect of the estimation error.
• Instead of solving an exact system, we change the topology during the learning
to another matrix with the same density and solve an overdetermined system of
equations. The overdetermined system makes us more robust against estimation
error, especially when the system is ill-conditioned.
• We rely on sparse matrices for the connectivity between the node sets.
While it seems that service availability (connectivity) is at odds with the quality
of the parameter estimation, we can overcome this restriction if we accept that the
learning phase will take longer. In order to avoid increasing the condition number of
the connectivity matrix when increasing the number of links, we propose to further
divide the measure and attack sets into smaller subsets that are independent. The
division allows us to perform concurrent yet slower learning while dealing with a
smaller matrix space with smaller bounds on the condition numbers.
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4.6.2 Prototype Implementation
In our environment we use Floodlight as the software-defined networking (SDN) con-
troller. Floodlight is an open-source controller that implements the OpenFlow pro-
tocol, an implementation of the SDN standard. The controller communicates with
physical and virtual OpenFlow-enabled switches. Floodlight implements multiple
modes to manipulate traffic flow in the network; it also implement an application
interface by using a REST API. The modes include a virtual switch (which abstracts
the network as one Layer-2 switch), a stateless firewall to implement an access control
list (ACL), and a circuit pusher to implement circuits.
For our system we use Floodlight in the virtual switch mode. When RRE is in
learning mode, the controller implements the connectivity matrix needed for param-
eter estimation. After the parameter estimator converges, the engine transitions to
the containment mode. In this mode, the engine enables the stateless firewall mode
in Floodlight, which denies all traffic by default. After generating a new connec-
tivity graph, the engine transforms the graph to an ACL. For each pair of nodes
(i, j)∀i ̸= j, if A(i, j) == 1 then the traffic is allowed. The ACL is implemented
using the REST API; in the following example, we allow the node with MAC address





After the virus spread stops (in which all infected hosts have been healed), RRE
transitions to the recovery mode: the connectivity fully is restored and Floodlight’s
firewall mode is disabled.
4.6.3 Healing Machines
During virus spread, the engine can detect and clear an infection. However, the
healed host remains susceptible to the infection; when the malware is removed, the
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vulnerability is not patched. In our implementation, we assume the hosts use virtual-
ization to run software. In order to heal a machine, a virtual machine is re-imaged. A
fresh new copy of the VM clears the virus but does not patch the vulnerabilities. We
schedule healing events after a node is detected as compromised by sampling from an
exponential distribution with rate δi. In practice, an exponential random variable is
generated using a uniform random variable, as follows:
1. Generate U ∼ unif(0, 1)
2. Set X = − 1
λ
ln(U).
In our system, RRE is an SDN application that implements the mechanisms that
change the topology and deploy healing events. Specifically, we implemented the
response engine to protect a mininet deployment. The engine takes as input timing
information of virus spread events that are used for learning; the learning and response
modules are implemented in MATLAB. The healing events are implemented over
mininet nodes by reimaging the node.
4.7 Evaluation
In the following we evaluate the performance of the learning mechanism while varying
the availability of service in the system. We also demonstrate via a simulation the
globally asymptotic stable disease-free equilibrium.
4.7.1 Demonstrating the DFE
Consider a small case study of a network of 5 nodes (N = 5). We have a virus spread-
ing with rates β = {2, 4, 6, 1, 7}. We demonstrate that the learning phase leads to
correct results in parameter estimation and that the response phase leads to a glob-
ally asymptotically stable DFE. During the learning phase, we need the connectivity
matrix to be invertible; we pick the matrix Al = {(1, 2), (1, 3), (3, 4), (2, 5), (4, 5)}.
The parameter estimator converges when we use a healing signal with n frequency
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(a) Error of parameter estimation over time





























(b) State evolution over time during the
response phase.
Figure 4.6: Simulation results of small case study.
components. The results in Figure 4.6a show that the parameter estimation error
converges to zero, meaning that the estimates converge to the correct values. After
we learn the parameters, the learning phase ends because the estimator converges,
and we move RRE to the response phase.
During the response phase, we use the estimated parameter to compute a connec-
tivity matrix. The connectivity matrix and healing rates lead to a GAS DFE. The
resulting graph has the edges Ar = {(4, 2), (1, 3), (3, 4), (4, 5)} and the healing rates
end up being constant, D = diag{5, 5, 5, 5, 5}. The results in Figure 4.6b show the
state of the spread dynamics over time. In the first phase, 0 < t < 10, the learn-
ing phase is still in progress and the probability of compromise is not under control.
When the learning phase ends, the response phase is initiated at t = 10. When the
response phase starts, the probability of infection starts to decay exponentially to
reach zero at t = 20.
114
















Figure 4.7: Duration to solve the optimization.
4.7.2 Topology Generation
RRE generates topologies for the learning and containment phases. In the learning
phase, generation of the topology is trivial for the dynamic strategy; however, the
optimal static strategy requires construction of a graph with a small chromatic number
to minimize the number of independent sets in the graph. We do not evaluate the
performance of the generation of connectivity matrices during parameter learning,
because the dynamic strategy is superior in terms of services and learning speed, and
is easy to implement.
On the other hand, finding a connectivity matrix and healing strategy in the
containment phase requires solution of a MINLP optimization problem. In our ex-
periments, we implemented the solution of the optimization using TOMLAB’s global
mixed-integer nonlinear programming solver (glc) and our search algorithm, Algo-
rithm 5. The stochastic search algorithm yields suboptimal solutions, while the glc
solver returns an optimal solution. We tested both methods while varying the num-
ber of nodes in the system; we measured the time to get a solution for the search
problem. Figure 4.7 shows the time it takes to find a solution for the problem. The
results show that the glc solver finds the optimal solution for networks with up to
400 nodes; after that, the solver does not return a solution. On the other hand, the
iterative solver yields a solution for up to 1000 nodes. In general, the iterative solver
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is faster than the glc solver; however, the solution produced by the iterative method
is suboptimal.
4.7.3 Learning Phase
Next, we evaluate our dynamic learning strategy. In that strategy we divide the nodes
in the network into two sets: the measure set and the attack set. We heal the nodes in
the measure set, but we do not heal the nodes in the attack set. During the learning
phase, we record the time it takes to infect a node in the measure set.
For our experiments, we ran an emulated attack over a network of nodes. The
following were the experiment parameters:
• Topology: The system consisted of OpenFlow switches and nodes. The switches
were connected to a top-level switch, while the nodes were connected equally to
the switches, creating a hierarchical topology.
• Connectivity: The network flows in the system were controlled by the SDN
controller. During the learning phase, the types of connectivity were as follows:
(1) the attack set was fully connected; (2) the measure set was not connected
(to achieve independence); or (3) the attack set and measure set were connected
by an invertible matrix with parameter pg ∈ [0, 1], where A(i, j) = 1 if U ∼
Unif(0, 1) < pg. The parameter pg determined the connectivity of the nodes.
• Attack Rates: The nodes in the attack set were infected; the infection rates
were randomly generated at the beginning of the experiment β(V ) ∼ 10 ×
Unif(0, 1).
• Healing Rates: The nodes in the defense set were healed instantly after an
attack.
• Duration: We varied the duration of the experiment between 10 to 200. We
normalized all the rates and durations to avoid dealing with specific units of
time.
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In the experiments we estimated the attack parameters for a given setup; we
computed the relative estimation error as e = |β − β̂|/β. We recorded the mean
estimation error while varying the generation parameter pg and the duration of the
experiment. The connectivity in the network was equal to parameter pg; if pg = 0.1
then on average only 10% of the possible n2 links were enabled. We also ran two
sets of experiments, one with data representing an exact system and the other with
data representing an overdetermined system. Figure 4.8 shows the results for different
generation parameters as we collected more data from the experiment. The solid lines
represent the overdetermined system (labeled with @), while the dotted lines represent
the exact system. In general, the results show that as we collected more measurements
by increasing the duration of the experiment, the relative estimation error decreased.
In both the exact and overdetermined cases, the sparse matrices resulted in a smaller
estimation error than the dense matrix. The reason is that the conditionality of a
dense matrix is higher than that of a sparse matrix; an ill-conditioned system is more
sensitive to noise in the measurements. Our results confirm that even if the estimation
error due to a dense matrix is low, the performance of parameter estimation is worse
than that of a sparse matrix. We also observe that the overdetermined systems
consistently perform better than the exact systems for all generation probabilities. In
fact, the sparse overdetermined system reduced the relative estimation error to 1%.
By reducing the error to 1%, we get better guarantees for the response phase in RRE.
In the next set of experiments, we introduced measurement errors due to clock
drift. We modeled clock drift as a linear relation between the clock time C and real
time U , C = d × U , where d is the drift rate. If d > 1 then the clock is fast; if
d < 1 then the clock is slow; and if d = 1 then the clock is perfect. For example,
an ordinary clock drifts 1 second every 11 days. In this study, we studied the effect
of clock drift on the estimation error in an overdetermined system for a clock with
a low drift rate (1 sec/11 days), a high drift rate (1 sec/3 hrs), and a perfect clock.
In Figure 4.9 the solid line is the system with a low drift (ld) rate; the dotted line
is the perfect clock (nd); and the dashed line is the high-drift clock (hd). The green
lines are for the dense setup with pg = 0.7, and the blue lines are for the sparse setup
with pg = 0.1. The results show that for all setups, the accuracy decreased as we
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Figure 4.8: Parameter estimation error for different connectivity matrices.
collected more data, because the clock drift’s effect worsened over time. Moreover,
in accordance with our previous results, the sparse matrix was more accurate than
the dense matrix; however, the low clock drift affected the dense matrix increasing
the error tenfold. On the other hand, the sparse matrix was robust to clock drift; the
error in the low drift clock rate remained at the same level, at around 4% of that of
the perfect clock. Even for a high drift rate, the estimation error did not exceed 10%
on average.
4.8 Related Work
The susceptible-infected-susceptible (SIS) dynamics, which we used to model infection
spread, have been throughly studied in the literature [127, 46, 2, 133, 48]. Nowzari et
al. [89] provide an extensive review of the literature in spreading processes in complex
networks. In the following we highlight some of the work that is relevant to our work.
Researchers have tackled the problem of limiting the influence of certain nodes in
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Figure 4.9: Parameter estimation error for different connectivity matrices and clock
drifts.
epidemic spread [17], and allocating healing rates for controlling a spread [15]. Van
Mieghem and Omic [126] proposed an eigenvalue formulation for virus spread control
over a modified adjacency matrix.
Moreover, design of healing allocation policy has been targeted by other re-
searchers. Cohen et al. [27] and Chung et al. [23] proposed heuristic approaches
for resource allocation to control virus spread. Wan et al. [130] designed another
eigenvalue-based control strategy. While almost all of the literature assumes that the
attacker’s spread rates are known to the controller, Xu et al. [139] proposed semi-
adaptive and fully adaptive control mechanisms against an attacker with unknown
spread rates. However, the authors assume that the probability of an infected state is
known to the centralized controller, and that is not always possible for the defender.
In our work we built an estimator to learn the parameters instead of relying on un-
measurable state information. Paré et al. [93] study epidemic spread over dynamic
graphs that vary over time, examining DFE stability as a function of node move-
ments. Han et al. [53] propose a data-driven approach to control SIS spread with an
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unknown spread rate; the authors assume limited observability of the state, which is
not possible in a computer setting.
4.9 Conclusion
In this chapter we presented RRE, a system to achieve cyber resilience against lateral
movement through virus spread in a computer network. The cyber resilience goal is
to stop virus spread (lateral movement) while maintaining service availability during
the response and recovery phase. RRE assumes that the lateral movement follows the
SIS virus spread model, wherein the spread parameters are unknown. To achieve
resilience, the engine deploys responses by changing the connectivity in the network
and the healing rates. First, RRE learns the attack parameters by using a dynamic
learning strategy that maximizes learning performance due to the estimation and
numerical error. Then, RRE finds a robust response strategy to achieve a GAS disease-
free equilibrium that causes the spread to stop at an exponential rate. We evaluated
RRE’s robustness against clock drift and estimation error; a trade-off emerged between
service availability and performance. In the future, we plan to find the properties of
the connectivity graph that increase estimation and DFE properties. Moreover, we
plan to design a feedback controller to stabilize the system with an estimation of the
state that is robust to learning error.
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CHAPTER 5
RESILIENT INTEGRITY CHECKING USING
POWER MEASUREMENTS
Image 5.1: The Okavango River spills out into the Kalahari Desert in northern Botswana. (Credit: ESA)
∂ρ
∂t
+∇ · J = 0.
- Charge conservation, Faraday
Cyber resilience through detection and response depends on agents for data collec-
tion and response actuation. In the previous two chapters, we presented agents and
methods to detect and respond to lateral movement. In that work we assumed that
the agents have not been tampered with. However, if the agents’ integrity has been
compromised, our resiliency goals will be subverted. Thus, critical to such a strategy
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is the ability to detect compromises and devise methods to find optimal responses
that check the validity of agents to maintain security and service goals.
In this chapter, we tackle the problem of runtime software integrity checking in
the face of advanced persistent threats (APT). APTs are sophisticated, targeted at-
tacks against a computing system containing a high-value asset [63]. APTs slowly
perform a series of steps in order to gain access and perform an attack. The sequence
of steps is often called the kill chain [29]. It starts with social engineering to gain
credentials, moves to do command-and-control through backdoors, engages in lateral
movement to find the high-value assets, and finally pursues data exfiltration or ma-
nipulation. Known APTs, such as Stuxnet, are slow and stealthy, with operations
spanning months to years to achieve the desired goal. APTs require meticulous plan-
ning and tremendous resources such as are typically available to nation-state actors.
A resiliency strategy is vulnerable to an adversary who has planned well. The
adversary will manipulate the monitoring information necessary for intrusion detec-
tion, leading to a false sense state of security. We propose a system that tackles
the following question: Without any trusted components in the machine, how can we
validate the integrity of software against a slow and stealthy attacker?
We believe that any pure software solution to the integrity problem would face the
“liar’s paradox” and therefore be unable to address the problem. In such a paradox,
a liar states that he is lying, for example, by declaring “this statement is false.”
In trying to verify the statement, we reach a contradiction. In a computer setting,
software assesses the state of the machine upon which it resides. The paradox arises
when the machine declares itself compromised. Even though an attacker does not
have an incentive to declare a compromised state, the paradox remains an issue.
For a checker to avoid the paradox, it should (1) be independent of the machine
to be checked, and (2) use a trust base that cannot be exploited by an attacker.
Today’s gold standard in security uses in-machine tamper-resistant chips (such as
TPM or AMT) that hold secrets to generate chains of trust. Those solutions are
dependent on the untrusted machine and are closed-source, making them vulnerable
to undiscovered exploits.
In order to address the problem, we propose PowerAlert, a low-cost out-of-box
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integrity checker that uses the physics of the machine as a trust base. Specifically,
PowerAlert directly measures the current drawn by the processor and uses current
models to validate the behavior of the untrusted machine. The intuition is that an
attacker attempting evasive maneuvers or deception will have to use extra energy,
thus drawing extra current. PowerAlert uses direct measurement of the current
and avoids using sensors on-board the untrusted machine as those could have been
tampered with. Moreover, timing information extracted from the signal is very ac-
curate (as opposed to network round-trip time, which is dependent on the network
conditions).
PowerAlert tackles the classical problem of the static defender. A static de-
fender is always at a disadvantage with respect to an attacker, as the attacker can
learn the protection mechanism, adapt, and evade the defender. We use a dynamic
integrity-checking program (IC-Program) that is generated each time PowerAlert
attempts to check the integrity of the machine. The diversity of the IC-Program
evens the playing field between the attacker and defender.
Each time PowerAlert decides to check the integrity of the machine, it initiates
the PowerAlert-protocol. It randomly generates the IC-Program and a nonce, and
sends the pair to the machine. Meanwhile, it starts measuring the current drawn by
the processor. The untrusted machine is expected to load the program, to run it, and
to return the output. PowerAlert validates the observed behavior by comparing
the current signal to the learned current model. The IC-Program traverses a small
set of addresses and hashes them using a randomly generated hash function. The
output of the IC-Program is similarly validated. We show that a low-cost low-power
device can efficiently generate the IC-Programs and that the space of IC-Programs
needs 6.246× 1018 years to be exhausted.
We reduce the overhead of continuous integrity checking by performing the checks
in small batches over a small segment of the state of the machine. We model the
interaction between the attacker and a PowerAlert verifier by using a continuous-
time game and simulate it over a period of 10 days. The attacker attempts to evade
the integrity checks by disabling its malicious activities at randomly chosen time
instants. Our results show that the PowerAlert verifier forces the attacker into
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a trade-off between maintaining stealthiness and working to achieve other goals. An
attacker who wants to remain stealthy would need to disable his or her activities
for longer periods of time, while an attacker seeking longer activity periods incurs
high risk of detection. We also show that if the verifier is moving too slowly (i.e.,
not making too many checks), the attacker can achieve stealthiness and a low risk of
detection while taking less frequent actions.
This chapter is organized as follows. The problem is described in Section 5.1,
we discuss the system model and threat model in Section 5.2, the PowerAlert-
Protocol in Section 5.3, and the generation of IC-Programs in Section 5.4. The
method for current signal processing and model learning is given in Section 5.5, and
the attacker-verifier game is described in Section 5.6. Our implementation details are
listed in Section 5.7. Our evaluation of the approach in terms of performance and
security is discussed in Section 5.8. Finally, we review related work in Section 5.9.
5.1 Problem Description
We are tackling the problem of low-cost trustworthy dynamic integrity checking of
software running on an untrusted machine. The goal of the integrity checker is to
detect unwanted changes in the known uncompromised static state of a system, while
being resilient to attacker evasion and deception. For example, we can check the
integrity of the static state of the kernel. The kernel provides the services needed by
applications to access hardware and perform other tasks that are typically accessed
through system calls, driver, and other functions, which are part of the unchanging
static state of the kernel. A prerequisite for secure software is access to secure kernel
services. An attacker will attempt to modify the services to undermine the security
state of the machine. Our checker will attempt to detect malicious changes to the
static state of the kernel by an attacker.
Definition 10. System State. Let Xt = (xt(0), xt(1), . . . , xt(n)) be the state of a
system at time t. The set of locations L defines the memory locations (addresses) in
the state such that for l ∈ L : Xt(l) = xt(l).
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Let Xgt be the known uncompromised state of the system and X
r
t (t) be the current
state of the system. A location lc is compromised iff X
g
t (lc) ̸= Xrt (lc). Let Lc ∈ L be
the set of compromised addresses. A machine is compromised iff |Lc| > 0.
The integrity checker detects whether a system is compromised by comparing it
to a known uncompromised state at time t.
Definition 11. Integrity Checker. Let f : (X × X × L) → {0, 1} be the integrity-
checking function. f(Xg, Xr, L) returns 1 if any of the locations in L are compro-
mised; otherwise it returns 0.
Let Tc be the instant of time at which a system is compromised and Lc be the set
of locations of compromise in said system.
The integrity checking problem is concerned with finding a sequence of times
T = (t1, t2, t3, . . .) to design and run an integrity checker f for a subset of locations
L = (L1, L2, L3, . . .), such that the compromise is eventually detected with minimum
overhead. That is, f(Xg(ti), X
c(ti), Li) = 1 such that ti > Tc and Li ∈ Lc. Finally,
the integrity-checking process should be validated using side information i(t) in order
to avoid deception by an adversary.
Two trade-offs between effectiveness and performance emerge from the selection
of addresses to be checked and the sequences of times to perform the checks. First,
the more addresses are checked, the higher the chance that the integrity checker will
detect the compromise (because of higher coverage), but that comes at a higher cost
for the machine and the checker. Second, if the frequency of checks is high, then
the checker has a higher chance of detection, but that comes at a higher cost for the
machine.
Finally, the integrity checker should be resistant to attacker deception. Such de-
ception can be done by supplying modified answers, by disabling the security checking
altogether, or by disabling the alerting capabilities (that is in case the checker does
detect that an alert has been issued). In Section 5.6, we study the effect of the
strategy of the integrity checker in detecting an attacker who attempts to hide in
anticipation of a check.
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5.2 System Description
In order to address the problem of dynamic integrity checking of software (mainly the
static memory in the kernel) on an untrusted machine, we propose PowerAlert, an
out-of-box device that checks the integrity of an untrusted machine. In this section, we
describe our approach for the solution, explaining the architecture of PowerAlert,
protection assumptions, and the threat model.
5.2.1 Solution Approach
At a high level, PowerAlert is a trusted external low-cost box tied to the untrusted
machine. Figure 5.1 shows the architecture of PowerAlert. The box runs a ver-
ification protocol, called the PowerAlert-protocol, on the untrusted machine. In
brief, the protocol sends a randomly generated integrity-checking program, called the
IC-Program, and a nonce to the untrusted machine. The machine runs the program,
which hashes parts of the static memory and returns a response to PowerAlert.
PowerAlert checks the response and compares it to the known state of the un-
trusted machine. In order to validate that only the IC-Program is running, Pow-
erAlert measures the current drawn by the processor of the machine and compares
it to the current model for normal behavior. The power model is specific to the pro-
cessor model and thus has to be learned for each machine. During the initialization
of PowerAlert, the machine is assumed to be uncompromised. PowerAlert
instruments the machine by measuring the current drawn by the processor while run-
ning operations semantically similar to the PowerAlert-protocol. PowerAlert
learns a power model specific to the machine that is later used for validation. Even
while the current signal is being used for validation, attackers might evade detection
by modifying the integrity-checking program. Researchers typically attempt to imple-
ment the most optimized version of the checking program, thus forcing the attacker
to incur extra clock cycles for evasion. Instead, we take a different approach by ran-
domly generating an IC-Program every time the PowerAlert-protocol is initiated.
The diversity of the IC-Program prevents the attacker from adapting, thus making
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Figure 5.1: The components of PowerAlert.
deception harder.
5.2.2 Threat Model
We assume a fairly powerful attacker when it comes to the untrusted machine; the
attacker has complete control over the software. However, we assume that the attacker
does not modify the hardware of the machine; for example, the attacker does not
change the CPU speed or modify firmware. We do not assume any trusted modules
or components on the machine to be tested. Our trust base is derived from the
randomness of the protocol and physical properties of the CPU.
We assume that the attacker runs deceptive countermeasures to hide her presence
and deceive the verifier into a false sense of security, and that the attack will at-
tempt to reverse-engineer the integrity-checking program for future attack attempts.
Specifically, the attacker can do the following:
• Reverse-engineer the program through static and dynamic analysis. Static anal-
ysis allows the attacker to figure out the functionality of the program without
running the program. With dynamic analysis, the attacker attempts to under-
stand the functionality of the program if it was obfuscated.
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• Tamper with the program or the state of the machine in order to supply the
checker with the “correct” answer. In this case, the attacker needs to understand
the functionality of the IC-Program.
• Impersonate a clean system state by either creating a new program that has
similar behavior or using a virtual machine.
We aim for our approach to resist the following attacks:
• Proxy attack: The attacker uses a proxy remote machine with the correct
state to compute the correct checksum and returns the result to the verifier.
• Data pointer redirection: The attacker attempts to modify the data pointer
that is loaded from memory.
• Static analysis: The attacker analyzes the IC-Program to determine its con-
trol flow and functionality within the time needed to compute the result. The
attacker can precompute and store the results, find the location of memory load
instructions, or find efficient methods to manipulate the IC-Program [113].
• Active analysis: The attacker instruments the IC-Program to find memory
load instructions in order to manipulate the program.
• Attacker hiding: The attacker uses compression [78] or ROP storage [19] in
data memory to hide the malicious changes when the PowerAlert-protocol
is running.
• Forced retraining: The attacker forces PowerAlert to retrain models by
simulating a hardware fault, thereby triggering a change in hardware.
We alleviate those threats by changing the IC-Program on every check, flattening
the control structure of the IC-Program, and observing the current trace for abnor-




In this work, we assume that PowerAlert is a trusted external entity. Having
PowerAlert be an external box as opposed to an internal module aids in separating
the boundaries between the entities. The clear boundary allows us to find a clear
attack surface, and enables easier alerting capabilities and easier methods to update
PowerAlert when vulnerabilities or new features are added. Moreover, we assume
that the communication channel between PowerAlert and the untrusted machine
is not compromised. While this assumption can be relaxed by using authentication,
we opt to address it in future work.
We assume that PowerAlert has a truly random number generator that cannot
be predicted by an attacker. Unpredictability is essential for the integrity-checking
function to be effective. The attacker should not be able to predict the defender’s
strategy for initiating the PowerAlert-protocol. Moreover, the attacker should not
be able to predict the particular IC-Program that will be generated. If the attacker
can predict the program, then the attacker can adapt and deceive PowerAlert.
We also assume that PowerAlert has complete knowledge of the normal static
state of the machine. PowerAlert uses the known state to verify the output from
the untrusted machine.
Finally, the current measurements are part of our trust base. Those measurements
are directly acquired and thus they cannot be tampered with; the learned models are
based on the physical properties of the system, which cannot be altered. Any attacker
computation, such as static analysis of the IC-Program, will manifest in the current
signal.
5.3 PowerAlert Protocol
We model the interaction between PowerAlert and the untrusted machine as an
interrogation between a verifier and prover. We named the protocol that defines
the interaction the PowerAlert-protocol. The goal of the checker is to verify that
the prover has the correct proof; in this case, we are interested in the state of the
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kernel text and data structures. At a high level, the verifier requests the state of a
random subset of the kernel state, and the prover has to produce the results. Instead
of directly requesting the memory locations, the verifier sends a randomly generated
function that hashes a subset of the kernel state. The verifier correlates current
measurement and side-channel information with the expected runtime of the sent
function. The PowerAlert-protocol is repeated over time; positive results increase
confidence that the kernel’s integrity is preserved. In the following, we describe the
interactions in the PowerAlert-protocol.
Figure 5.2 shows the interactions when the PowerAlert-protocol is initiated. At
a random instance in time, based on the initiation strategy described in Section 5.6,
the verifier initiates the PowerAlert-protocol. The verifier starts by randomly
generating a hash function f , a function to randomly generate an ordered set of
addresses L, and a nonce η. In this setting, the hash function f is the IC-Program.
The verifier connects to the prover and sends the random parameters < f,L, η >.
The prover is then supposed to load the hash function, f , and run it with inputs L
and η. Meanwhile, PowerAlert measures and records the current drawn by the
processor i(t). Subsequently, the prover sends the output of the hash function back
to the verifier. Finally, the verifier stops recording the current trace, confirms the
output, and validates the expected execution with i(t), the measured current drawn
by the processor.
The verifier introduces uncertainty by changing the ordered set of addresses, and
the nonce. The uncertainty makes it extremely hard for a deceptive prover to falsify
the output. Changing the hash function prevents the attacker from adapting to
the verifier’s strategy; changing the addresses and nonce prevents the attacker from
predicting the verifier’s target.
In the following sections, we define the method for generating the hash functions,
the strategy for picking a subset of memory addresses, and the method for measuring





L ∈ {0, 1}∗, η ∈
{0, 1}∗, f ∈ P
record i(t)
< L, η, f >
y = f(L, η, x)
< y >
1. stop i(t)
2. verify < y >
3. validate i(t)
  PowerAlert-Protocol
Figure 5.2: Illustration of the PowerAlert-protocol.
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5.4 Integrity Checking Program
PowerAlert uses the integrity checking program, IC-Program, to check the in-
tegrity of the untrusted machine. We use diversity instead of a static well-designed
IC-Program. It is typical for designers to engineer a static well-designed IC-Program.
The design typically focuses on hash collision resistance and seeks an optimal run-
time implementation. A hash collision allows the attacker to find a system state that
hashes to the correct value. Thus, hash collision resistance ensures that the attacker
does not deceive the verifier. An optimal runtime implementation ensures that a
memory redirection attack significantly increases the runtime of the IC-Program. A
memory redirection attack occurs when the attacker keeps an uncompromised copy
of the state; all memory reads are redirected to the copy.
Once the static IC-Program is used, the attacker adapts and finds evasive methods
to deceive the verifier. A hash function previously thought to be collision-resistant
might become vulnerable. Moreover, an implementation once thought to be optimal
might be evaded by an ingenious attacker. This is the problem of the static defender:
the attacker can always find a method to circumvent the protection mechanism. In
this arms race, even if the attacker is detected the first time the protection method
is revealed, the attacker will adapt and find new methods to hide. An attacker will
have enough resources beyond the compromised machine to adapt.
In this work, we take a different approach to address the problem. Instead of build-
ing the strongest mechanism possible, we build a changing mechanism that prevents
the attacker from adapting. Specifically, we randomly generate a new IC-Program
each time the PowerAlert-protocol is initiated, and choose a randomized input set.
The input set is drawn randomly from the address space of kernel text and read-only
data.
We want to force the untrusted machine to run the IC-Program without modifi-
cation. The IC-Program has to be resistant to active and passive (static) analysis.
To counter active analysis, we change the program every time and thus make it hard
for the attacker to catch up; to counter passive analysis, the program is lightly ob-
fuscated by flattening the control flow structure so that the attacker’s analysis will
132
show up in the power trace. We present the method for generating the IC-Program
in the following sections.
5.4.1 IC-Program Structure
The IC-Program’s purpose is to hash a subset of the state of the untrusted machine
in order to assess the integrity of the machine. The general flow of the program is a
loop that reads a new memory location (generated by the function in Section 5.4.2)
and updates the state of the hash function.
Algorithm 6 IC-Program Pseudocode
Require: Address space size N and nonce η
Initiate hash function with η, h = f(h, η)
for n ∈ [0, N ] do
A := generate random address
x := load A
Update hash, h = f(h, x)
end for
We obfuscate the high-level structure by flattening the control graph of the pro-
gram using the technique in [131]. The obfuscated program makes it harder for the
attacker to locate the load instructions necessary for a memory redirection attack.
Any static or active analysis will be observed on the power trace and thus can be
detected.
It is important to note that the program that is randomly generated is not poly-
morphic; that is, the functionality of the program changes, not just the structure.
5.4.2 Populating the Addresses
Given the static portion of the kernel’s virtual address space that starts from Llow
and goes to Lhigh, a selection algorithm selects an ordered subset of the space for
integrity checking. The ordered subset is a list of address tuples; each tuple contains
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an address and the number of words to read <base address, words> (where the size
of the word is equal to the number of bytes, 4 or 8 depending on the architecture
of the machine). For example, the tuple <0xffffffff81c000000, 4> reads 4 words
starting from address 0xffffffff81c000000. The output of the selection algorithm
is a list of the following form: A =< A1, k1 >, . . . < Aj, kj >; the expanded form of
the list is A1, A1 + 1, . . . , Aj + 1, . . . , Aj + kj. The selection algorithm takes as an
input the total number of bytes N . The algorithm generates a random list of address
tuples such that
∑
ki = N . The selection algorithm is embedded in the IC-Program;
it is simply a linear-feedback shift register (LFSR). Another important property of
the address list is coverage; we define coverage as the fraction of selected bytes over
the total size of the system. Specifically, cov(A) = N/(Lhigh − Llow). The coverage
affects the cost of running the IC-Program and the probability that a given round of
the PowerAlert-Protocol will check a compromised address.
5.4.3 LFSR Generation
A new hash function is used for every run of the protocol. We propose to chain
randomly generated LFSRs, the outputs of which are combined using a nonlinear
Boolean function. Figure 5.3 shows the high-level configuration of the hash function.
Each LFSR is enabled depending on the address being processed. The outputs of the
LFSRs are accumulated with the data in a k-bit vector. In the following, we explain
the method for generating and chaining the LFSRs. The LFSRs are generated using
irreducible polynomials in a Galois field. The configuration of LFSRs is generated
using a random tree that specifies the control flow of the program.
An LFSR is related to polynomials in a Galois field GF (2). The process for gen-
erating maximal LFSRs uses an irreducible polynomial p(x) of degree n. A maximal
LFSR has the highest period; the period of the LFSR is the time it takes for the
register to return to its initial state. A short period makes it easier to predict the
output. A polynomial is irreducible if x2
n
= x mod p(x). For a polynomial p(x),
the n-bit Galois LFSR is constructed by tapping the positions in the register that are
part of p(x). In operation, bits that are tapped get XOR’ed with the output bit and
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Figure 5.3: General architecture of the hash function.
shifted, while untapped bits are shifted without being changed. The output bit is the
input to the LFSR. In Algorithm 7, we generate random polynomials and apply the
Ben-Or irreducibility test [45]. The polynomials are generated by sampling the uni-
form distribution, unif(1, 2n − 1). For example, p = 123 with binary representation
01111011 encodes p(x) = 1 + x + x3 + x4 + x5. The worst-case runtime complexity
of the Ben-Or algorithm is O(n2 log2(n) log log(n)). However, the Ben-Or algorithm
is efficient as per our experiments in Section 5.8.1.
Algorithm 7 Irreducible polynomial generation using Ben-Or irreducibility test
while true do
Generate poly p(x) ∈ GF (2) of degree at most n
for i := 1 to n/2 do
g := gcd(p, x2
i − x mod p);









For a set of N LFSRs, the goal of the chaining strategy is to define the logic for
enabling the LFSRs. The input of the enable logic is the memory address being
processed, not the data. Because the memory address is used, it will be harder for
the attacker to perform a memory redirection attack. The logic is constructed by
creating a random binary tree of depth n. The tree defines the control flow of each
loop in the IC-Program. The control variable at each level is a unique memory address
bit.
Each level decides whether an LFSR is enabled or not. For each node, an LFSR
is enabled/disabled, and then, using a subset of the bits of the program counter, the
IC-programs jumps to either child.
enable LSFR i
if (a[i] == true) go to child 1
if (a[i] == false) go to child 2
If the node has only one child, the jump instruction will be omitted for a continuous
execution. Figure 5.4 shows the structure of the generated tree.
Because we provide a program with a randomly generated structure, the attacker
cannot predict the program’s structure based on previous runs. The attacker is re-
quired to perform static analysis on the program (instructions) if she is to attempt
to evade the checking algorithm.
5.5 Power Analysis
We verify the execution of the PowerAlert-protocol using the current drawn by
the processor. We learn the normal power finite state machine (PFSM) model using
training data from the machine. Then, for each round of the PowerAlert-protocol,
we extract the power states and confirm that they were generated by the normal
model.
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Figure 5.4: Control structure.
In the following section we explain the method for current measurement, the
method to extract the power states from a current signal, the high-level PFSM model,
the method to learn the normal parameters of the model, and the method for val-
idation. Finally, we use the learned model to aid in the parameter selection for
IC-Program generation.
5.5.1 Measurement Method
The current drawn by the processor is measured using a current measuring loop
placed around the line, as shown in Figure 5.5. Our setup works for computers with
motherboards that have a separate power line for the processor. Our generation and
verification algorithms are not limited to any sampling rate; in fact, the algorithms can
be adapted for any sampling rate depending on the needed accuracy. We measure the
current directly by tapping the line from the power supply to the CPU socket on the
motherboard, as opposed to measuring the power usage by using the instrumentation
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provided by the processor as the data will pass through the untrusted software stack.
Such data are susceptible to manipulation and cannot be trusted as an absolute truth.
On the other hand, direct measurement provides a trusted side-channel that we use
to verify that a PowerAlert-protocol that has not been tampered with is being
executed.
The measured current signal is either stored for model learning or processed in
near real-time for PowerAlert-protocol execution validation.
5.5.2 Extracting the Power States
We observe that the current drawn by a processor during an operation takes the form
of multilevel power states, where each state draws a constant current level. Such be-
havior is consistent with the way a processor works: different operations use different
parts of the processor’s circuitry. As each part of the processor switches, dynamic
current passes through the transistors. Thus different combinations of the circuitry
will draw different current levels. Thus to learn the power models of operations, we
start by extracting the power states exhibited in a current signal.
We start by filtering i(t) using a lowpass filter, h1(t), to remove high-frequency
noise from the signal, il(t) = i(t) ∗ h1(t). Then we compute the derivative of the
filtered signal, I(t) = il(t)
′. The derivative will be near zero for the pieces of i(t) with
a constant current level. We filter the derived signal I(t) with another lowpass filter,
h2(t), to remove more high-frequency noise, If (t) = I(t) ∗ h2(t). Finally, we compute
a threshold of the signal using an indicator function I>λ(t). The indicator function is
1 if the absolute value of a signal is greater than λ. Figure 5.6 shows a block diagram
of the transformation. The transformation leads us to finding the segments of the
signal with constant current; those segments are the power states. For each segment





il(t)dt. The average represents the
current drawn during the power state. The duration of each state is computed as
τ = tb − ta.
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Figure 5.6: Block diagram for power state extraction.
5.5.3 Power Models
We use power finite state machines (PFSM) to model the operations that take place
in PowerAlert-protocol, network, and hashing operations. The model and timing
of each power state are used by PowerAlert to verify that the PowerAlert-
protocol was not being tampered with.
A PFSM, as proposed by Pathak [94], is a state machine in which each state
represents a power state Sk. Each power state has a constant amount of current
drawn, ik. The duration of each state is not encoded in the PFSM. A PFSM has an
initial idle state S0 with power level i(S0) = iidle. When an operation starts, such as
a network receive with a TCP socket, the PFSM moves deterministically to another
power state S1 with current level i(S1) = i1 such that the total current drawn is
iidle + i1.
We extend the PFSM to store the spectral information of the current signal during
each state; that is, while the PFSM stores the average which is the information at the
zero frequency component, we store the whole spectrum. Storing the whole spectrum
allows us to detect more changes to the execution.
The PowerAlert-protocol starts with a network communication (network op-
eration) between PowerAlert and the machine. Then the machine is supposed to
load and run the IC-Program (hash operation). Below is the description of the PFSM
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(a) Memory read and hash current trace
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(b) Network operation current trace




















Figure 5.7: Current drawn during network and memory read operations. The
variance on each level is around 3 mA.
of the operations:
• A short network operation has a PFSM that moves from the idle state S0 to S1
with current level i1. A long network operation alternates between S0 and S1;
the period is T µs. A short network operation is longer than T µs. Figure 5.7b
shows the current trace drawn during a network operation.
• The hash operation has a PFSM that moves from the idle state S0 to S2 with
current level i2. Then, after the hash function is loaded, the program starts
running and the power state moves to S3 with current level i3. At the end of the
operation, the PFSM returns to the idle power state S0. The duration of state
S3 is equivalent to the time it takes for the operation to execute. Figure 5.7a
shows the current trace drawn during a hash operation.
We merge the two state machines to follow the operation of the PowerAlert-
protocol. The overall operation of the state machine is shown in Figure 5.8.
The PowerAlert-protocol PFSM starts from state S0, and it moves to S1 during
the network operation when the untrusted machine receives the hash function (IC-
Program), the address list, and the nonce. The PFSM then moves to the hash
operation (state S2 to load and S3 to run). Finally, as the untrusted machine sends











Figure 5.8: Power finite state machine (PFSM) of PowerAlert-protocol.
In the following, we explain the method for learning the normal PFSM of a ma-
chine.
5.5.4 Learning the Models
For each machine, we assume that we start from an initial uncompromised state. We
establish a power behavioral baseline, build the PFSM and a language for each op-
eration, and learn an execution-time model. We initiate the PowerAlert-protocol
multiple times and store the current signal for every run. For each signal, the power
states are extracted using the method in Section 5.5.2 and the values of the spectrum
of the current are averaged. Moreover, we establish the idle power state by measuring
power when no applications are running, that is, i(t) is constant.
In our test machine, an AMD Athlon 64 machine running Linux 4.1.13, the average
current drawn during the idle state was 870±3 mA, the average current drawn during
the load phase was 2340 ± 4 mA, the average current drawn during the hash phase
was 1580 ± 10mA, and the current drawn during the network operation phase was
1.360± 200 mA. In addition to having the average currents being well-separated, the
spectrum information of the signals during each phase are different. We compare the
spectra of the signals using a findpeaks algorithm. The idle state current depends on
many factors, including the minimum services running in the operating system and the
semiconductor manufacturing process. The manufacturing process determines static
power consumption (subthreshold conduction and tunneling current), which is the
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current draw when the gates are not switching. Thus, the current levels in the PFSM
are unique to the machine and need to be learned for each machine. We decided
not to fold semiconductor aging into the power model. Aging causes degradation
of the transistor, leading to failures; however, the time scale on which aging affects
performance is on the order of 5 years. Specifically, aging has no effect on dynamic
power [51], but it does affect threshold voltage. The static power is proportional to
the threshold voltage [143]. Studies have shown that the threshold voltage varies
within 1 V during thermally accelerated aging [20] which causes a 0.4% increase in
static power. We consider this increase too insignificant to incorporate into the model,
especially as it requires years to happen.
In the following, we learn a timing model using the training data from the ma-
chine to be inspected, and we propose a method of validating the execution of the
PowerAlert-protocol using the learned PFSM and the timing model.
Retraining the Models
In order to retrain the model when needed, we opt for the following procedure: (1)
back up the data in permanent storage, (2) wipe the storage, (3) install a clean OS,
(4) collect training data and learn the models, and (5) restore the permanent storage.
This process, given our assumption of no hardware attacks, ensures that the attacker
cannot interfere with the training process, as the persistent storage is removed during
the training phase.
5.5.5 Learning Power State Timing
We use timing information in our system as part of the validation process. Specifically,
to confirm that an adversary is not trying to deceive PowerAlert, we extract the
timing information (duration) from each power state and compare it to the learned
model; the details are in the next section. By extracting the timing information using
the power signal, we control the accuracy of the measure, whereas if we used network
RTT similar to the case in remote attestation schemes, the measurement would be
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affected network conditions. Moreover, we have confidence that the timing was not
manipulated, as it was extracted from a source that could not have been tampered
with. We learn the execution time model for the hash phase and the network phase.
The hash function (IC-Program) has a variable number of instructions to execute
per cycle and a variable input set size. We consider the general structure of the IC-
Program (Section 5.4.1) f(L, η), where N = |L| is the size of the input set, and ∥f∥c
is the number of instructions executed by the hash function during each iteration.
All IC-Programs have a complexity O(c ·N), where N is the input size and c is the
number of instructions per loop, and use the same type of instructions as any IC-
Program. We postulate that any IC-Programs of equal input size N and c number
of instructions will have the same execution time. Thus, to obtain the training data
for learning the timing model, we generate IC-Programs for different input sizes and
instruction counts and find the execution durations per program.
The experiments are repeated multiple times; the results are averaged to ac-
count for the indeterministic nature of program execution. We use multivariate
linear regression to learn a model of the execution time of the IC-Program. The
model uses predictor variables x = [N, ∥f∥c] and a response variable y = t (exe-
cution time). For our test machine, Figure 5.9 shows the data points for the dura-
tion of execution at power state S2 during the hash phase of the PowerAlert-
protocol. The surface drawn is the learned model, with implicit equation y =
1.3958 + 0.081x(1) − 0.017x(2) + 0.008x(1) × x(2) and mean error σ = 5.4542µs.
The mean error of the model is significant because it determines how much leeway
the adversary has. If the error is high, then the attacker has a wide gap in which
to employ evasion techniques. However, a minor error means that the attacker has
only a small gap for evasion. Figure 5.10 shows the impact of an attacker’s injecting
instructions into the program. The plot shows the current signal measured during the
hash phase. The blue signal is the normal behavior, and the orange signal is the one
that has been tampered with. Both signals have the same power states. However,
the signal that has been tampered with stays in the second state longer.
During the network phase, the machine is either receiving data or sending the
result. When the PowerAlert-protocol is initiated, the CPU performs an IO oper-
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Figure 5.9: Power state timing model for hashing phase.
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Figure 5.10: Timing difference in current signal due to tampering.
ation to transfer data from the network card. When the machine returns the results,
the CPU performs an IO operation to transfer data to the network card. We learn the
timing model of the network phase by varying the number of bytes to be transferred
and then measuring the time it takes to transfer those bytes. Based on results from
our test machine, yn = 0.129× x+ 12.48 is the linear model that predicts the timing
for the network phase as a function of the number of bytes (x). The mean error of
the model is σn = 1.902 µs. The model’s constant component is the time it takes the
OS to create the buffers, and the linear component is the time it takes to transfer the
data over the buses using DMA. The linear coefficient models the bus speed.
5.5.6 Measurement Validation
PowerAlert measures the current drawn in real time when it initiates the protocol
and attempts to verify that the power trace was generated by the PowerAlert-
protocol PFSM. The power states are extracted from the current signal, resulting
in a sequence of states S = S(0), S(1), S(2), . . . , S(n). The sequence of states is
matched to the regular language which is generated by the PowerAlert-protocol
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PFSM learned by PowerAlert during the training phase (Figure 5.8).
L = (S0, S1)
+(S0, S2, S3, S0)(S0, S1).
The first part of the language L, (S0, S1)
+, is the protocol initiation phase. The
second part, (S0, S2, S3, S0), is the hashing phase. Finally, the last part, (S0, S1), is
the output phase. Note that the output phase is expected to be a short network
operation, while the initiation phase is expected to be a long network operation.
During the current trace validation, PowerAlert extracts the duration of each
power state, and then the duration of each operation phase. We use the timing
information to confirm that the duration of each phase is consistent with the protocol
operation and hashing. The expected duration of each phase is determined by the
following:
• For the hash phase: PowerAlert computes δ = |ŷ−yt|, the difference between
the expected execution time, ŷ, and the measured execution time, yt. Malicious
behavior is detected if δ ≥ γmax(σm + σs), where σm is model error, σs is the
sampling error, and γ is a tolerance factor.
• For the network operation: PowerAlert computes δn = |ŷn − yn,t|, where
ŷn is the predicted time and yn,t is the measured time. Malicious behavior is
detected if δn ≥ γmax(σn, σs), where σn is the model error, σs is the sampling
error, and γ is a tolerance factor.
• A sanity check is performed to ensure that the total duration of the phases is
less than the RTT as measured by PowerAlert’s clock.
The dynamic nature of the hash functions makes the use of timing information
effective. While an attacker can find a faster implementation of a static integrity-
checking program to evade time-based checks, we, on the other hand, use diversity to
prevent the attacker from adapting. However, we keep the timing information as an
extra check to detect manipulation.
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5.5.7 Parameter Search
The gradient of the model, ∇y = ((0.008x(2) + 0.081), (0.008x(1) − 0.017)), reveals
that when x(1) is kept constant, a slight increase in the number of instructions exe-
cuted, x(2), leads to an increase in the execution time proportional to the input size,
x(1). A larger input size has a greater impact. If an attacker were to inject some in-
structions into the IC-Program, the input size and the original number of instructions
would determine ∇y(x), the increase in execution time.
The parameters of the IC-Program impact the effectiveness of the detection method.
A small ∇y(x) will increase the false positive rates, while a large ∇y(x) will increase
the cost to initiate the PowerAlert-protocol. Moreover, the sampling rate of the
current measurement system in PowerAlert constrains the minimum ∇y(x) al-
lowed. The sampling rate is determined by the hardware used; hardware with a low
sampling rate has a lower cost than that with a high sampling rate. A high sampling
rate requires more memory and bandwidth to acquire, process, and store the data. In
order to find the optimal parameters for the IC-Program, PowerAlert minimizes
the total running time constrained by the hardware sampling rate, the cost to run the
IC-Program, and the coverage required. Table 5.1 contains solutions for the following




subject to y(N, ∥f∥p + k)− y(N, ∥f∥p) > γ ·max(σm, σs)
yn(∥f∥p) > γ ·max(σn, σs)
∥f∥p < cost, N/Ntotal > coverage.
We compute the parameters of the IC-Program for k = 4 with a tolerance factor
γ = 10, cost = 300, and coverage = 0.000001. We varied the sampling rates for
measuring current; the sampling rates reflect the investment made onPowerAlert’s
capabilities. Our computations show that the higher the sampling rate, the smaller
the IC-Program can be. So if the designer invests more in the hardware capabilities of
PowerAlert, the attacker’s leeway will be tighter, and there will be low overhead
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Table 5.1: Minimum IC-Program parameters.
Sampling Rate Error Tolerance
(µs)
Coverage (bytes) Program Size
(∥f∥p)
1 MHz 64.542 2,019 40
500 kHz 74.542 2,331 40
250 kHz 94.542 2,956 40
200 kHz 104.542 3,269 40
54 kHz 239.727 7,493 40
on the machine.
5.6 Attacker-Verifier Game
In this section, we study the interactions between the PowerAlert strategy and
an attacker trying to persist in a target machine. At a high level, we introduce a
continuous-time game to model the interactions between the attacker who is trying to
hide and a verifier using the PowerAlert strategy to detect intruders. In this game,
the verifier initiates the PowerAlert-protocol at random times with a predefined
strategy. The attacker tries to anticipate the verifier’s strategy and disables the
malicious changes to the kernel in order to avoid detection.
The verifier’s actions consist of deciding on the time instants at which she wants to
initiate the PowerAlert-protocol, while the attacker’s actions consist of choosing
time instants at which he wants to hide his activity in order to avoid detection. The
attacker’s goal is to ensure that his actions coincide with the verifier’s actions, so that
his malicious activity is hidden when the PowerAlert-protocol is running. It is in
the verifier’s interest, however, for the attacker to disable his malicious activities as
much as possible. The verifier’s goal, on the other hand, is to select a strategy that
will catch the attacker off-guard (i.e., when the malicious activity is not hidden) and
detect the attacker’s presence. In what follows, we first prove that when the verifier
chooses her action times independently and in an identically distributed fashion, then
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the attacker’s best strategy is to hide his activities periodically with a fixed period
T ∗. We then use simulation to evaluate the interactions between the attacker and the
verifier for the scenario where the verifier plays according to exponentially distributed
attestation times. We measure the probability of the attacker’s being detected, the
fraction of verifier actions that coincide with the attacker’s actions, and the fraction
of time in which the attacker’s malicious activity is hidden, as a function of the
rates of play of both the verifier and the attacker (i.e., the rate λ0 of the exponential
distribution and the rate λ1 =
1
T ∗
of the periodic distribution). We next will formalize
our game setting, present our theorem and then present our model and simulation
results. In the next chapter we will find the Nash equilibrium of the game for a
generalized state checking game.
5.6.1 Formalization as a Game
We follow an approach similar to that of FlipIt [125], a continuous-time game in
which both players make stealthy moves (i.e., a player cannot obtain the state of
the game unless she makes a move, and thus cannot observe her opponents’ moves
unless she makes a move of her own) in order to take control of a shared resource.
Our formalization differs from FlipIt in that moves are not instantaneous, but rather
spread over an interval of time. Furthermore, the verifier’s moves in our game do
not always yield a successful outcome; they often fail either because the attacker has
hidden his malicious activity or because of memory coverage considerations. In what
follows we define the players’ actions, their views of the game, their strategies, and
the type of strategies we consider in our simulation. We refer to the verifier as player
0 and to the attacker as player 1, and let B = {⊤,⊥} be the set of Boolean constants
true and false.
The attacker’s action consists of hiding his malicious activity for a specified period
of time. Such an action would restore all of the kernel address space locations to
their original state, and thus avoid detection if the verifier initiates a PowerAlert-
protocol attestation process. Let c : R+ −→ B be the function defining the state of
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the attacker’s malicious activity at any time t > 0, i.e.,
c(t) =
{
⊤ iff attacker is active at time t
⊥ otherwise.
Let C be the state of all such state functions. Let c([ta, tb]) be to the state of the
attacker’s activity in the time interval ta ≤ t ≤ tb.
Definition 12. Attacker action. An attacker’s action is defined as a function a1 :
C −→ C that changes the state of the attacker’s activity for a period of time α1.
a1(c([t, t+ α1]) =
{
⊥ iff c([t, t+ α1]) = ⊤
c([t, t+ α1]) otherwise.
The verifier’s action consists of initiating the PowerAlert-protocol and at-
tempting to attest the victim machine’s kernel address space. An attestation fails
when the attacker has modified a memory location that the verifier is attempting
to attest. A successful attestation does not necessarily mean the absence of mali-
cious activities; the attacker might have changed memory locations not requested for
attestation by the PowerAlert-protocol.
Let α0 be the length of time needed to complete an attestation procedure, and pe
be the probability that an attacker will evade the verifier’s attestation attempt. In
other words, pe refers to the probability that the verifier’s action will succeed even in
the presence of an active attacker. The game ends if the attacker is detected, i.e., if
∃t > 0 such that a0(t) = ⊥.
Definition 13. Verifier action. Let the verifier’s action be a function a0 : R+ −→ B,
where a0(t) is the outcome of initiating an attestation process at time t. a0(t) = ⊤
if the attestation succeeds, and a0 = ⊥ if the attestation fails and the verifier detects
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the presence of the attacker.
a0(tv) =

⊤ if ∃t ∈ [tv, tv + α0).C(t) = ⊤ w.p. pe
⊥ if ∃t ∈ [tv, tv + α0).C(t) = ⊤ w.p. 1− pe
⊤ otherwise.
The verifier can observe only the outcomes of her own actions, while the attacker
can observe the outcomes of any action (i.e., attestation attempt) that the verifier
has attempted between the time of the attacker’s last move and the current move
time.
Definition 14. Feedback function. Let ti,k be the time at which player i makes her




ϕ1(t1,k) = {a1(t1,k)} ∪
{a0(t0,j) | t1,k−1 + α1 < t0,j < t1,k + α1}.
Definition 15. Player view. For each player i ∈ {0, 1}, we define the player’s view
of the game at time t as vi(t) = {(ti,1, ϕi(ti,1)) , . . . , (ti,k, ϕi(ti,k))}, where ti,k ≤ t is
the time at which player i made her last move before time t. We use V to denote the
set of all possible player views.
A player’s strategy defines the time instants at which she wants to make her
moves.
Definition 16. Player strategy. Let vi(tk) be player i’s view at time ti,k = tk when
she made her kth move; then, the player’s strategy is a function Si : V −→ R such
that ti,k+1 = ti,k + S(vi(tk)).
Definition 17. Renewal strategy. A strategy Si is a renewal strategy if the action
interarrival times are independent and identically distributed. In other words, the
action interarrival times form a renewal process [12].
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Theorem 5.1. If the verifier is playing with a renewal strategy, then the attacker’s
best strategy is to play periodically with a fixed period T ∗.
Proof. Since the verifier’s action interarrival times are i.i.d., if at any time tk the
attacker computes an optimal action play time S1(v1(tk)), then S1(v1(tk)) would also
be optimal at any other time instant t′k. Therefore the attacker’s best strategy is to
play periodically with period T ∗ = S1(v1(tk)). In the following chapter we obtain the
analytical expression of T ∗.
Theorem 5.1 states that the attacker’s best response strategy to a verifier playing
with a renewal strategy is to play periodically. The theorem further illustrates an
important advantage that the attacker enjoys over the verifier, that of observability.
Since the verifier does not know if the attacker is present or not, the events of a
successful verification attempt and the attacker hiding her activity are indistinguish-
able. In other words, the verifier cannot observe the attacker’s actions, and thus must
choose her strategy before playing the game. As for the attacker, the verifier’s actions
are completely observable, and thus she can use that information to further improve
her strategy.
5.6.2 Simulation and Results
We implement a model of our game using stochastic activity networks [106] in the
Möbius modeling and simulation tool [25]. In accordance with Theorem 5.1, we
assume that the verifier is playing with an exponential strategy with rate λ0, while
the attacker plays with a periodic strategy with rate λ1 =
1
T1
, where T1 is the attacker’s
period. We vary the players’ rates λ0 and λ1, and evaluate the performance of their
strategies with respect to three metrics: (1) the probability of detection, (2) the
fraction of time the attacker is inactive, and (3) the hit ratio. We compute the
probability of detection as the average fraction of simulation runs in which the game
has ended. We rely on simulations to compute those metrics because finding analytic
solutions is infeasible for general attacker and PowerAlert strategies. Moreover, by
using Möbius’s simulation design tool, our simulations are repeated until the solutions
153
converge thus ensuring valid simulation design. In the next Chapter, we analytically
analyze the game and compute the Nash equilibrium strategies for players that use
periodic and exponential strategies.
We define the attacker’s inactivity indicator function as
I(t) =
{
1 iff C(t) = ⊥
0 otherwise.





I(t)dt. Finally, we define the hit ratio as the fraction of verifier actions
that coincide with attacker actions. In other words, the hit ratio is the fraction of
attestation attempts that succeed because the attacker has turned off her malicious
activity.
For our simulations, we assume that the verifier is using a sampling rate of 500
kHz. From Table 5.1, we know that the coverage of the verifier’s generated programs
is 2331 bytes. For a machine running the Linux 4.1.13 kernel with an average kernel
memory size of 200 MB, those include static datastructures, kernel modules, and
kernel code. We can compute the probability of evasion as pe = 1 − 2331200∗1024∗1024 =
0.99998. Also, using our learned model in Section 5.5.5, we can compute the time
needed for attestation α0 = 903 µs.
We vary the attacker’s period (T1) from 30 seconds to 5 minutes in steps of 10
seconds, and the verifier actions’ average interarrival times (T0) from 1 minutes to 3
minutes in steps of 15 seconds. In addition, we assume that the attacker chooses to





. We ran our simulation for
10 days and report average results for all of our metrics.
Figure 5.11 shows the probability of detection as a function of the attackers play
rate λ1 and the verifiers play rate λ0; Figure 5.12 shows the fraction of time the
attacker is inactive as a function of λ1 and λ0. For a fixed attacker play rate, the
probability of detection increases as the verifier increases her play rate. Intuitively,
one can see that the verifier is performing more attestation procedures, and thus the
probability that an attestation will take place while the attacker is active increases,
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so it is more likely that the verifier will be able to detect the attacker’s presence.
For a fixed verifier strategy, decreasing the attacker’s play rate would yield a
reduction in the probability of detection. As the attacker is playing slower, his period
increases, and thus he would have to hide his malicious activity for longer periods







). Therefore it is more likely that the verifier’s
attestation attempt will coincide with the time the attacker has hidden his malicious
activity, thus reducing his probability of detection. This is shown in Figure 5.12
where for a fixed verifier play rate, the fraction of time where the attacker turns off
his malicious activity decreases as her play rate increases. This is further confirmed
by Figure 5.13, where the hit ratio is at its highest when the attacker is playing
slowly, and decreases as the attacker increases his play rate. This means that when
the attacker is playing slowly, he is hiding more often and thus avoiding the verifier’s
attestations, therefore reducing the probability of being detected. However, that
advantage comes at the expense of increased activity time; the slower the attacker
plays, the longer he has to turn off his malicious activity, reaching 70% inactivity
when the verifier is playing at her slowest rate.
Another interesting result is revealed by the peaks of the surfaces in Figures 5.12
and 5.13. The fraction of time the attacker is inactive reaches its peak when the
attacker is playing slowly while the verifier is acting at her fastest rate. The reason is
that a high verifier rate induces a high hit ratio; thus, during one period of inactivity,
the attacker might have to go through multiple attestation procedures, and might
even have to extend his inactivity period if an attestation procedure is started right
before the end of that period.
Furthermore, when the verifier chooses a slow rate of play, the rate of increase in
the probability of detection as a function of the attacker’s play rate is slow. Therefore
it is best for the attacker, in this case, to play fast, thus reducing his fraction of time
spent inactive while maintaining a relatively acceptable low probability of detection.
Therefore a slow rate of play for the verifier puts her at a disadvantage when the at-
tacker can play fast, increase his activity time, and still avoid detection. However, as
the defender starts increasing her rate of play, the attacker faces a trade-off between
the probability of detection and the fraction of time spent inactive. Achieving high
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levels of activity means risking a higher detection probability, while keeping the detec-
tion probability low would require the attacker to remain inactive for longer periods
of time. The decision on such a trade-off depends on the attacker’s level of stealthi-
ness. An attacker who wants to remain stealthy, as in the case of an APT, would be
inclined to turn off his or her malicious activities more often than an attacker whose
goal is to inflict the maximum damage in the shortest period of time.
In summary, our simulation results show that the usage of the PowerAlert-
protocol for checking the integrity of the kernel space would force a malicious attacker
to make a trade-off between risk of detection and amount of activity. An attacker
that wishes to remain active as much as possible would risk a higher probability of
detection, while an attacker who seeks to remain stealthy would have to incur periods
of inactivity that could be as high as 70% across the lifetime of the attack.
5.7 Discussion
In this section, we discuss some security details related to the implementation of the
PowerAlert system. Specifically, we discuss the attack surface of PowerAlert
and the security concerns with the IC-Program. Moreover, we consider the practical-
ity of our solution, and its importance despite the existence of TPMs.
5.7.1 Implementation Details
Each PowerAlert device has a client on the untrusted machine. The client is a
low-level module that communicates with PowerAlert. The client can be imple-
mented for placement in the kernel or the hypervisor. The communication channel
between PowerAlert and the client can be over any medium, such as Ethernet,
USB, or serial link. All those channels are feasible because of the proximity between
PowerAlert and the untrusted machine. The use of serial or USB communication
is advantageous because it limits the attacker to physical attacks, making man-in-






























Figure 5.11: The average probability that the attacker will be detected, as a

































Figure 5.12: The average fraction of time the attacker’s malicious activity is hidden,
























Figure 5.13: The average ratio of attestation tasks that were evaded by the
attacker’s actions, as a function of the attacker’s (λ1) and the verifier’s (λ0) play
rates.
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machine, then he or she could tamper with PowerAlert.
The client receives the IC-Program as machine code over the communication chan-
nel. PowerAlert signs the code; PowerAlert and the host exchange keys during
the initialization phase of the system. The signed program allows the machine to at-
test that PowerAlert is the generator. We propose using a stream cipher, as it
has better performance than public-private key ciphers or block ciphers.
As for PowerAlert’s hardware, the resource requirements are minimal. We
implemented a prototype using a Raspberry Pi 2. The Raspberry Pi 2 Model B has
the following specs: A 900 MHz quad-core ARM Cortex-A7 CPU, VideoCore IV 3D
graphics core, 32 GB of storage (Micro SD card storage), and 1GB of RAM. The
prototype uses an oscilloscope (Tektronix TDS3000 Series) for analog to digital con-
version (ADC) to convert the current measurements from the current loop to a digital
signal. The oscilloscope’s sampling rate is set to 500 kHz; we use a low sampling rate
to accommodate for hardware capabilities of the Raspberry Pi 2. We run power state
extraction after the PowerAlert-Protocol has terminated; thus the operation does
not need to be real-time. In a production prototype, a dedicated ADC chip can
be used to convert the current measurements to be PowerAlert, as opposed to
relying on an external oscilloscope. We implemented PowerAlert’s IC-program
generation algorithm using the NTL library for the hash function generation, current
measurement analysis (power state extraction and spectral analysis) was implemented
using the Aquila DSP library. In our implementation PowerAlert communicates
with the untrusted machine over an Ethernet connection using a dedicated network
interface card at 100 Mbps. On the other hand, the untrusted machine uses an AMD
Athlon 64 processor, 8 GB of memory, 1 TB of storage, and a Gigabit Ethernet card
for PowerAlert communication (running at 100 Mbps). The machine is running
CRUX, a Linux distribution, running the Linux kernel version 4.1.13 with minimum
services running. The untrusted machine includes a custom kernel module that runs
the PA-protocol. Specifically, the kernel module takes as an input the IC-program
and loads it to system memory, pauses execution temporarily of kernel threads, and
runs the IC-program. Finally, the kernel module communicates the output of the
IC-program to PowerAlert. We expect the kernel module in the untrusted ma-
160
chine to be cooperative, any modification to the kernel module will be detected by
PowerAlert’s model validation of the current measurements.
5.7.2 PowerAlert’s Attack Surface
If the untrusted machine gets compromised, the attacker might try to compromise
PowerAlert to disable its functionality. The attack surface of power is limited to
one communication channel that only uses the PowerAlert-Protocol. During the
implementation of the protocol, PowerAlert receives the output of the IC-Program
only. The current measurements are out of the attacker’s control. The language of
the protocol is context-free and thus can be verified using language-theoretic security
approaches [16]. By verifying the parser, we can have assurance that even if the
attacker compromises the machine, the attack cannot spread to PowerAlert.
5.7.3 Comparison to TPM
PowerAlert does not rely on specialized hardware within the untrusted machine,
as TPM and Intel’s AMT do. However, PowerAlert and trusted modules are or-
thogonal systems; whereas TPMs provide a method for secure boot, dynamic integrity
checking is still costly and harder to enforce. PowerAlert provides an external se-
curity solution that can be tied to security management across a wide network. In
fact, PowerAlert can use Intel’s AMT as a communication channel. Finally, our
work demonstrates the need for measurements that do not pass through or originate
in the untrusted machine. Such measurements reduce the risk of attacker tampering
and mimicry.
5.8 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our PowerAlert implementation in
generating the IC-Program and we determine the size of the space of IC-Programs.
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Figure 5.14: Average time in seconds for generating a random irreducible
polynomial for degree d.
5.8.1 IC-Program Generation
In the program-generation algorithm, the hard problem is the generation of random
irreducible polynomials of degree d in GF (2). We implemented the generation al-
gorithm by using NTL [114], A Library for doing Number Theory, on a Raspberry
PI 2 v1.1. The results in Figure 5.14 show the average time it took to generate an
LFSR for each degree d using our implementation compared to the worst-case com-
plexity. Our implementation performs orders of magnitude better than the worst-case
runtime. Practically speaking, it takes around one second to generate an irreducible
polynomial of degree 128. The performance can be significantly improved by optimiz-
ing the algorithm, parallelizing the generation algorithm, or precomputing and then
caching the generated polynomials. For the system to be stable, the rate of initiation
of the PowerAlert-protocol should be less than the rate of IC-Program generation.




We want to investigate the maximum number of IC-Programs that can be generated
by PowerAlert. The goal is to have a large space so that the generated programs
are not reused. An IC-Program is generated by chaining randomly generated LFSRs
of degree d through use of a randomly generated binary tree of depth n. The maximum
number of IC-programs that can be generated is the product of the maximum number
of binary trees multiplied by the maximum number of irreducible polynomials. Let
the maximum number of binary trees with depth n be tn (see equations below). The
maximum number of nodes for a binary tree of depth n is 2n, and thus the total
number of tree is the sum of the Catalan number Cm, which is the number of binary
trees with m nodes, over the total number of possible nodes. Let Md be the maximum

















Finally, the total number of IC-programs that can be generated is Dd,n = Md(2)×
tn. Figure 5.15 shows the total number of programs for an increasing degree of
polynomials and depth of tree. The maximum number of programs reaches 1.9721×
1026 for n = 40, and d = 5 guarantees that no program ever gets reused in the lifetime
of the device; in fact, if a new program is generated every one second, the space would
be depleted in 6.246× 1018 years.
5.8.3 Performance Impact
When the PowerAlert-protocol is initiated and the IC-Program starts execution,
execution of all other tasks is paused. This is needed in order to ensure that no
other tasks interfere with the current measured from the CPU. In terms of graphical
responsiveness, the pixel response time should not exceed 4 ms [87]. The Pow-
erAlert-protocol is initiated, on average, once every minute for 0.9 ms. Thus the
graphical degradation will not be noticeable by a user. Moreover, we measured the
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Figure 5.15: Maximum number of IC-Programs, as a function of tree depth and
polynomial degree.
performance degradation to be a factor of 0.0018.
5.8.4 Security Analysis
PowerAlert uses current measurements, timing information, and diversity of the
IC-Program to protect against subversion of integrity checking. The power measure-
ments are used to limit the operation of the machine to just the IC-Program while
diversity limits the attacker’s ability to adapt to our checking mechanisms. In this
section, we list the methods in which PowerAlert addresses the attacks discussed
in Section 5.2.2.
Proxy attack: The attacker attempts to forward the IC-Program to a remote
machine to compute and return the result via the same network link. PowerAlert
detects this attack by examining its effects on the current trace and the timing of
the network phase. Using the current trace, PowerAlert will observe that network
operations took longer than expected as more bytes were transferred between the
CPU and the network card. The size of the IC-Program, which was picked by the
optimization process described in Section 5.5.7, ensures that our hardware will pick
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up the retransmission. For our test machine, Table 5.1 shows that 40 instructions
per iteration is enough. Any physical attack, such as tapping of the network line or
firmware changes to the NIC, are not within our purview.
Active analysis: Active reverse engineering is used to learn the usage patterns
of the IC-Program. PowerAlert changes the IC-Program each time the Pow-
erAlert-protocol is initiated; the diversity renders the information learned by the
attacker from the previous run obsolete. The probability that a program will ever
get repeated is 1/1020. Moreover, it is practically impossible for the attacker to predict
our next IC-Program. The attacker has to predict the random numbers generated by
PowerAlert’s random number generator; in this work, we require PowerAlert
to use a true random number generator that uses some physical phenomena as op-
posed to a pseudorandom number generator that can be predicted by a dedicated
attacker.
Static analysis: Analyzing a flattened control flow is NP-hard [131]. Thus it will
not be possible for the attacker to analyze the program without significant computa-
tions. Note that we combine control flow flattening with IC-Program diversity; thus
even if the attacker successfully analyzes the IC-Program the solution is not useful
for the next run of the protocol.
Data pointer redirection attack: The attacker stores an unmodified copy of
the data in another portion of memory. When an address is to be checked, the
attacker changes the address to be checked to that of the unmodified data. The
IC-Program uses the address and the memory content when computing the hash
function. To compute a valid hash, the attacker has to change the address to the
location of the copy while retaining the original address. In our IC-Program design
phase, the designer sets the smallest number of instructions that can be added to
the program such that the execution difference is detected when PowerAlert’s
hardware specifications are taken into account (the sampling rate).
For example, Table 5.1 lists the design parameters of the IC-Program when the
defender wants to protect against an attacker injecting four, k = 4, instructions per
loop into the IC-Program for different sampling rates of PowerAlert.
Note that this measure is more effective when combined with the IC-Program
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diversity. Each time a new IC-Program is generated, the attacker has only one chance
to find an injection scheme such that the final number of instructions is less than the
threshold we design for. The new program in the next iteration will require a new
injection method and thus any runtime method to automatically find the optimal
method will require computations that will be detected by our current measurements.
Attacker hiding: If an attacker attempts to hide, he or she must predict when the
PowerAlert-protocol will be initiated. PowerAlert’s random initiation mech-
anisms ensure that the attacker cannot predict those instances. Our game-theoretic
analysis shows that when the attacker is using an exponential initiation strategy, his
best strategy is to hide more often if the verifier is aggressive. Note that because
PowerAlert is using a random strategy, the attack will not always correctly pre-
dict the strategy. Thus, some of PowerAlert actions will be run when the attacker
is not hiding, leading to detection. The attacker’s strategy, to be stealthy, can delay
detection but cannot prevent it.
Forced retraining: The attacker forces PowerAlert to retrain by simulating a
hardware fault that requires a CPU change, to lead PowerAlert to a compromised
model. Then PowerAlert’s process is to wipe the permanent storage, retrain
using a clean OS, and then restore data. Since we assume that the attacker does not
modify the hardware state, by removing permanent storage, we prevent the attacker
from affecting the retraining process.
5.9 Related Work
Timing Attestation
Seshadri et al. propose Pioneer [112], a timing-based remote attestation system for
legacy systems (without TPM). The timing is computed using the network round-
trip time. This work was extended by Kovah et al. [72]. The work assumes that the
machine can be restricted to execution in one thread. The issue with the work is that
the round-trip time is affected by the network conditions, which the authors do not
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explore; a heavily congested network will lead to a high variation on the RRT, causing
a high rate of false positives. Moreover, the restriction of execution to one thread
can be evaded by a lower-level attacker. In later, work the authors discuss the issues
of Time Of Check, Time Of Use attacks. Later work adapted timing attestation to
embedded devices [42].
Hernández et al. [55] implement a monitor integrity-checking system by estimat-
ing the time it takes for a piece of software to run. The timing information is sent
from the machine to a remote server that uses phase change detection algorithms to
detect malicious changes. The issue with that work is that the timing information
is sent by the untrusted machine, and thus the information can easily be manipu-
lated. Armknecht et al. [9] propose a generalized framework for remote attestation
in embedded systems. The authors use timing as a method to limit the ability of
an attacker to evade detection. The framework formalizes the goals of the attacker
and defender. The authors provide a generic attestation scheme and prove sufficient
conditions for provable secure attestation schemes.
Power Malware Detection
Several researchers use power usage to detect malware. In WattsUPDoc, Clark et
al. [26] collect power usage data from embedded medical devices and extract features
for anomaly detection. The authors exploit the regularity of the operation of an
embedded device to detect irregularities. The authors do not, however, investigate
mimicry attacks. Kim et al. [67] use battery consumption as a method to detect
energy-greedy malware. The power readings are sent from the untrusted device to a
remote server for comparison against a trusted baseline. The problem with this work
is that the power readings can be manipulated by the attacker as the data are sent
through the untrusted software. PowerProf [70] is another in-device unsupervised
malware detection approach that uses power profiles. The power information is sim-




Secure Boot [31] verifies the integrity of the system, with the root of trust a boot-
loader. Trusted PlatformModules (TPMs) use platform configuration registers (PCRs)
to store the secure measurements (hash) of the system. Both secure boot and TPMs
are static in that the integrity is checked at boot time. Dynamic attestation, on the
other hand, can perform attestation on the current state of the system. Such fea-
tures are supported by CPU extensions (for example, Intel TXT). El Defrawy et al.
propose SMART [33], an efficient hardware-software primitive to establish a dynamic
root of trust in an embedded processor; however, the authors assume that there are
no hardware attacks. In our work, we propose a method that uses an external trusted
checker with a trustworthy side channel (the current measurements), to check the in-
tegrity of the state in runtime. Thus our method protects against state tampering
that is not reflected in the presistent state of the system.
VM-based Integrity Checker
OSck [57], proposed by Hofmann et al., is a KVM-based kernel integrity checker that
inspects kernel data structures and text to detect rootkits. The checker runs as a
guest OS thread but is isolated by the hypervisor. Most VMM introspection integrity
checkers assume a trusted hypervisor. Those techniques are vulnerable to hardware-
level attacks [71, 116, 136]. In our work, we do not have any trust assumptions as
the attestation device is external to the untrusted machine.
Checksum Diversity
Wang et al. [131] propose to use diversity of probe software for security. The au-
thors obfuscate the control flow by flattening the probing software in order to make
it harder for an attacker to reverse-engineer the program for evasion. While the flat-
tened control flow is hard to analyze statically, the programs are susceptible to active
learning, thus allowing an attacker to adapt over time. Giffin et al. [47] propose
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self-modification to detect modification of checksum code. The experiments show an
overhead of 1 microsecond for each checksum computation, but the method is costly
for large programs, adding 1 second per check. The authors of [1] use randomized
address checking and memory noise to achieve unpredictability.
5.10 Conclusion
In this chapter, we presented PowerAlert, an external integrity checker that
uses power measurements as a trust base. The power signal provides an untainted,
trusted, and very accurate method for observing the behavior of the untrusted com-
puter. PowerAlert initiates the interrogation protocol with a randomly generated
integrity-checking program. The diversity of the IC-Program prevents the attacker
from adapting. We show that the space of IC-Programs is impossible to exhaust and
that the generation is very efficient for low-power devices. PowerAlert measures
the current drawn by the processor during computation and compares it to a learned
model to validate the output of the untrusted machine. We model the interaction
between PowerAlert and the attacker as a continuous-time game. The attacker
disables his or her malicious activities at randomly chosen time instants in order
to evade PowerAlert’s integrity checks. Our simulations show that the attacker
trades off stealthiness against the cost of having periods of inactivity. An attacker
who wants to remain stealthy needs to remain inactive for longer periods of time,
and an increase in activity periods leads to an increase in the probability of being
detected by PowerAlert. We also show that even for a stealthy attacker, Pow-
erAlert still achieves an acceptable probability of detection given the long lifetime
of stealthy APTs; by remaining stealthy, the attacker only delays the inevitable and
incurs extended periods of inactivity.
In the next chapter, we formalize the game that we described in this chapter to
capture the interaction between PowerAlert and the attacker.
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CHAPTER 6
A STRATEGY FOR OPTIMALLY CHECKING
SYSTEM STATE INTEGRITY
Image 6.1: The Tortoise and the Hare (Credit: Baldwin Project)
“The race is not always to the swift.”
- The Hare & the Tortoise, Aesop’s Fables
In this chapter, we study the problem of finding an optimal strategy for integrity
checking to provide system trustworthiness.
A defender, such as PowerAlert, validates the integrity of a system by ob-
serving its state and comparing it to a known good state. Specifically, a defender
measures the state directly or estimates the state using external observations and
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then compares it to a known good state. The process of checking the state is typi-
cally done in the face of malicious manipulations or accidental faults. The defender
has to address two challenges:
• Determining how often and when to check system state integrity. In the case of
malicious manipulation, an adversary will attempt to evade detection by hiding
the state changes so that a check results in a false negative.
• Checking system state integrity in a way that does not unacceptably degrade
system performance. The size of system state presents a challenge for a defender
when checking the integrity of the system. If the state is large, then the overhead
of naively performing the check is high.
When one wants to check the integrity of a large state while an attacker is at-
tempting evasion, one might think that periodically and incrementally checking state
integrity would be an intuitive solution. However, the details of how to do this are
not obvious. For example, the defender might pick a low rate of checking to conserve
resources. On the other hand, the defender might decide to be aggressive to force
the attacker to hide more often. Selecting an optimal strategy thus depends on the
strategies of both the defender and the attacker.
In this chapter we address the following question: What is the optimal strategy
that a defender can take against an attacker attempting to evade detection, such that
it increases the resiliency of the system? We answer this question by proposing
and analyzing the Tireless game. Tireless is a novel continuous-time security
game between two players: a defender and an attacker. In this game, the defender
incrementally and repeatedly checks the integrity of a system, while the attacker
attempts to evade detection by hiding. The defender’s action is to test the state,
while the attacker’s action is to hide. Actions in the game are asynchronous. A
strategy determines when each player performs an action.
We study the game for three attacker-defender strategies: 1) periodic-periodic, 2)
periodic-exponential, and 3) exponential-exponential. In each case, we find the Nash
equilibrium (NE) strategy profile, which is the optimal strategy that a player can use
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to maximize his or her payoff. Table 6.1 presents the NE strategies for each set of
strategies and the theorem that proves the NE.
In the periodic-periodic strategy, both the defender and attacker play periodic
strategies, such that at the beginning of the game, the defender picks a period and
uses it to determine when to perform an action (i.e., check the integrity of the state
of the system), while the attacker selects a period to determine when to perform her
action (i.e., to hide).
In the periodic-exponential strategy, the attacker plays a periodic strategy, while
the defender plays an exponential strategy. The exponential strategy is one in which
the interarrival time between the actions performed by a player are independently and
identically sampled from an exponential distribution. The defender prefers a random
strategy because it thwarts an adaptive attacker.
Finally, in an exponential-exponential strategy, both the attacker and the defender
play exponential strategies. To analyze this case, we introduced general renewal
strategies for which the interarrival times are IID random variables, and then applied
it to the exponential case. Thus if the defender plays an exponential strategy, she
uses the Nash equilibrium strategy to maximize her payoff given the attacker’s moves.
We analyzed the case in which the defender is not interested in maximizing her
payoff, but interested in forcing the attacker to hide more often or risk detection. In
this case, the defender plays an aggressive strategy using the Nash equilibrium that
we compute.
Based on our analysis, we find that the best strategy that the defender should
play is an exponential strategy. It allows the defender to be unpredictable, and gives
the defender two options, either to use the minimum NE strategy of slow checking to
maximize payoff, or to force the attacker to hide by aggressively checking the state
with the NE strategy.
The defender has to make several decisions on the cost of the move and the
coverage of her integrity-checking operations when checking the state. We generated
numerical results on the effects of varying both the cost and coverage on the optimal
strategy and optimal payoff. The results show that low coverage favors a higher cost,
while the high coverage favors the low cost.
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Table 6.1: Summary of results.
Attacker Strategy Defender Strategy Result In Chapter
Periodic Periodic NE Exists Theorem 6.1
Periodic Exponential NE Exists Theorem 6.2
Exponential Exponential NE Exists Theorem 6.3, 6.4
The Tireless game addresses two shortcomings of game-theoretic approaches in
cyber security: (1) the moves in our game are asynchronous, and (2) the moves are
not instantaneous. Those properties allow us to apply the optimal strategies to two
real-world scenarios:
• Host Integrity Validation (PowerAlert): The checker, a verifier, attempts
to verify the integrity of a machine when an adversary is attempting to hide to
avoid detection. Such scenarios are called time-of-check-time-of-use situations,
in which the attacker can hide up until the check is complete. A resiliency-
inspired checker would not halt machine execution to check all of the machine’s
kernel code. Instead, it would check random portions of the code at random
time instances.
• SDN Network State Validation: We consider the case when an attacker compro-
mises network switches for redirecting and duplicating data plane traffic for his
or her benefit, and we check the validity of switch-forwarding tables via data
plane validation.
6.1 Formulation
In this section, we introduce Tireless, a novel continuous-time game, to study the
interaction between the defender and the attacker with respect to system state in-
tegrity. The defender checks the integrity of the system’s state incrementally at
certain instants of time. In parallel, the attacker manipulates the integrity of the
state to perform a malicious activity and attempts to evade detection by hiding.
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The defender’s actions consist of deciding on the time instants at which he wants
to perform an integrity check, while the attacker’s actions consist of choosing time
instants to hide her activity in order to avoid detection. The attacker’s goal is to
make her actions coincide with those of the defender, so that her malicious activity
is hidden when the system state’s integrity is checked. It is in the defender’s interest,
however, for the attacker to disable her malicious activities as much as possible. The
defender’s goal, on the other hand, is to select a strategy that will catch the attacker
off-guard (i.e., when the malicious activity is not hidden) and detect the attacker’s
presence.
We first formalize the Tireless game, and then analyze the game for the differ-
ent strategies, and discuss the strategy the defender has to take for state integrity
checking; and finally, we present some numerical results from applying Tireless to
real-world scenarios.
Formalization as a Game
We use the same formalization as the game in Section 5.6. However, we add the
following. The defender takes an integrity-checking action at time td,i with coverage
pc . The coverage is the fraction of the state the defender is checking each time an
action is performed. Note that the coverage is equal to the probability of detection
if the check action is performed when the attacker is not hiding. The duration of
the check is denoted by αd; note that αd is directly proportional to the probability
of detection, pc. On the other hand, the attacker’s action is to disable the malicious
activity at time ta,j. We assume that the attack disables protection for a deterministic
duration of time, αa. In our analysis, we do not include αd in the timing of the
defender’s move because we assume that if the attacker is turned off and the defender
starts, the attacker does not start activity until the check has ended.
Figure 6.1 shows an example evolution of the game. In this example, the attacker
has manipulated the state of the system. The defender initiates a check at td,1, and
during that check the attacker hides at ta,1 < td,1 for a duration of αa. During the





Figure 6.1: Example progression of the Tireless game.
the second defender check at td,2, the check does not detect the attacker even when
the attacker is not hiding. In the second attacker action at ta,2, the attacker hides,
but the defender does not perform any action, which costs the attacker. The game
proceeds in this fashion until the defender detects the attacker.
The payoff of each player is related to the result of each move. For the defender,
the move always has defender action cost −cm; if the checker detects an attacker,
then the payoff is cw. For the attacker, when the attacker disables activity, she incurs
attacker action cost −ca; when the attacker is detected, the attacker action cost is
−cl such that cl ≫ ca. When the attack is running, the attacker action gain is +ca.
Definition 18. Let βi(x), i ∈ {a, d} be the payoff function for each player evaluated
at x ∈ S = Sa × Sd, the strategy profile selected by the players. Each player selects
a strategy xa ∈ Sa, and xb ∈ Sb, x = (xa, xb) is the strategy profile of the game. The
payoff for each player is evaluated as βi(x).
Definition 19. For a Tireless game with (S, β) where S = Sa × Sd is the set of
strategy profiles and β(x) = (βa(x), βd(x)) with x ∈ S. Let xi be the strategy profile
of player i and x−i be the strategy profile of all players except player i.
A strategy profile x∗ ∈ S is a Nash equilibrium if no player has an incentive to
unilaterally deviate.
∀i, xi ∈ Si : βi(x∗i , x∗−i) ≥ βi(xi, x∗−i).
Definition 20. A (weakly) dominant strategy for a player Pi for i ∈ {a, d} is a
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strategy xi ∈ Si such that
∀ x′i ∈ Si\{xi}, x−i ∈ S−i, βi(xi, x−i) ≥ βi(x′i, x−i).
That is, for player Pi, the dominant strategy xi renders a payoff equal to or better
than that of all other strategies x′i ∈ Si, no matter what the strategy profile of the
other players is.
6.2 Game Analysis
In this section we analyze the Tireless game for three combinations of defender and
attacker strategies: (1) The defender and attacker both play periodic strategies in
which they pick their periods and a random offset; in the periodic strategy the player
performs the action at the beginning of every period. (2) The attacker plays a periodic
strategy and the defender plays an exponential strategy in which the defender picks
the rate of the exponential distribution and uses a renewal process with exponential
waiting times as the interaction times. (3) The defender and attacker both play
exponential strategies.
For every game we find the optimal strategy that the defender plays to maximize
the payoff function. The general form of the payoff for the attacker is:
βa =− cl · pc × Pr[Defender action when attack enabled]
+ ca × Pr[Attack running]
− ca · α× Pr[Attacker hiding].
The general form of the payoff the defender is:
βd =+ cw · pc × Pr[Defender action when attack enabled]
− cm × Pr[Defender Action].
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6.2.1 Periodic Strategies
We first consider the case in which both players adopt periodic strategies, i.e., their
interaction times are constant with periods πd and πa for the defender and the at-
tacker, respectively. We assume a fixed value of the attacker’s turn-off period α, and







. In this analysis and what follows, we assume that πa > α, and thus λa ≤ 1α .
We also assume that the minimum rate at which the defender is willing to play is
Λd,0. In all of the cases, we assume that cm ≪ pccw and ca ≪ pccl; this assumption
states that the cost of a move for the defender is much less than the expected benefit
she receives if she detects the presence of the attacker. Similarly, the cost of a move
for the attacker is much less than the expected loss she receives when she is detected.
In addition, we assume that in order to avoid total predictability, both players choose
the times of their initial actions uniformly at random from the intervals [0, πd] and
[0, πa] (for the defender and the attacker, respectively). Therefore, the probabilities
we compute in the following analysis are with respect to the initial choices of the
times of the starting moves.






































Proof. We consider two cases, depending on which player is playing faster.
Case I: (πd ≤ πa) We first consider the case in which the defender is playing at
least as fast as the attacker (i.e., λd ≥ λa). Consider one interval of the defender’s
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moves, namely the interval [t, t + πd] for any t ≥ 0. Since πa ≥ πd, the attacker can
at most move once in [t, t+ πd]; therefore, we can write the defender’s payoff as








The first term corresponds to the average move cost that the defender has to pay for
all the moves she decides to take. The second term corresponds to the probability
that the defender will detect the attacker multiplied by the defender’s benefit from
detection (i.e., cw). The probability that the defender will detect the attacker corre-
sponds to the probability that the attacker’s move will fall in the interval [t, t+πd−α);
that way, when the defender makes her next move at time t + πd − α, the attacker
would not be in hiding. Therefore, the probability of detection would be (πd−α)
πa
pc.







It follows that in this case, the defender’s payoff is strictly decreasing.
Similarly, using the same reasoning, we can write the attacker’s payoff as
βa(λa, λd) = −αλaca + (
1
λd




Taking the partial derivative with respect to λa, we get
∂βa
∂λa
= α(pccl − 2ca)−
1
λd
(pccl − ca). (6.2)
Since we assume that ca ≪ pccl, we approximate pccl−2ca ∼ pccl and pccl−ca ∼ pccl.




Case II: (πd ≥ πa) We now consider the case in which the defender plays at most
as fast the attacker, i.e., λd ≤ λa ≤ 1α . Consider one interval of the attacker’s play,
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namely [t, t + πa] for any t ≥ 0. Since πd ≥ πa, the defender can at most play once
in this interval. Since the attacker hides her activity for the interval [t, t + α], the
probability that the defender will actually detect the attacker’s presence corresponds
to the probability that the defender’s move will fall outside of this interval of the
attacker’s inactivity, namely in the interval (t+α, t+πa]. Therefore, we can write the





− α)pc. We can now write the defender’s
payoff as




Taking the partial derivative with respect to λd, we get
∂βd
∂λd








λa ≤ 1α .
Similarly, we write the attacker’s payoff as
βa(λa, λd) = −αλaca + (
1
λa

















































, then βa(λa, ·) is maximized at 1α .
We first compute the defender’s best response for any attacker rate λa. Based on
Equations 6.1 and 6.3, we distinguish among three cases:
• If λa < pccwcm+αpccw , it follows that the defender’s benefit is increasing on [0, λa]
and decreasing on [λa,∞]. Therefore, the defender’s optimal benefit would be
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to match the attacker’s rate and play at λd = λa.







is strictly decreasing on λd >
pccw
cm+αpccw
. Therefore the defender’s best response






• If λa > pccwcm+αpccw , then βd is strictly decreasing, and it follows that the defender’s
best response is to play her minimum rate of play, Λd,0.

















Similarly, based on Equations 6.2 and 6.4, we distinguish among the following
cases:




• If λd < 2caαpccl <
1
α




























Without loss of generality, we assume that cl = cw, i.e., the gain the defender
obtains when detecting the attacker is equal to the loss the attacker incurs when
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she is detected. Therefore, we compute the Nash equilibrium strategies (λ∗d, λ
∗
a) by
looking at the intersections between the two best response functions BRd and BRa,
and thus obtain































Figure 6.2 illustrates the Nash equilibria of the Tireless game when both players
employ periodic strategies. We plot the defender’s best response as well as the at-








(Attacker 3 in the figure).
We first note that for a given defender’s move cost cm, the defender’s best response
strategy is always fixed. The main reason is that the defender cannot observe the
attacker’s actions unless she is able to detect them. Conversely, the attacker’s best
response is highly affected by her moves’ cost/benefit ca as well as the defender’s
move cost cm.
As Figure 6.2 shows, for high values of ca, the equilibrium shifts towards slower
strategies for the attacker, since she now puts more value on the benefit obtained from
being active than on the loss incurred when hiding. Alternatively, for an attacker
who values stealthiness more than the benefit of being active, the equilibrium shifts
towards faster attacker strategies and slower defender strategies. This means that
the attacker is hiding more often, and thus the equilibrium strategy of the defender is
























Figure 6.2: Best-response plots for players with periodic strategies.
6.2.2 Exponential-Periodic Strategies
Consider the case in which the defender is playing an exponential strategy and the
attacker is playing a periodic strategy.
Theorem 6.2. The Tireless game, with the defender playing an exponential strat-
egy and attacker playing a periodic strategy, has a strongly dominant strategy with
attacker’s periodic rate λ∗a = − 1λd ln
ca
λdpccl
and defender’s exponential rate λ∗d = Λd,0.
Remark. The attacker plays the strongly dominating strategy, and the defender plays
the minimum rate.
Proof. Let Xd ∼ exp(λd) and let Xa ∼ periodic(λa). In this case, at the beginning
the attacker picks a random period, πa, and then every πa the attacker pauses her
malicious activity for α. On the other hand, the defender picks a random time instance
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= ca(λa − 2α) + pccle−λdλ − pccle−λdα.









fX(u)(pccw − cm)du︸ ︷︷ ︸
Detection
= cm(e
−λdλa − 1) + pccw(e−λdα − e−λdλa).
In order to find the best strategies for both the attacker and defender, we compute
derivatives of both payoff functions, ∂βa/∂λa = 0 and ∂βd/∂λd = 0. For the attacker:
∂βa
∂λa
= ca − λdpccle−λdλa .








The strategy λ∗a is a strongly dominating strategy for the attacker, where ca ≪
λdpccl. The reason is that, for all rates λa < λ
∗
a, the derivative ∂βa/∂λa > 0, and for
all rates λa > λ
∗
















The payoff of the defender, β∗d , is decreasing for an increasing rate λ. Thus the
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defender has to play at Λd,0, the smallest rate possible to get the highest possible
payoff.
6.2.3 Exponential Strategies
In this section, we study the game in which both players use exponential strategies.
First, we find the form of the expected payoff of both players for any renewal strategy;
then we compute the expected payoffs for the exponential strategy. Finally, we find
the best response strategies for both players and the Nash equilibrium of the game.
Let y = Za(t) be the age of the renewal process for the attacker; it is the time
since the last move, i.e., y = t− ta. Let x = Zd(t) be the age of the renewal process
for the defender, i.e., x = t− td.
Let the size-bias density function of random variable X with pdf f be f ∗(z) =
1−F (z)
µ
, where µ = E[X] and F (z) is the cdf of X. The size-bias cumulative distribu-




. Based on the results in [40], limt→∞ fZ(t)(z) = f
∗(z)
and limt→∞ FZ(t)(z) = F
∗(z). Consider the following cases:




















fa,t(x) [1− Fd,t(x+ α)] dx














f ∗a (x) [1− F ∗d (y + α)] dx (6.5)










fa,t(y) [Fd,t(y + α)− Fd,t(y)] dy







f ∗a (y) [F
∗
d (y + α)− F ∗d (y)] dy (6.6)











We compute the time-averaged payoff for the attacker as:
βa =−cl(pc)(C∗1 + C∗2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Detection







The first term is the cost incurred when the check fails and the attack is detected;
the second term is the gains of the attacker when the attack is running; and the third
term is the costs of the action of hiding.
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We also compute the time-averaged payoff for the defender:











The first term is the benefit of detecting the attack (this is when the integrity check
determines that the state was tampered), and the second term is the cost incurred
when an action is performed.
Consider the case of the exponential underlying random variable. Specifically, let
Xa ∼ exp(λa) and Xd ∼ exp(λd).
Theorem 6.3. The Tireless game with exponential strategy has a Nash equilibrium









Remark. In this equilibrium the player, not sure if an attacker is targeting the
system, plays a low rate to maximize his payoff. The attacker will follow suit and
play at a slow rate. The defender is certain to detect the attacker in the equilibrium.
Note that while in theory, the defender can decide not to play to get the maximum
payoff, the defender must play or else the attacker would also stop playing, which is
not an equilibrium.
Proof. First, observe that fa,t(z) = λae
−λaz, f ∗(z) = 1 − F (z)/E(X) = λa(e−λaz),














In computing the best response for each player, we find the rate that maximizes
the payoff given the rate of the other player. If the payoff function is convex then
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the global maximum represents the best response, dβx
dλx
= 0. For α ≪ 1
λ
, the ex-
ponential terms in the probabilities are approximated as e−αλ ≈ 1 − αλ. Using the















< 0 for λa > λ
∗
a. Thus the best response








Moreover, the defender’s payoff is strictly decreasing at this rate:
dβd
dλd







Note that the root of the payoff function, βd(λ
∗
d) = 0, determines the sign of
the payoff function. When the root is positive, the payoff is positive in the interval
0 < λd < λ
∗
d; it becomes negative after the root. On the other hand, if λ
∗
d < 0, then
the payoff is strictly negative for all λd.
The following equation is the closed-form root of the defender’s payoff as a function





m + 2λacm(α + 1)p+ (α− 1)2p2
2cm
− λacm − pα + p
2cm
. (6.8)
For all positive values of λa and α, the root is positive: λ
∗
d ≥ 0. Thus the defender
will always have a positive payoff. To maximize the defender’s utility, the defender




The Nash equilibrium of this game is λ∗a = BRa(BRd(λ
∗
a)).
We consider the case in which the defender decides to inflict damage on the at-
tacker.
Theorem 6.4. For a defender attempting to inflict damage on the attacker, a Nash










Proof. Increasing λd increases the best response rate of the attacker, thus forcing the
attacker to hide more frequently. We propose that the defender play a strategy that
leads to βd = 0. The goal of this strategy is to harm the attacker before the detection
succeeds. We define the best response strategy for the defender in response to the





m + 2λacm(α + 1)p+ (α− 1)2p2
2cm
− λacm − pα + p
2cm
.
On the other hand, the attacker’s best strategy is highlighted in Equation (6.7).









The Nash equilibrium is computed as λ∗d = BRd(BRa(λ
∗
d)).
Figure 6.3 shows the game profile for both defender goals. The plot shows the two
goals that the defender can consider.
6.3 Discussion
In the integrity-checking game, the defender has to pick a strategy to maximize the




















Figure 6.3: Game profile with pure Nash equilibrium.
In the following, we use the Tireless game to reason about the strategy that the
defender has to take to be effective in performing detection and to maximize the
payoff given the attacker’s strategy.
We start by assuming that the attacker and the defender do not adapt, that is,
when they pick a strategy they do not change it during the life of the game. If
the defender and attacker play a periodic strategy, then the optimal strategy for the
defender is to play one of the Nash equilibria in Section 6.2.1. The Nash equilibrium
represents the strategy that maximizes the defender’s utility for any attacker action.
In a Nash equilibrium, no player can improve his or her payoff by playing a different
strategy. We note that, in this case, it is the type of the attacker that dictates which
Nash equilibrium the defender is going to play. If the attacker cares more about the
cost of her actions than about the benefit she gains from being active, she will play
at a slower rate, and thus the defender will increase his checking rate in order to
achieve fast detection and reduce the losses incurred from the attacker’s activities.
On the other hand, if the attacker cares most about being stealthy, then she will play
at higher rate, thus hiding more. Therefore the Nash equilibrium strategy for the
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defender would be to lower his rate since the attacker is active for smaller periods of
time, and thus the probability of detection is small.
However, to be realistic, the attacker can easily detect the random offset that the
defender picks and the period (an adaptive attacker trivially knows if the defender
plays the NE strategy). By observing two action steps of the defender, the attacker
can adapt her strategy and synchronize her actions with those of the defender and
thus effectively hide entirely. The defender’s rational choice is to stop playing because
every move incurs a cost −ca without any benefit. The defender may want to increase
her rate to the point where the attacker is always hiding, but the cost of such a strategy
is too high. (In theory the machine would not be usable, as it would be checking the
state all the time.)
Thus, the defender has to use an exponential strategy that is unpredictable by the
attacker. That is, the attacker cannot synchronize her actions with the defender’s.
Thus the situation is a Tireless game in which the attacker plays a periodic strategy
and the defender plays an exponential strategy. We study this in Section 6.2.2 and
show that the attacker has a strongly dominating strategy. In the period-exponential
game, the attacker plays her dominating strategy, and the defender plays the strategy
with the slow rate to maximize utility. The defender will slowly attempt to find the
issues until the state corruption is eventually detected.
By playing a periodic strategy, the attacker takes a small risk of being predictable.
(Her actions should be stealthy, but leakage of information is always a possibility.)
Although it is optimal, the attacker might consider the choice of playing periodically
too risky. Therefore, in Section 6.2.3, we analyze and find the Nash equilibrium for a
Tireless game in which both the attacker and the defender play with exponential
strategies. Our analysis shows that we have two Nash equilibria depending on the
goals of the defender. If the defender is interested in inflicting damage on the attacker,
the defender plays a Nash equilibrium (NE 2) that uses lots of resources for the sake
of detecting the attacker; at this equilibrium, the utility of the defender is kept at 0.
However, if the defender wants to maximize his utility, then he selects the smallest
possible rate as a strategy. This equilibrium has the attacker playing at a relatively
slow rate in response to the defender’s slow rate. The defender slowly checks the
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state of the system and eventually detects the attacker while being unpredictable to
an adaptive attacker.
Thus, in conclusion, the best strategies for the attacker and defender to play are
the exponential strategies at either of the Nash equilibria. In the following section,
we show real-world scenarios along with numerical results for the game.
6.4 Case Studies
We consider two real-world scenarios in which the Tireless game is NE strategy
can be used by a defender to optimize detection. For each strategy, we numerically
evaluate the impact of the choices made by the attacker and defender on the payoffs
of the players and the resilience of the system.
6.4.1 Host State Validation
Consider PowerAlert’s checking strategy. PowerAlert checks the integrity of
an untrusted host by using an external trusted checker. A host’s kernel implements
services that are used by applications to access hardware. Applications trust the
kernel to provide the services correctly. An attacker can breach the trust by manip-
ulating the services and the kernel (e.g., by implementing a rootkit). The defender
attempts to detect the changes by querying the state of the machine and comparing
it to the known good state. The NE strategy of the Tireless game provides the
optimal strategy that the defender should use. In this section, we introduce the sys-
tem model, the threat model, and the resiliency strategy to be used by an external
defender. Figure 6.4 shows the architecture of the system with the trusted checker.
System model
Let the system be a single host with a kernel providing services (i.e., system calls).













Figure 6.4: Architecture of a host state checker.
of the kernel. Let Mt = (mt,mt(1), . . . ,mt(n)) be the state of the system at time
t. The state mt describes the content of memory at time t. Memory is accessed one
element at a time, so we consider I to be the set of memory locations such that
|I| = n is the size of the memory. Let M gt be the known good state of the memory at
time t, and let M̂t be the measured state at time t. An attacker will manipulate the
state of the system to change the services provided by the kernel. (For example, to
implement a key logger, the keyboard driver is modified.) Thus, a state manipulation
is expressed as ∃X ∈ |I| s.t. ∀x ∈ X ,Mt(x) ̸= Mt(x)g.
Threat model
We assume that the machine is completely untrusted. However, we assume that the
attacker does not manipulate the hardware state of the system. Moreover, we assume
that the external checker can perform the checking actions without interference by the
attacker. Noninterference can be guaranteed by looking at side-channel information,
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for example. Finally, the attacker will attempt to evade detection by hiding the
changes he or she makes (ROP [19]).
Tireless testing strategy
The integrity checker measures the state of the system at time t, M̂t and compares it
to the known good state M gt . If the states match, then the system is uncompromised;
however, if the states are different, then the system’s integrity has been compromised.
Facing an attacker who wants to evade detection, we model the scenario as aTireless
game between the defender and attacker.
The probability pc in this scenario relates to the number of addresses the defender
inspects at each action. If the defender selects the address set Si = (i1, i2, . . . , ik) in
I, then pc is the ratio of checked addresses to the total addresses, pc = Si/|I|. The
defender has to use an exponential strategy because the attacker can easily adapt to
a periodic strategy. Our defender has two options, either to play at the minimum
rate Λd,0 or to play aggressively. By playing at the minimum rate, the defender
maximizes his payoff regardless of the attacker’s strategy. In practice, the defender
will be using the least amount resources for protection and will eventually detect an
attack. However, if the defender wants to affect the fraction of time the system’s
state is corrupted, then he must play the aggressive NE.
6.4.2 Network State Validation
In this section, we consider the validation of network state for software-defined net-
working (SDN) architectures. SDN architectures decouple how traffic is forwarded
(control plane) from the traffic being forwarded (data plane), and such architectures
provide a logically centralized but physically distributed set of programmable con-
trollers that control the network’s switches [73]. These controllers can query the
switches for their state to check consistency as well as set forwarding behavior based
on high-level application intents.
Figure 6.5 shows a typical SDN-based local area network (LAN), with the data
193
plane links as solid lines and control plane connections shown as dashed lines. In
OpenFlow-based SDN architectures, each switch implements data plane forwarding
behavior through one or more forwarding tables [97]. Each forwarding table consists
of flow entries, where each flow entry has a set of matching attributes (e.g., source
and destination MAC addresses) and a set of instructions (e.g., forward traffic out a
specific port) [97]. Incoming packets are matched against a switch’s forwarding table.
Controllers may choose to keep local copies of the forwarding behavior that they
have issued to switches, or they may collectively keep copies of the forwarding behavior
in a distributed way and share this information among themselves for later reference.
The OpenFlow protocol includes STATS REQUEST and STATS REPLY messages that
controllers use to learn the switches’ forwarding behavior states to correct for any
state inconsistencies. However, an attacker could compromise the network’s switches’
forwarding tables to redirect or duplicate data plane traffic without the controllers
being aware [8, 100], leading to potential data exfiltration.
System Model
Assume a network of N end hosts, S switches, and C controllers. Furthermore,
assume that the system’s forwarding state Σ is the union of the switches’ states ΣS
and the controllers’ states ΣC . Also assume that a state is observable by some view
V . Thus, the defender’s observable states for switches and controllers are V (ΣS) and
V (ΣC), respectively. A defender generates V (ΣS) by asking the controller to query
the switches for their states.
An attacker may wish to modify one or more of the switches’ states for her benefit
without the controller being aware of it [100]. Thus, an attacker could lie or equivocate
about the state ΣS when queried, resulting in the defender’s receiving V (ΣS) = V (ΣC)
even when ΣS ̸= ΣC . We say that the network has been compromised1 when ΣS ̸= ΣC ,
and our goal is to validate the system state by checking whether ΣS = ΣC even when
1Under non-malicious assumptions, this would be an example of state inconsistency brought
about by distributed consensus issues in SDN state updates. While we do not explicitly attempt to










Figure 6.5: A typical local area network SDN architecture with compromised
switches. Solid lines represent physical data plane links, dashed lines represent
logical control plane connections, and tables represent the state stored by each
networking device.
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we cannot trust V (ΣS).
Threat Model
We assume that the controllers are trusted; that is, our view of their state V (ΣC)
is considered trusted. We also assume that one or more switches are not trusted;
that is, we cannot trust V (ΣS). We assume that the defender has full administrative
control over end hosts, as is common in a corporate enterprise network. End hosts are
considered to be trusted during the detection and response integrity checking, though
we note that in practice, attackers will likely target these end hosts after targeting
the network as part of their strategy.
Tireless Testing Strategy
We use data plane validation to validate ΣS. The defender chooses a pair of two end
hosts n1, n2 ∈ N and initiates a connection between them via a probing packet. If
the hosts are reachable but their reachability is not allowed by the forwarding rules in
ΣC and not reflected in V (ΣS), then this suggests ΣS ̸= ΣC . Our goal is to make the
probing packets indistinguishable from regular packets when viewed by the attacker.
If the SDN architecture operates as a Layer 2 switch with flow entries’ matching
attributes matched based only on end host MAC addresses, a naive testing approach
would be to consider the reachability of all end hosts from all other end hosts, requir-
ing that up to O(N2) messages be sent at regular intervals. However, if more specific
attributes are included in the matching attributes (e.g., matching up to Layer 4 for
TCP/UDP port numbers [97]), then the number of possibilities becomes significantly
larger. Previous work has considered automatic packet generation for minimal check-
ing of every link or maximal checking of every forwarding rule in the network based on
ΣC [141], but such tests attempt to check for what connections ought to exist rather
than the (ostensibly larger) set of connections that ought not to exist. Thus, our
universe of possible probing packets includes the complement of flow entries’ match-
ing attributes. As the space of probing packets is large, the defender has to check a
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subset of the routes at random times. Using the Tireless game’s Nash equilibrium
strategy, the defender would compute pc as the number of probes sent each time over
the universe of probe packets. The defender playing the NE strategy profile computed
for the exponential-exponential game will maximize the resiliency of the system.
In the following section, we evaluate numerically the impact of different defender
and attacker choices on the average payoffs and NE strategies.
6.4.3 Evaluation
In this section, we numerically evaluate the Tireless game with exponential actions
playing the Nash equilibrium strategies.
We study the effect of the probability of detection per check, pc, and the cost of an
attacker’s action and the benefit of the attack, ca, on the Nash equilibrium strategy
and average payoff when the NE strategy is used. We set the cost of a defender’s
action cm = 1, the cost/benefit of losing/winning cl = cw = 10
6, and the hiding
duration α = 0.1. In Figure 6.6, we observe that when pc increases, the NE rate
for the attacker increases, as the attacker has to hide more to accommodate for the
higher detection rate per check. That is, the attacker’s increasing NE rate decreases
the probability of detection. Moreover, when ca increases, the attacker’s NE rate
decreases because it costs more to take actions. The same behavior is observed for
the defender. However, when pc > 0.012, the impact of ca becomes negligible. Thus
the defender can make his rate independent of the attacker’s payoff by increasing the
coverage.
In Figure 6.7, we observe the optimal payoff, which is the payoff of the NE strategy
for the attacker and defender as a function of pc and ca. In general, the attacker’s
payoff is negative, so during the game the attacker is attempting to minimize the
losses due to the eventual detection. Moreover, when pc increases, the payoff of
the defender increases while the payoff of the attacker decreases. However, when ca
increases, the defender’s payoff decreases while the attacker’s payoff increases. The
attacker’s increase is due to the decrease in the NE rate, in which the attacker is



































Figure 6.6: The effect of pc and ca on the Nash equilibrium strategy for
exponential-exponential games.
decreases the defender’s payoff because of the decrease in the probability of detection.
6.5 Related Work
Researchers have proposed many security games to find optimal defender strategies.
In particular, the extensive literature survey by Manshaei et al. [81] provides a struc-
tured and comprehensive overview of research on security and privacy in computer
and communication networks that uses game-theoretic approaches. Likewise, Roy et
al. [102] provide a taxonomy of game-theoretic models in network security.
Hamilton et al. [52] and Roy et al. noticed that all games assume that moves are
synchronous and instantaneous. The assumption of instantaneous moves hinders real
implementations because in most systems, actions take a variable amount of time,
and the attacker does not wait for the defender to make a move. Those shortcomings
were first addressed by FlipIt. FlipIt [125] is a continuous-time game that attempts
to defend resources from being taken by stealthy attackers. In FlipIt, the players’
actions are asynchronous, and the state of the game is not known to the players;
198
























Figure 6.7: The effect of pc and ca on the payoff for exponential-exponential games.
limited information is released to players when an action is performed. The authors
assume that an action is instantaneous and is always successful.
FlipIt assumes unrealistically that the attacker exists and that the defender gains
information about the attacker just by performing an action. In contrast, Tireless’s
goal is to model the defender’s attempts to detect the attacker’s existence. Moreover,
FlipIt assumes that actions are instantaneous and always successful, while in reality
an action needs time to be performed and might fail. Tireless models the duration
of an attacker’s action (α) and the chance that the defender’s action might fail to
detect the attacker (pc).
Various variants of FlipIt have been proposed. FlipThem covers multiple re-
sources [75]. In the fight over resources in a system, the authors study two models
whereby the attacker must either take over all the resources to compromise the sys-
tem, or take over just one resource. Laszka et al. [76] propose economically optimal
mitigation strategies in the presence of targeted and non-targeted covert attacks,
whereby the response resets the resource to a safe state. Zhang et al. [142] propose
a two-player, non-zero-sum game for protecting against a stealthy attacker if a fully
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observable defender has resource constraints. Feng et al. [41] propose a three-player
version of FlipIt with an insider player that trades information for profit. However,
the authors assume that the defender is the leader and that both the attacker and
insider are followers. Farhang and Grossklags [38] propose FlipLeakage to model sce-
narios in which an attacker incrementally takes over a resource until it is completely
compromised, while the defender has to decide when to perform a costly recovery
action.
6.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we proposed the Tireless game, a more realistic alternative to FlipIt.
In this game, a defender attempts to check the integrity of a system while an attacker
hides to evade detection. TheTirelessmodel is more realistic than FlipIt; it assumes
that the defender’s actions might fail, and that actions are not instantaneous.
We studied the game for a set of strategies and found that the best strategy for
the attacker and the defender is the exponential strategy. We computed the optimal
strategies by finding the Nash equilibrium. Tireless can be used to solve real-world
problems as it realistically models asynchronous actions of players, failure of actions,
and duration of actions. We showed that those optimal strategies can be used to
solve two real-world security problems: host integrity checking (i.e., PowerAlert)




Traditionally, security research focused on intrusion prevention as the main method to
protect systems and networks. However, we know that successful attacks are bound
to happen due to misuse, misconfiguration, or zero-day vulnerabilities. Thus, we
have to mitigate attacks by detecting them and then by deploying the appropriate
adaptive response measures. As such, to protect systems, we need to evolve our pro-
tection strategies beyond prevention and detection to include response. An effective
response strategy adapts to the reality that attacks are inevitable; it reacts by pre-
serving services especially in systems where the service provided is critical, such as
the power grid. We refer to the system’s ability to mitigate attacks while maintaining
an acceptable level of service as cyber resilience.
In this dissertation, we presented a trustworthy cyber resilience strategy to protect
systems against lateral movement attacks as well as misuse attacks and integrity
tampering attacks. Lateral movement describes an attacker’s motion from an initially
compromised host to a set of target servers. In particular, we presented a set of
practical and theoretically based components of the cyber resilience strategy. The
components include monitors that detect unwanted activity in a system and response
engines that contain the detected activity. Finally, we proposed a method to check
the integrity of the components using current measurements as a trustworthy side-
channel.
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7.1 Review of Contributions
First, we presentedKobra, a kernel-level monitor that collects low-level kernel events
and maintains a process-centric view of the system. The system view is a representa-
tion of the state of the host that Kobra is monitoring. We use the system view for
three purposes: (1) anomaly detection, (2) specifying security policies, and (3) net-
work connection correlation. In anomaly detection, the system view is transformed to
a discrete-time complex-valued signal. Kobra uses the transformed signal to learn
the baseline behavior of applications in the system using sparse representation dictio-
nary learning. The transformation preserves timing information which the learning
algorithm exploits to find patterns for anomaly detection.
To achieve resilience against lateral movement, we presented a hierarchical scheme
to detect and respond against lateral movement in a network. The lateral movement
detection scheme fuses data between host-level and network-wide agents. Host-level
agents, such as Kobra, maintain a process communication graph that records in-
ternal process communication and network events. Those agents correlate incoming
and outgoing network events locally. Then, the network correlations are sent to the
network-wide agents. The network-wide agents combine the captured relationships
to generate a view of lateral movement chains in the system. The fusion scheme
tolerates out-of-order network correlations without requiring a global clock.
The response and recovery engine learns the parameters of the attack and adap-
tively responds by changing the connectivity in the network. The engine learns the
parameters of the attack while it is in progress. The response engine’s objective is
to achieve a globally asymptotic stable disease-free equilibrium. While our goal for
any response mechanism is to be generic, a mechanism should be specifically designed
to mitigate a specific class of attacks, so as to achieve an optimal response. Since
attack models differ in complexity, some being nonlinear, a one-size-fits-all solution is
not possible. Our proposed detection and response scheme depends on agents to col-
lect information and deploy adaptive responses. The agents need to be untampered;
otherwise, our resilience scheme fails to achieve its goals.
We proposed PowerAlert, an out-of-box checker that addresses the issue of
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trusting agents for monitoring and response in the resiliency strategy. PowerAlert
uses electric current, as a trustworthy side channel, to continuously check the runtime
state of the executing software. The electric current measurements provide an accu-
rate view of the computation performed by the processor. It incrementally checks the
state of a system through a randomly generated integrity checking program.
Finally, we find the optimal strategy for the runtime integrity checking of a
large state against an evasive attacker. We formalize the problem as Tireless, a
continuous-time game. We find the Nash equilibrium of the game when the attacker
and defender play a set of periodic and exponential strategies. Tireless shows that
the optimal strategy for the defender is to spend a small amount of resources on de-
fense in order to eventually detect an attacker with minimal performance overhead.
7.2 Future Directions
Moving forward, we believe cyber resilience strategies that employ automated detec-
tion and response methods will be the standard in protecting systems against adaptive
human attackers. Those systems will dynamically assign resources for protection ser-
vices as attacks unfold. They will automatically relocate services and resources to
ensure acceptable service, and dynamically assign resources to the task of monitoring
fusion and optimal response calculation. In the process, systems will have to adapt to
malicious and abnormal behavior, learn about the launched attacks and then mitigate
them.
We have to thoroughly study resilient architectures to lead the way for practical
and sound implementations. In particular, we should push towards establishing cyber
resiliency as a scientific discipline of study. To do this, we should (1) establish a theory
of cyber resiliency, and (2) design a complete and customizable end-to-end resilient
architecture that apply to any target system. A theory of cyber resiliency will abstract
the system into its essential parts and relate the information available to the fusion
and response mechanisms via the control avenues in the system to resiliency metrics.
The theory should establish fundamental results in the field regarding the limits of
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any resiliency mechanism, determine the effect of increasing protection resources on
resiliency, and, finally, enable one to evaluate and compare resiliency mechanisms.
In the second path, we believe work should be done to to design and implement
cyber resiliency as a service (RaaS), that can be incorporated into any system, such
as an enterprise system (e.g., office network), a cyberphysical system (e.g., power
grid), a cloud network, or an Internet of Things realization (e.g., smart home net-
work). For each type of target system, one should create a model of the system state
and the service-level metrics that need to be maintained. Then, one should deter-
mine the data sources that can be used to monitor the state. Monitors should be
deployed at different levels of the system to collect information about the occurring
events. The observed events should be used to establish views of the system, leading
to the detection of malicious activity. Response algorithms should be designed to
allocate monitoring and protection resources against an attack. Such dynamic allo-
cation might include learning more about a possible attack by increasing monitoring,
adapting the system state to contain an attack, or recovering the system to a secure
state.
The response phase of cyber resiliency requires knowledge of an attacker model.
The attacker model allows the response strategy to predict future attack steps and
contain them. However, if the attack model does not realistically reflect the behavior
of an attacker, the response mechanism’s action might be either too pessimistic or
ineffective. Finding accurate attack models is difficult when we consider that the
attacker is a human actor. Thus, it is essential that we work on improving attack
models and find methods to refine them as the attack unfolds in a system. One can
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Sanders, and P. Webster. The Möbius modeling tool. In Proceedings. 9th
International Workshop on Petri Nets and Performance Models, pages 241–
250, 2001.
[26] Shane S. Clark, Benjamin Ransford, Amir Rahmati, Shane Guineau, Jacob
Sorber, Wenyuan Xu, and Kevin Fu. WattsUpDoc: Power side channels to
nonintrusively discover untargeted malware on embedded medical devices. In
the 2013 USENIX Workshop on Health Information Technologies, Berkeley, CA,
2013.
[27] Reuven Cohen, Shlomo Havlin, and Daniel Ben-Avraham. Efficient immuniza-
tion strategies for computer networks and populations. Physical Review Letters,
91(24):247901, 2003.
[28] Lockheed Martin Corporation. Cyber kill chain.
[29] Lockheed Martin Corporation. White paper: Seven Ways to Apply the Cyber
Kill Chain® with a Threat Intelligence Platform. Technical report, Lockheed
Martin Corp., 2015.
207
[30] Gideon Creech and Jiankun Hu. A semantic approach to host-based intru-
sion detection systems using contiguous and discontiguous system call patterns.
IEEE Transactions on Computers, 63(4):807–819, Apr 2014.
[31] Derek L. Davis. Secure Boot, 1999.
[32] George W. Dunlap, Samuel T. King, Sukru Cinar, Murtaza A. Basrai, and
Peter M. Chen. ReVirt: Enabling intrusion analysis through virtual-machine
logging and replay. ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review, 36:211–224, Win-
ter 2002.
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